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This dissertation is comprised of three essays, each studying a different aspect related to topics
in the economics of education. These pieces each study how education production is impacted
by different economic forces. In Chapter 1, I study the effect of racial segregation on academic
achievement, college preparation, and postsecondary attainment in a large, urban school district.
To achieve racial balance in its oversubscribed magnet schools, this district conducted separate
admissions lotteries for black and non-black students. Because the student body was predominantly
black, administrators set aside disproportionately more seats for the non-black lottery. In 2003, the
federal Office of Civil Rights forced this district to instead use a race-blind lottery procedure that
dramatically increased racial segregation for incoming magnet school cohorts. In an instrumental
variables framework that exploits both randomized lottery offers and this unanticipated shock to
racial makeup, I test whether student racial composition is a meaningful input in the education
production function. As a baseline, I use admissions lotteries to estimate the effect of enrolling in a
magnet middle school on student outcomes. In general, enrollment returns are comparable between
magnet and traditional schools, but I estimate heterogeneous magnet school effects across student
subgroups. Education production is sensitive to school racial composition in that segregation has a
deleterious impact on student outcomes. I find that increasing the share of black peers in a cohort
decreases student achievement in math, science, and writing for black students with losses primarily
driven by high-aptitude black students. Further, racial segregation erodes high school graduation
rates and also decreases college attendance by reducing enrollment at 2-year institutions among
female black students. These findings suggest that policies aimed at achieving racial balance in
schools will likely increase aggregate educational achievement.
Chapter 2 examines the impact of competition due to charter school entry on the level and compo-
sition of expenditures within traditional public school districts (TPSDs). I leverage policy changes
affecting the location and timing of charter entry to account for endogenous charter competition.
TPSDs respond to competition by allocating resources away from instructional and other expendi-
tures towards new capital construction. Using teacher contracts, I show the declines in instructional
spending are partially due to decreases in collectively bargained salaries. Competition depresses
appraised housing valuations, in turn causing TPSDs to lose property tax revenues resulting in a
decline in overall spending.
In Chapter 3, which is joint work with Richard Mansfield, we use administrative panel data to de-
compose worker performance into components relating to general talent, task-specific talent, general
experience, and task-specific experience. We consider the context of high school teachers, in which
tasks consist of teaching particular subjects in particular tracks. Using the timing of changes in
the subjects and difficulty levels to which teachers are assigned to provide identifying variation, we
show that a substantial part of the productivity gains to teacher experience are actually subject-
specific. Similarly, while three-quarters of the variance in the permanent component of productivity
among teachers is portable across subjects and levels, there exist non-trivial subject-specific and
level-specific components. Counterfactual simulations suggest that maximizing the test-score con-
tribution of task-specific experience and task-specific talent can increase student performance by as
much as .04 test score standard deviations relative to random assignment of teachers to classrooms.
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Evidence from the Introduction of
Race-Blind Magnet School Lotteries
1.1 Introduction
The landmark ruling of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka ended de jure school segregation and
spurred integration efforts across the United States education system. The assumption underlying
this significant ruling is that peer racial composition is a meaningful parameter in the education
production function. Specifically, the ruling assumes that racial isolation negatively affects student
outcomes, particularly for minorities. However, the effects of peer racial composition on academic
outcomes are still not known. Despite early integration efforts, schools nationwide are growing
increasingly de facto segregated (Lutz, 2011; Reardon et al., 2012; GAO, 2016; Clotfelter et al.,
2006, 2008). In the 2013-2014 school year, over 6.5 million students attended schools in which over
90 percent of their peers were black or Hispanic.1 Moreover, the proportion of these high-minority-
share schools have tripled over the last two decades nationwide (Orfield et al., 2016). With de
1Author’s calculations using Common Core Data from the National Center for Education Statistics.
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facto school segregation on the rise, the causal link between peer racial composition and student
achievement has important implications for policy.
I directly test whether peer racial composition is a meaningful input in the education production
function by studying the end of race-conscious admissions lotteries in a large urban school district
(LUSD). The change in the lottery regime caused magnet middle schools that were nearly racially
balanced to instead enroll a high share of minority students. Thus, more specifically, I explore how
a large, exogenous increase in racial segregation impacts education production in the context of
magnet middle schools.
Magnet schools provide an ideal setting to explore the impact of racial segregation on academic
outcomes. Magnets were established as a voluntary alternative to compulsory desegregation efforts
such as busing. While being publicly funded and operated, magnets differ from traditional public
schools in that they are permitted to offer specialized programs and services. They also differ in
that they lack specified catchment boundaries allowing them to attract enrollment district-wide,
hence the term “magnet.” In theory, districts attempting to discourage racial segregation would
establish magnet schools touting specialized programs within high-minority-share neighborhoods
to encourage non-resident white families to enroll their children. Thus, magnets promote racial
balance in what would otherwise be high-minority-share schools.2 Despite racial balance being a
founding principle motivating the creation of magnet schools, we have no understanding about the
extent to which racial composition drives magnet school achievement gains.
I begin by establishing the baseline effect of enrolling in a magnet school on achievement and
postsecondary attainment using two decades of LUSD admissions lotteries. To my knowledge, this
is the longest panel of lotteries used in any admissions lottery study to date.
I then isolate the impact of segregation on the effectiveness of magnet enrollment using an in-
strumental variables design based on a change in the district’s lottery system. Prior to 2003, the
LUSD ran magnet school lotteries separately for black and non-black students. This provided dis-
trict administrators full control over the racial composition of each magnet school’s entering class,
allowing them to artificially improve racial balance in their admissions by providing disproportion-
2However in practice, Rossell (2003) finds that adding voluntary magnet programs to a district’s desegregation
plan has little impact on exposure to other races.
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ately more offers to non-black students. In 2003, the federal Office of Civil Rights required the
district to consolidate their race-specific lotteries to a system with a combined, race-blind lottery.
Under this regime, the racial composition of the entering class simply mirrored the racial makeup
of the lottery pool. Importantly, the lottery consolidation only affected the admissions process and
left other school policies and staffing unaffected.3 Thus, the shift in the racial composition of a
school’s incoming class induced by the lottery consolidation was a function of how disproportion-
ately non-black the pre-consolidation lottery winners were compared to the racial composition of
the school’s entire lottery pool.
Following this intuition, my identification strategy isolates the exogenous variation in magnet school
racial composition that is induced by the district’s lottery consolidation. I instrument for the racial
composition in a student’s enrolled school using a measure of how “disproportionately non-black”
the school’s lottery winners were prior to the consolidation interacted both with indicators for
whether the student won a magnet lottery and whether the lottery occurred after the consolidation.
The main threat to this strategy is if unobserved determinants of the effect of magnet offers on
student outcomes are trending differentially for magnets with more “disproportionately non-black”
lottery offers in 2002. I test this assumption in an event study framework and find no evidence for
the existence of such trends.
The other main threat to the validity of this strategy is if changes to the composition of the lottery
pool after 2002 are correlated with “disproportionately white offers” for magnet schools. I test for
changes in the composition of the lottery pool and find that magnet schools with more “dispro-
portionately non-black offers” have a higher proportion of black and male applicants following the
termination of race-based admissions. However, I find no evidence for such compositional changes
in baseline achievement both with and without conditioning on student race and gender. Thus,
by exploring heterogeneous effects of segregation by race and gender subgroups, I remove these
compositional effects and can isolate the impact of segregation on student outcomes.
My baseline estimates reveal that the returns to magnet middle school enrollment are generally
3Staff reshuﬄing could result from changes in student demographics (Jackson, 2009), however, none of these
changes were structurally linked with the lottery consolidation and can be considered part of the segregation treat-
ment.
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statistically indistinguishable from traditional school enrollment. However, magnet middle schools
boost science achievement for non-black students as well as female students and increase ACT test
taking among non-black as well as low-achieving students. The localized nature of the returns
to enrolling in a magnet school relative to a traditional public school highlights the similarities
between both institutions. Thus, I argue that any effects of segregation I estimate within magnet
schools may generalize to traditional schools more broadly.
The end of race-conscious admissions lotteries led to an immediate 7 percentage point increase
in segregation among magnet middle schools as measured by the exposure index (Massey and
Denton, 1988).4 This is slightly larger than the immediate change in exposure index resulting from
the end of forced busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg (Billings et al., 2014) or roughly half the effect of
court-ordered desegregation in the 1960s and 70s (Rossell and Armor, 1996; Guryan, 2004). Racial
segregation in magnet schools has deleterious effects on student outcomes. A 10 percentage point
increase in the share of black peers at a student’s school, which represents an increase in racial
segregation, decreases student achievement by roughly 0.12 standard deviations. These effects are
slightly larger than other estimates in the literature (Hoxby, 2000; Hanushek et al., 2009; Billings
et al., 2014). Similar to Hanushek and Rivkin (2009), I find that the losses from segregation are
concentrated among high-achieving black students. Segregation in magnet middle schools also
decreases the probability of graduating from high school and later enrolling in a two-year college
for black female students. I conclude that racial balance is an important input into the education
production function in the magnet schools I study.
This paper makes contributions to two different literatures. First, I add to the literature studying
the returns to magnet schools by providing the first lottery evidence of magnet middle school
attendance on postsecondary attainment. Second, I contribute to the literature studying the effect
of school segregation and peer racial composition on student academic outcomes by leveraging a
natural experiment that is better suited to isolate the contribution of peer racial composition on
education production. Previous studies have assessed changes to peer racial composition driven
by naturally-occurring variation in cohort- or classroom-specific racial composition (Hoxby, 2000;
Vigdor and Nechyba, 2007; Hanushek et al., 2009; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2009). However, by
4The exposure index measures the probability that a randomly chosen peer of a minority student is also a minority.
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construction, these strategies exploit very small differences in peer composition, which plausibly
affect student achievement differently than policy reforms that generate large changes to peer
composition.5 Other studies assess policies that induce large shifts to peer composition including
the introduction of court-ordered desegregation (Guryan, 2004; Johnson, 2015) or its termination
(Billings et al., 2014; Lutz, 2011; Gamoran and An, 2016), inner-city busing (Angrist and Lang,
2004), a change in attendance zone boundaries (Vigdor and Nechyba, 2007; Billings et al., 2014),
or mandated school reassignment (Hoxby, 2006). However, these studies do not occur in settings
where students are explicitly randomly assigned to schools. Because my empirical strategy leverages
explicit randomization into schools both before and after a large shift in school segregation, I am
able to provide a cleaner estimate than previous work of how school racial composition enters into
the education production function.6
My findings are highly relevant for current education policy along a number of dimensions given
the resurgence of de facto segregation over the past few decades in the United States. Because
racial balance appears to be an important factor in the education production of magnet schools,
districts may have additional justification to implement policies that promote racial balance.7 In
fact, President Obama’s “Stronger Together” initiative currently proposes to double the amount of
federal funding up to $120 million to improve voluntary integration efforts across the Unites States,
of which magnet programs are a part.
I argue that the negative effect of segregation is likely not specific to the magnet school setting.
Magnet schools in this district are statistically comparable to traditional schools with regard to
5Vigdor and Nechyba (2007) estimate racial composition peer effects using classroom-specific variation, but
conversely find no evidence for racial peer effects when limiting the analysis to year-to-year variation induced by
changes to school assignment policies.
6Two recent studies assess the effect of peer racial composition using regression discontinuity methods based on
entrance exams scores to attend highly selective exam schools in Boston and NYC (Abulkadiroglu et al., 2014; Dobbie
and Fryer, 2014). Students narrowly gaining admission experience a drastically less racially diverse peer group than
narrowly failing students. However, unlike in my setting, these works are unable to disentangle the effect of peer
racial composition from the effect of attending the exam school (e.g., having access to better teachers or academic
resources).
7Enforcing racial diversity in schools is complicated due to recent court cases, such as Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 in 2007, which prevents districts from utilizing race in admissions
decisions.
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school inputs, peer composition, and general returns. Moreover, my identification strategy is able
to isolate the effect of segregation from any magnet-school-specific inputs. Thus, the deleterious
effect of segregation on academic outcomes plausibly generalizes to other school settings.
1.2 Prior Literature
Why might segregation impact student outcomes? One potential explanation involves the direct
influence of a student’s peer group. In Florida, Carrell and Hoekstra (2010) find that black and
low-income students are more likely to experience domestic violence at home and are more likely to
be disruptive in the classroom as a result. Further, Carrell and Hoekstra (2010) find that exposure
to these disruptive peers decreases reading and math test scores for students in this district.8 If
these findings hold in this LUSD, then increasing the share of black students in schools may increase
the probability of exposure to disruptive peers.
In a similar vein, because black students in this district have lower average test scores compared
to non-black students, increasing segregation will decrease the average baseline achievement of a
student’s peer group. There is a large, mixed literature testing for the presence of peer achievement
effects in schools (see Sacerdote, 2011, for a detailed review). Also, if teachers adjust how they
teach to the aptitude of the average student, then decreasing peer baseline achievement could affect
the teacher’s contribution to student outcomes (Duflo et al., 2011).
It is impossible to separately isolate the contribution of these different potential mechanisms within
my setting. Instead, this study provides estimates for the combined impact of these channels
on student outcomes. However, my reduced-form estimates of segregation effects are inherently
interesting to researchers and policy makers faced with evaluating the impact of a policy that will
influence school racial composition.
This study contributes to two different literatures. The first is a growing, but mixed literature
estimating the short- and medium-run academic returns to attending magnet schools using lotteries.
Several studies estimate limited-to-no academic returns to magnet attendance (Cullen et al., 2006;
8However, Hoxby (2006) find little support for “bad apple” models of peer effects (Lazear, 2001) in North Carolina.
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Cullen and Jacob, 2007; Engberg et al., 2014; Abulkadiroglu et al., 2014; Dobbie and Fryer, 2014;
Dee and Lan, 2015), while other studies estimate academic returns roughly half the magnitude
of lottery-based charter school estimates (Hastings et al., 2012; Bifulco et al., 2009; Crain et al.,
1992).9 However, we know far less about long-run returns to magnet enrollment particularly in
the United States.10 Several studies explore the short-, medium-, and long-run returns to open
enrollment systems, of which magnet schools are a part (Hastings et al., 2006, 2009; Deming,
2011; Deming et al., 2014). However, these studies do not separately report estimates for magnet
enrollment. Hoxby (2003a) asserts that magnet schools should not be considered as part of the
school choice movement. She argues that magnet schools predate the school choice movement and
do not provide the same financial incentive structure as traditional school choice programs, which
further motivates separately exploring the contribution of magnets. I contribute to this literature
by providing the first estimates of the effect of magnet middle school enrollment on postsecondary
attainment using administrative lottery data.
Second, this work contributes the to large literature assessing the impact of segregation and racial
peer effects on student outcomes.11 While there are studies that estimate little-to-no effect of
student racial composition on achievement (Gamoran and An, 2016; Hoxby, 2006; Abulkadiroglu
et al., 2014; Dobbie and Fryer, 2014), many others find that increasing the share of minority
peers negatively impacts student achievement and behavioral outcomes particularly among minority
subgroups and females (Vigdor and Nechyba, 2007; Angrist and Lang, 2004; Billings et al., 2014;
Lutz, 2011; Hoxby, 2000; Hanushek et al., 2009; Guryan, 2004; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2009).12
9Cullen et al. (2006) and Engberg et al. (2014) estimate limited academic returns to magnet enrollment, but do
find behavioral effects. Crain and Thaler (1999) find positive effects for some types of magnets and null or negative
effects for other types.
10Crain and Thaler (1999) provide qualitative evidence about postsecondary attainment and compare in-depth
survey responses between lottery winners and losers for 110 students. Park et al. (2015) find that magnet attendance
increases the probability of attending college in rural China.
11See Gamoran and An (2016) for a full review of the literature estimating the effect of segregation on student
achievement and Vigdor and Ludwig (2008) for a review on the literature relating neighborhood and school segregation
to the black-white test score gap.
12Hoxby (2006) find evidence that peer race and ethnicity have only slight effects once conditioning on peer
achievement. Vigdor and Nechyba (2007) find that school-wide racial composition does not significantly predict
achievement, however, they estimate that non-black students in classrooms with a disproportionately share of black
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To overcome selection biases, several studies rely on quasi-random variation in racial composition
generated from naturally occurring cohort- or classroom-specific variation (Hoxby, 2000; Vigdor
and Nechyba, 2007; Hanushek et al., 2009; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2009). However, the quasi-
randomization that allows these studies to address selection concerns also reduces variation in
racial composition. Thus, these studies identify effects from small fluctuations in racial composition,
which potentially impact student outcomes differently than a large, policy-induced shift in racial
composition. Other studies utilize policies that induce large shifts in racial composition such as
the introduction of court-ordered desegregation (Guryan, 2004; Johnson, 2015) or its termination
(Billings et al., 2014; Lutz, 2011; Gamoran and An, 2016), inner-city busing (Angrist and Lang,
2004), the change in attendance zone boundaries (Vigdor and Nechyba, 2007; Billings et al., 2014),
or mandated school reassignment (Hoxby, 2006). These studies lack the benefits that exploiting
randomized peer composition provides for identification, though each study goes to great lengths
to show that identification assumptions are met.
The work of Billings et al. (2014) is most closely related to this paper. Billings et al. (2014) study
the effect of segregation induced by the end of forced busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg. They
compare students who live in the same neighborhood and school zone prior to the end of forced
busing, but then live on opposite sides of newly drawn school catchment boundaries, and thus, go
on to attend schools with drastically different peer racial compositions. They find that segregation
decreases high school achievement for white and minority students as well as lowers graduation
rates and college attendance among white students and increases crime among minority males. My
study compliments this seminal work in several ways. First, schools in my setting were not allocated
compensatory resources due to increased segregation, which Billings et al. (2014) show may have
mitigated segregation effects for younger cohorts in their study.13 Second, because students in my
setting are explicitly randomly assigned to schools both before and after the segregation treatment,
my natural experiment is better situated to cleanly isolate racial composition effects.14 Finally,
students experience lower math achievement. Johnson (2015) finds that school desegregation positively impacts
adult outcomes and that school funding is the likely mechanism as opposed to any direct effects of changing the racial
composition of a student’s peers.
13Reber (2010) also shows that desegregation effects are attributed to increased resources rather than peer racial
composition.
14For example, Billings et al. (2014) find that white students who are assigned to school zones with a higher
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because this article and the work of Billings et al. (2014) are studying different policies, both studies
generate policy implications better suited to their respective settings. The findings of Billings et al.
(2014) are more relevant to assessing the effects of a policy that ends forced busing and changes
school zone assignment, while the results in my setting are more relevant to understanding the
implications of a policy that ends race-conscious lotteries.
Two recent papers have explored the effect of peer composition on student outcomes using regression
discontinuity evidence. These studies compare students near the admissions cutoffs to top exam
schools in Boston and New York where the composition of peers are drastically different for students
who are provided or denied admission (Abulkadiroglu et al., 2014; Dobbie and Fryer, 2014).15 Unlike
the previous work in this literature, these studies exploit both random variation in test scores near
the admissions threshold as well as markedly different peer compositions experienced by treated
and untreated students. However, it is difficult to distinguish peer effects from the effect of exposure
to the exam school teachers and other exam-school-specific effects. Further, students who narrowly
gain and lose admission will be near the bottom and top of the baseline achievement distributions
in their respective schools. Thus, these regression discontinuity studies potentially conflate any
effect of a student’s class ranking with peer effects.
I contribute to the literature studying segregation and racial peer effects by providing a cleaner
estimate than previous work of how school racial composition enters into the education production
function. My study strikes a balance between the studies exploiting explicit random variation
in peer composition and those with large, policy-driven shocks to peer composition. Because
students are randomized into magnet schools, my empirical strategy benefits from the virtues of
randomization, while simultaneously leveraging a large shift in peer composition due to the end of
race-based admissions. Further, relative to the regression discontinuity studies, my work is able
to study heterogeneous effects across baseline student aptitude and does not suffer from conflating
any class ranking effects.16 Additionally, I am able to isolate the effect of peer composition from
minority share are more likely to attend a magnet program. They note that if the relative returns to magnet
attendance are positive then this would place upward pressure on segregation effects for white students.
15Exam schools are highly selective magnet schools with strict admissions cutoffs.
16Because the 6 exam school cutoffs hit at different parts of the student baseline achievement distribution, the
estimates in Abulkadiroglu et al. (2014) reflect both high- and moderate-ability students.
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magnet-specific effects because the segregation effects I estimate are identified off of changes in the
returns to magnet enrollment across the policy change.
1.3 Institutional Details
1.3.1 Magnet Schools in this Large Urban School District
Magnet schools are similar to traditional schools in that they are publicly funded and run. All
LUSD schools use the same general curriculum, but magnet schools can differ in the instruction
methods used. Magnets can also emphasize a particular focus of instruction, e.g., performing arts,
bilingual education, STEM, or International Baccalaureate programs. Magnet schools also differ
in that they lack specified catchment boundaries allowing them to attract enrollment district-wide,
hence the term “magnet.” In addition to the district’s traditional public schools, the LUSD ran
roughly 10 to 15 magnet middle schools throughout the time period of this study.17
As was the case with magnet school programs across the United States, a founding principal
underlying this LUSD’s magnet program was to improve racial balance and prevent “white flight.”18
Shortly after the first LUSD magnets launched in the 1970s, the district also began the mandatory
busing of subsets of students to desegregate schools through the 1990s. During this time, the
magnet program coexisted with forced busing as an effort to discourage middle class families from
migrating to the suburbs.
Because the demand for these magnet schools far outpaced supply, magnet seats were filled via
randomized lotteries. To ensure racial balance, the district held separate school-specific lotteries
for black and non-black students.19 Each year the district set a universal target for the racial
composition of new enrollment that reflected the racial make-up of the district as a whole. The
district then set admissions quotas for each race-specific lottery to hit the district-wide target.
Black students disproportionately applied to magnet schools and so students in the non-black
17Exact magnet counts are purposefully withheld to maintain the anonymity of the district.
18See Rossell (2005) for a detailed history of the emergence of magnet schools in the United States.
19This was a common practice for over-subscribed magnet schools across the nation. Chicago, for example, ran
separate lotteries based on both gender and race (Cullen et al., 2006).
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magnet lottery had a better chance at receiving a seat offer than students in the black magnet
lottery. In the 2002-03 school year, the federal Office of Civil Rights required the LUSD to instead
utilize a combined, race-blind lottery system comparable to the system in Durham County, North
Carolina (Clotfelter et al., 2008).20
In addition to filling magnet school seats with lotteries, the LUSD allowed students to apply to
transfer to other oversubscribed traditional schools via the same centralized lottery. Students
applied to up to three schools and did not specify a rank ordering. Lotteries would occur at the
school-grade level. Once offers were made, students had roughly one week to respond. If parents
failed to respond, the seat was forfeited to the next waitlisted student. Conversely, if a student
accepted a seat in a school, they were automatically withdrawn from all other waitlists. Once the
district was notified that an offered seat had been declined, subsequent offers were determined by
moving down a randomized waitlist.21
To explore how race-blind lotteries impact the racial composition within LUSD schools, Figure 1.1
presents the percentage of black students enrolled in traditional and magnet schools across the time
period of the study, 1998 to 2007. From 1998 to 2002, even despite utilizing race-specific lotteries,
magnet schools enrolled a higher proportion of black students than traditional schools.22 Upon
the introduction of race-blind lotteries in 2003-04, district administrators lost their control over
the racial balance of admissions resulting in roughly a 7 percentage point increase in the black-
share within magnet schools over the next few years. This also equates to roughly a 7 percentage
point increase in the exposure index (Massey and Denton, 1988), which is slightly larger than the
immediate increase in the exposure index due to the end of forced busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg
20The LUSD moved to a simple race-blind lottery as opposed to a race-neutral, place-based system such as
with Chicago Public Schools (Ellison and Pathak, 2016) where student need is instead determined using aggregated
residential neighborhood information. Other districts approached achieving race-blind balance within schools by
instead incorporating information about student socioeconomic status and achievement as in Wake County, North
Carolina (Clotfelter et al., 2008; Hoxby, 2006).
21The LUSD generated separate waitlists for students with and without siblings at the school. After the initial
lottery offers and responses were processed, any seats not accepted were offered to students on these waitlists in an
alternating fashion. Specifically, the first seat was offered to a student on the sibling waitlist, then the next was
offered from the non-sibling waitlist, the third was from the sibling waitlist, etc.
22Recall that magnet schools are purposefully built in particularly high-minority-share neighborhoods.
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(Billings et al., 2014) or half the size of court-ordered desegregation in the ’60s and ’70s (Rossell
and Armor, 1996; Guryan, 2004).
1.3.2 No Child Left Behind
In 2002, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act was signed into law as an update to the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Because NCLB and race-blind lotteries were contempora-
neously implemented, NCLB accountability measures present potential concerns for the validity of
my identification strategy. In this section, I provide details about how this district implemented
NCLB. I reserve discussing how NCLB may threaten the validity of my estimation strategy for
section 1.6.3 to allow the discussion to occur in the context of my empirical method.
One of the earliest consequences for a school that fails to meet NCLB-determined academic re-
quirements is to be subjected to increased competitive pressures through school choice. Starting in
the 2003-04 school year, the LUSD required every school in the district (including magnet schools)
to set aside a portion of their seats for the NCLB placement mechanism.23
Students across the district were ranked using two inputs: the student’s baseline testing and family
income, where a low ordinal ranking signified the lowest achieving, poorest students in the dis-
trict. Students currently assigned to a traditional school in the district that failed to meet NCLB-
determined academic measures were eligible to participate in NCLB school placement. Prior to
the magnet school admissions lotteries, students from these failing schools would rank order up
to three schools in the district into which they wanted to transfer. The student with the lowest
rank (most disadvantaged) was placed first, followed by the next lowest ranked student, and so
on. If the student’s first-choice school had no more NCLB seats, then the student would be placed
in their second-, or third-choice school. If all three choices were full, the student would not re-
ceive a NCLB-seat and would have to apply to the magnet school lotteries as before. After NCLB
seats were determined, the (now race-blind) magnet school lotteries were carried out normally as
explained in Section 1.3.1.
23LUSD magnet middle schools set aside roughly 20% of their 6th grade seats for NCLB placements.
12
1.4 Data
I use student-level administrative data from a large urban school district (LUSD) from 1998 through
2007. As a condition to access their data the district requested complete anonymity. This district
enrolls roughly 40 to 60 thousand students in traditional schools and 10 to 15 thousand students
in magnet schools in any given school year.
In addition to statewide standardized achievement measures and student demographic information,
the district also merged student information to several medium- to long-run student outcomes.24
The district matched student records with ACT/SAT achievement from 2004 through 2011 and
also merged student records for each graduating class with college information collected by the
National Student Clearinghouse (NSC).25 NSC data include the name of each college attended and
the student’s major as well as whether and when they graduated from college. The NSC covers all
public and private, two- and four-year postsecondary institutions in the United States allowing me
to observe students attending out-of-state schools.26 The LUSD combined these student-level data
with admissions lottery records over the same time horizon which includes information on which
schools each student applied in a given year and any seat offers. From waitlist information, I can
deduce which students were offered seats during the initial wave, hereafter denoted “initial offers.”
I am also able to observe basic demographic information for all teachers in the district and, for
2000 and later, I can link students to their teachers and classmates.
Prior to any sample restrictions, I observe roughly 50,000 6th grade students from 1998 to 2007.27
Data contain students attending any of the traditional or magnet public schools within the LUSD,
thus I cannot observe any students who transfer to a charter or private school or who move out of
24Student demographic information is only available from 2000 onward, but I infer student race for earlier years
based on which race-specific lottery they utilize.
25I am in the process of matching NSC records to all lottery applicants to avoid any differential attrition concerns.
26See Dynarski et al. (2013) for further details on NSC coverage rates across institution types.
27Starting in 2008-09, the LUSD set aside a third of the seats within several of the most popular magnet schools for
a separate selective-admissions lottery. Students who were categorized as “Gifted” or who tested in the top 5 percent
of the district on a standardized test in 6th grade were eligible to apply using this smaller lottery. Because eligible
students were disproportionately white, the share of white students in magnet schools rapidly increased starting in
the 2008-09 school year. As a result, for this paper, I restrict attention to lotteries occurring prior to 2008-09.
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the area entirely. Table 2.1 presents descriptive information about the student composition of this
LUSD. Column 1 shows that for the full sample, the district is composed almost entirely of black
and white students (cumulatively 92%) with a majority of the district being comprised of black
students. Because race-specific admissions lotteries were conducted separately for black and non-
black students, I similarly consider students of other races and ethnicities as non-black throughout
the paper.
On average, black students in this district test below non-black students. Figure 1.2 displays the
distribution of scores among black and non-black students in the district broken out by subject.
The distribution of black test scores lies to the left of the non-black distribution for all subjects.
I restrict the sample to students who have applied to at least one magnet school in 6th grade
and do not come from a sending school with automatic placement in a magnet middle school.
The sample is further restricted to students without sibling priority in any magnet lottery. I also
exclude lotteries from the 2001-02 school year because observable student characteristics fail to
balance across lottery winners and losers for this year. Finally, given these restrictions, I drop any
students who are the only ones in the district applying to the given magnet lottery after other
sample restrictions are applied.
Column 3 of Table 2.1, shows descriptive information for all students in this baseline estimation
sample. The sample for this table further requires that students have valid reading achievement
outcome information. These conditions limit the sample to roughly 6,000 student-year observations
for 6th grade applicants. Students in this lottery sample are more likely to be female and black.
Additionally, students in the magnet school regression sample have higher baseline achievement
performance across all four subjects.
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1.5 Estimating the Baseline Returns to Magnet School Atten-
dance
1.5.1 Magnet School Lottery
As a baseline, I establish how magnet schools compare to traditional schools by estimating differ-
ences in school inputs, peer composition, student achievement, and long-run outcomes for students
who win a magnet school lottery seat relative to those who do not. Specifically, I estimate
yil = ρMil + Γ2l + γ
′Xi + il (1.1)
where yil is an outcome for a student i who applies to the 6th grade magnet school lottery l.
28 Xi
is a vector of pre-lottery demographics that includes indicator variables for student race (black or
non-black) and gender. Similar to Billings et al. (2014), Xi also includes quadratics in pre-lottery
baseline reading, math, science, and writing achievement as well as missing achievement indicators
for each subject. Mil is an indicator equal to one if the student enrolled in a magnet school
during the year following the lottery.29 Γ2l are lottery indicators, i.e., a unique application-school-
by-lottery-type-by-year combination.30 Because the unit of observation is a student-application,
standard errors are two-way clustered by student and the enrolled school after the lottery in 6th
grade. Further, regressions are weighted by the inverse of the number of applications submitted by
the given student so that each student contributes equally to the regression.
If magnet enrollment were randomly assigned, then ρ would give the causal effect of attending a
magnet school in sixth grade on the given outcome. However, any unobserved determinants of
student outcomes that also correlate with the decision to enroll in a magnet school would bias my
estimate of ρ. The existence of such unobservable correlates seems likely given that magnet school
applicants have higher baseline standardized test scores and are more likely to be black than other
traditional public school students as shown in Table 2.1. As a result, I instrument for magnet
enrollment using exogenous lottery offers through the following first-stage:
Mil = Γ1l + β
′Xi + piZil + ηil , (1.2)
28Note that if a student applies to multiple 6th grade lotteries the outcome is common across all lotteries.
29Students are counted as being enrolled in a magnet school if they are enrolled for one or more days.
30Lottery type refers to black, non-black, or race-blind lotteries.
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where Zil is an indicator variable equal to one if student i receives an initial magnet offer in lottery
l. In a comparable estimation framework, Angrist et al. (2016) use both initial lottery offers as well
as whether the student ever receives an offer as instruments to assess the returns to charter school
enrollment. However, in my setting, because students do not rank their school preferences and once
a student accepts a lottery offer they are automatically removed from all other waitlists, subsequent
lottery offers from randomized waitlists are endogenous. To see this, suppose that wealthier families
are more willing to wait for a magnet seat in their preferred school and that low-income families
are more likely to accept the first school offer they receive. If this is the case, then while the set
of initial offers should have an equal share of high- and low-income students offered a seat, there
would be a disproportionately larger share of lottery offers that are ever extended to high-income
families from the waitlist because they are more likely to have waited.
To ensure that lotteries only compare students with the same probability of receiving a magnet
offer, all regressions condition on a full set of lottery effects Γl. Students share a lottery if during
the same year they apply to enter the same magnet school in 6th grade through the same type of
lottery (i.e., black, non-black, or consolidated race-blind lottery).
If offers are truly random, then predetermined student characteristics should be equally represented
or “balanced” across winners and losers within lotteries. I test for lottery balance by regressing
student observables on an indicator for whether the student receives a magnet offer to the given
lottery’s reference school and a full set of lottery fixed effects. Column 5 of Table 2.1 presents
these tests. Overall, lottery winners are comparable, on average, to losers across these observable
dimensions. While not statistically different than zero, students with higher baseline reading test
scores appear marginally less likely to win a seat. The combined p-value in the table is for a test
of joint significance of the difference between lottery winners and losers across all outcomes. While
this difference is statistically different at the 10 percent level, these individual offer differentials are
comparable to other lottery studies in the literature (e.g., Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2011; Angrist et al.,
2016). As a precaution, I include race and gender as well as baseline subject-specific achievement
as controls throughout the paper. Overall, these regressions provide evidence that initial lottery
offers are indeed random.
My empirical strategy is similar to Cullen et al. (2006), who estimate the reduced-form effect of
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receiving a school lottery offer on achievement using application-level data. Cullen et al. (2006)
are inherently interested in the effect of additional schooling options and so they focus on the
direct effect of receiving a lottery offer on student outcomes. Because I am specifically interested
in estimating how magnet enrollment impacts student outcomes, I instead pursue a two-stage least
squares approach (2SLS) that provides the causal effect of enrolling in a magnet school among the
set of students that are induced to enroll by the randomized lottery offers (Imbens and Angrist,
1994).
Further, it is important to emphasize that just as in Cullen et al. (2006) and Cullen and Jacob
(2007) the unit of observation in my setting is a student-application. Thus, students who apply to
multiple magnet schools will appear in the data multiple times.31 As a result, a student who wins
one lottery and loses another will contribute to the treatment and control groups of the respective
lotteries. Cullen and Jacob (2007) explain that this setup still produces consistent parameter
estimates because randomization ensures that while some proportion of lottery winners also won
seats in other lotteries, this is also the case among lottery losers. However, Cullen and Jacob (2007)
go on to highlight that multiple applications do influence the magnitude of the treatment effect,
because differences in outcomes between average lottery winners and losers will be more similar. An
alternate strategy would be to employ a nested model that incorporates multiple magnet choices and
student-year-level data similar to Angrist et al. (2016). However, subsequent segregation estimates
(see Section 1.6) require the use of application-level data. Thus, to make baseline estimates more
comparable with subsequent segregation estimates, I utilize the same application-level data in both
settings.32
1.6 Estimating Peer Racial Composition Effects
To ensure a pre-determined level of racial diversity in its magnet schools, this LUSD held separate
lotteries for black and non-black students to fill seats in oversubscribed schools through the 2002-
31Students can apply to up to 3 magnet schools and, on average, students end up applying to 2 schools.
32I also estimate baseline regressions using a framework comparable to Angrist et al. (2016) and find qualitatively
similar results. These estimates are available upon request.
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2003 school year. In subsequent years, this district instead used race-blind lotteries where the
probability of winning the lottery was the same regardless of race or ethnicity. Figure 1.3 depicts
how the introduction of race-blind lotteries impacted the probability of winning a magnet lottery
each year by student race. Prior to 2003, because black families disproportionately applied to
magnet schools, non-black students were 15 to 20 percentage points more likely to win an initial
lottery seat than black students. The introduction of race-blind lotteries, denoted by the reference
line in 2003, caused both black and non-black students to have nearly identical, albeit much lower
probabilities of winning.
The large drop in win probability is due to the introduction of NCLB. In addition to consolidating
the lotteries, in 2003-04, the LUSD implemented NCLB school choice requirements by setting aside
seats in schools across the district for the least-proficient, lowest-income students from failing schools
(see Section 1.3.2). Because these students are disproportionately black, the NCLB placement
mechanism potentially further exacerbated racial imbalance within magnets. The drop in the
probability of acceptance reflects the decrease in the number of seats available to be filled via
lottery.
While the lottery regime change impacted the composition of the 2003-04 entering class, the adjust-
ment did not directly affect magnet school curricula or teaching staff.33 However, the concurrent
passage of NCLB presents a possible confounder. Thus, simply comparing estimates of the effect
of attending a magnet school before and after the lottery consolidation in 2003 would conflate any
NCLB-driven impacts.
Prior to 2003-04, the racial composition of students receiving initial seat offers did not necessarily
reflect the composition of the full applicant pool, but did so thereafter. To account for potential
structural changes outside of the termination of race-based lotteries, I leverage the fact that the
size of the shift in racial composition due to the lottery change varied by how “disproportionately
non-black” that lottery offers were for each school. I measure how “disproportionately non-black”
that offers were for a given school by calculating the difference between the percentage of black
33Staff reshuﬄing could result from changes in student demographics (Jackson, 2009), however, none of these
changes were structurally a part of the lottery consolidation and can be considered as part of the re-segregation
treatment.
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students in the lottery pool for the school to the percentage of black students receiving an initial
magnet school offer during the 2002-03 school year (denoted DPB
′02).
This DPB
′02 measure is useful because the larger the difference the larger the potential shift in
school racial composition upon the lottery consolidation. To see this, consider a school (call it
school A) where 80% of all 2002 lottery applicants were black, but due to the dual lottery system,
the school offered only 50% of the seats to black students. Conversely, consider school B, where
50% of the students in the applicant pool were black and also that 50% of the students who received
an initial offer were black. Supposing that the composition of the student applicant pool remains
roughly the same from 2002 to 2003, after consolidation, the composition of black students offered
a seat to school A would rise to 80% to mirror the applicant pool, while the racial composition of
lottery offers to school B would remain unchanged.
I isolate the exogenous shift in school segregation due to the establishment of race-blind lotteries
in an instrumental variables framework by estimating the following first-stage:
%Blackil = ρDPB
′02
l ∗ 1(Post ′02)t ∗ 1(Offer)il (1.3)
+ κ11(Post
′02)t ∗ 1(Offer)il + δ1DPB′02l ∗ 1(Offer)il
+ θ11(Offer)il + γ
′
1Xi + Γ1l + νil
with the accompanying second-stage
yil = β %̂Blackil (1.4)
+ κ21(Post
′02)t ∗ 1(Offer)il + δ2DPB′02l ∗ 1(Offer)il
+ θ21(Offer)il + γ
′
2Xi + Γ2l + il ,
where %Blackil is the leave-one-out percentage of black students enrolled in the school that student
i attends during the year following the given lottery l.34 DPB
′02 is the 2002-03 application-
school-specific difference in the percentage of black students in the lottery applicant pool relative
to the percentage receiving an initial offer for the application school in lottery l. Specifically,
DPB









, where Nj is the total number of applicants
34The leave-one-out percentage is calculated by ignoring the reference student and calculating the given statistic
for the remaining 6th grade students in the school.
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to school j.35 1(Post ′02) and 1(Offer) are indicator variables respectively equal to one if the
current lottery occurs strictly after the 2002-03 school year or if the student receives an initial seat
offer in lottery l.36 Xi and Γl are respectively the same set of pre-lottery characteristics and lottery-
specific fixed effects from equation (1.1). Similarly, standard errors are again two-way clustered by
student and school-after-lottery and regressions are weighted by one over the number of applications
submitted by the given student in the given year so that each student equally contributes to the
estimation.
I instrument for the percentage of black students using the triple interaction between my measure of
lottery racial imbalance (DPB
′02), an indicator for whether the lottery occurred after 2002, and an
indicator for whether the student received an initial magnet offer. To understand the interpretation
of the coefficient ρ, consider two schools A and B where the 2002 lottery racial imbalance in A is
one percentage point larger than B. ρ provides the differential effect of winning an initial seat after
2002 in the lottery for school A relative to B on the percentage of black students that will enroll
in the student’s 6th grade school. In other words, this instrument isolates the variation in racial
composition that is induced by the change in the lottery regime across schools with differing levels of
underlying lottery racial disparity. The identification assumption is that unobserved determinants
of magnet school effects are not trending differentially by DPB
′02. For example, suppose that
the schools in the neighborhoods experiencing “white flight” are also steadily declining in their
effectiveness. If “white flight” is trending upwards in neighborhoods where high-DPB
′02 schools are
located, then trends in “white flight” and school effectiveness would bias my estimates.37 However,
in Section 1.6.1, I provide event studies that show little evidence for differential trends in school
composition and productivity across school DPB
′02 values.
This empirical strategy is able to account for a variety of potential confounders. First, I can
handle changes to policies that are contemporaneous with the lottery consolidation. As long as
other policy changes do not differentially affect schools by DPB
′02 then these potential confounders
35Several magnet schools have DPB
′02 values near 0, while others have values ranging up to a 10 percentage point
difference.
36
1(Post ′02) and DPB
′02 main effects are absorbed by lottery effects.
37Gamoran and An (2016) find that upon the termination of court-ordered desegregation in Nashville, academically
selective magnet schools became more white and non-selective magnets more black.
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will be controlled for directly by the interaction between the initial offer and post-2002 binaries.
Further, suppose that magnet schools that have higher lottery racial disparity are generally better
schools. Then, the interaction between DPB
′02 and the initial offer binary controls for this directly
as long as the effectiveness of these schools do not change after 2002.
It is important to note that while I am estimating the effect of a plausibly exogenous racial composi-
tion shock, I will be unable to disentangle any other composition changes happening simultaneously.
For example, because black students in this district test lower on average than non-black students,
an exogenous increase in the percentage of black students at the school will likely decrease the
average baseline standardized achievement as well. Thus, if peer achievement is the actual mech-
anism that affects own achievement, an ability peer effect would appear like a race peer effect.
However, this is still an interesting parameter to estimate. Policy-makers aiming to increase racial
diversity in schools are simultaneously changing not only racial make-up, but also socioeconomic
status, aptitude, and an array of other student and teacher demographics (Jackson, 2009). As a
result, while I am unable to isolate the effect of racial diversity on student outcomes, per se, I can
estimate parameters relevant to real-world desegregation policies.
1.6.1 Validating the Instrumental Variables Strategy
In this section, I test whether the causal effect of winning a magnet seat trends differentially by
my measure of pre-consolidation lottery racial disparity. I assess the power of my first stage by
regressing the reduced form analog of equation (1.3) where I interact initial offers and lottery racial













l · 1(Offer)ijl + θ11(Offer)il + γ′1Xil + Γl + νijl
where variable definitions are analogous to equation (1.3). Estimates are relative to 2002, the year
prior to the lottery consolidation. If my empirical strategy successfully isolates the variation in
racial composition driven by the lottery consolidation, then, relative to 2002, the effect of winning
a seat in a more racially disparate 2002 lottery pool on the racial composition within the student’s
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enrolled school should be zero for 2001 and earlier and positive thereafter. Figure 1.4 displays
estimates of ρt for this regression.
38 Indeed, prior to the consolidation, aside from 1999, winning
a seat to a magnet school with a larger DPB
′02 value has no statistically distinguishable effect
on the percentage of black peers that eventually attend the lottery winner’s school of enrollment.
However, upon the termination of race-conscious lotteries in 2003, I estimate that winning a seat to
a school with a one percentage point larger DPB
′02 value increases the proportion of black peers
attending the school where the lottery winner enrolls by roughly 1.8 percentage points. Because
the effect of magnet seat offers on the enrolled school racial composition does not systemically differ
by DPB
′02 prior to the consolidation, this is evidence for the absence of trends in unobservables
that correlate with DPB
′02 and also drive school racial composition.
Figure 1.5, presents estimates of the same regression, but for several important dimensions of school
composition and student achievement. Panels 1.5a, 1.5b, and 1.5c respectively present estimates
for the leave-one-out averages of baseline math and reading achievement and free/reduced lunch
eligibility among peer 6th graders within the student’s enrolled school.39 As expected, peer baseline
math and reading scores drop after the lottery consolidation, while free-lunch eligibility increases.
Because black students in this district have lower baseline achievement on average and a higher
proportion are free-lunch eligible, it is not surprising that an exogenous increase in the proportion
of black students within a grade affects student composition along these dimensions.
Panels 1.5d through 1.5f present event studies for several student outcomes. Figures for the remain-
ing outcomes explored in this paper can be found in Appendix A. To concisely summarize outcomes,
I create indices by respectively taking averages over standardized versions of the achievement out-
comes (i.e., math, reading, science, and writing achievement) and the postsecondary attainment
outcomes (i.e., college enrollment, 2-year, 4-year, and “Top 50” rank enrollment). Foreshadowing
future results, student achievement and postsecondary attainment is negatively affected by winning
a seat to a school with a higher DPB
′02 value after 2002, while ACT test taking is unaffected. In
general, the absence of pre-trends across these regressions supports the identifying assumptions
underlying my estimation strategy.
38Recall from section 3.4 that I exclude lotteries from 2001 because they fail to balance on observable student
characteristics.
39Free/Reduced price lunch eligibility comes from school-level averages from the CCD.
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1.6.2 Differential Attrition
After testing whether the lotteries balance across observable student demographics, the other pri-
mary concern that potentially invalidates the lottery empirical strategy is differential attrition from
the analysis sample between winners and losers. Suppose that wealthier families who lose a magnet
lottery are more likely to send their child to a private school. Because I cannot observe students
in private schools, this attrition would cause the lottery losers with valid outcome data to be
disproportionately lower income, invalidating the empirical design.
In Table 1.2, I test whether lottery winners are less likely to be: enrolled within the district during
the year following the lottery, missing math achievement outcome information, and missing NSC
data.40 In Panel A, I test differential attrition for my baseline estimates by regressing each attrition
outcome on an indicator equal to one if the student was awarded an initial offer to the lottery’s
magnet school as well as a full set of lottery fixed effects. Lottery winners are indeed less likely to
be missing from my analysis sample across all outcomes though the difference is only statistically
significant for missing NSC outcome information. Magnet winners are about 2 percentage points
less likely to be missing NSC outcome data.41 In Panel B, I test whether differential attrition
presents a threat to my segregation estimates from equation (1.3) by further interacting the initial
offer variable with a post-2002 indicator and with DPB
′02. In order to be an issue, rates of
differential attrition must vary by DPB
′02 levels and must shift after 2002. I find no evidence
that the rates of differential attrition systematically change after 2002 across lotteries with varying
DPB
′02 levels. Thus, differential attrition does not present a concern for my estimates of the effect
of racial composition on student outcomes.
40The virtue of NSC data is that students can be matched even if they leave the sample. However, because the
LUSD only matched NSC data for graduating cohorts, differential attrition is still a concern in my setting. I am in
the process of matching NSC data to all students in the lottery sample.
41The magnitude of differential attrition is comparable to the differential attrition estimated by Cullen et al. (2006)
in the open enrollment system in Chicago.
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1.6.3 Accounting for No Child Left Behind and Changes in the Composition of
Applicants
Both the introduction of NCLB and the lottery consolidation in 2003-04 could plausibly alter the
composition of the pool of magnet lottery applicants. NCLB requires all schools in the district
to reserve seats for the poorest and least proficient students enrolled in failing schools. Further,
students who utilize the NCLB placement mechanism do not apply to magnet lotteries. As a result,
one might expect the lottery pool to include students with higher baseline achievement and family
resources than before NCLB. The lottery consolidation itself may also influence the composition of
the lottery pool. Recall that the lottery consolidation caused the probability of winning a seat for
non-black relative to black students to fall. Thus, one might expect to see a higher share of black
students in the lottery pool after the consolidation.
While randomization ensures that average lottery winners and losers are comparable along observ-
able and unobservable dimensions, changes in the composition of the lottery pool will impact how
to interpret the treatment effect. To see this, suppose that NCLB increases the baseline achieve-
ment within the lottery pool as explained above. Even though the composition of the lottery has
changed, lottery offers are still randomized among the new pool. Thus, the average baseline charac-
teristics of winners and losers will be indistinguishable, but now both average lottery winners and
losers have a higher baseline aptitude. This is only a problem if the effects of magnet enrollment
are heterogeneous along the same dimension.
Suppose that magnet schools relative to traditional schools are better equipped to teach high-
aptitude than low-aptitude students and that the effect of attending a magnet school is constant
over time. Under these assumptions, because the lottery pool is filled with higher achieving students
after 2002 and magnets are better at instructing these students, then the average returns to winning
a magnet lottery would be larger after 2003 than before. However, this change simply reflects
the shift in the composition of the lottery pool and not any change in the underlying education
production of magnet schools over time.
This consideration does not pose a problem for my baseline estimates in Section 1.7, but potentially
threatens how I identify segregation effects in Section 1.8. Specifically, if treatment effects are het-
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erogeneous and if the composition of lottery applicants changes before and after 2002 differentially
based on how disproportionately non-black the school’s lottery offers were in 2002 (DPB
′02), this
would bias my estimated impact of segregation.




j ∗ 1(Post 2002)t + γt + θj + jt, (1.6)
where yjt is the average of a pre-lottery characteristic across students applying to enter magnet
school j in year t.42 DPB
′02 is defined as in (1.3), 1(Post 2002) is an indicator variable equal to
one if the lottery occurs after the lottery consolidation in 2002, while γt and θj are respectively year
and school effects.43 Consider two schools A and B, where school A has a one percentage point
larger DPB
′02 value than school B. β provides the average difference in how the lottery pool for
school A changes after 2002 relative to how school B changes for the given student characteristic.
Table 1.3 depicts estimates of equation (1.6) for student race, gender, and baseline achievement. I
find that the proportion of black students applying to schools with a one percentage point higher
DPB
′02 value increases by 0.8 percentage points. I also find that the proportion of female students
decreases by 0.3 percentage points. The largest DPB
′02 value in the district is roughly 10, meaning
that terminating race-based lotteries shifts the share of black and female students in the lottery
pool for the school with the largest 2002 lottery racial disparity upwards by 8 percentage points
and downwards by 3 percentage points, respectively. Considering that on average, the proportion
of black students applying to a magnet school is roughly 0.80 and the proportion of female applying
is 0.55, I consider these compositional changes as second-order concerns.
Additionally, I find no statistically significant shifts in baseline achievement. Because the lottery
composition is only changing with respect to race and gender, estimating the effect of segregation
separately by these two groups will eliminate these compositional effects. In order for this to be
successful, it needs to be the case that conditional on race/gender the composition of students
is fixed. In Panel B, I test for changes in achievement within race and gender categories by
restricting the sample appropriately. Indeed, I am unable to detect significant changes to the
baseline achievement of the lottery applicants within these groups. Thus, I can abstract from
42The regression is weighted by the number of students applying to the given school in the given year.
43Main effects for 1(Post 2002) and DPB
′02 are absorbed by these indicator variables.
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compositional changes to the lottery pool by simply exploring sub-group analyses of segregation
effects.
Aside from these composition issues, NCLB also potentially changes how to interpret the treatment.
Because black students have lower average achievement than non-black students in the district (see
Figure 1.2), NCLB seats may be disproportionately awarded to black students. I consider DPB
′02
to proxy for the underlying black student demand for the given magnet school. Thus, if a higher
proportion of black students fill NCLB seats for schools with higher DPB
′02 values, then the lottery
consolidation will appear to induce additional racial imbalance into the school. While this poses no
threat to internal validity, it impacts how to interpret the treatment. In Table 1.4, I show that the
composition of students awarded NCLB seats to magnet schools does not statistically significantly
differ by the school’s value of DPB
′02.44 As a result, I interpret the results from equation (1.3)
as isolating the exogenous change in racial composition solely resulting from the termination of
race-blind lotteries.
1.7 Magnet Enrollment Effects
1.7.1 Effects of Magnet Enrollment on Teacher and Peer Characteristics
Before estimating the impact of racial segregation on magnet school effects, I first benchmark the
returns to magnet enrollment within the LUSD. I begin by analyzing how magnet school enrollment
changes a student’s exposure to different dimensions of teacher quality, school institutional details,
and peer composition. Together these effects help characterize the magnet enrollment treatment,
which will be useful in determining whether the racial composition effects I estimate in magnet
schools may generalize to traditional schools as well. Table 1.5 presents the effect of magnet
enrollment on a variety of teacher and peer characteristics from equation (1.1). Recall that the
endogenous variable of interest is an indicator variable equal to one if the student enrolled in a
magnet school during 6th grade. I instrument magnet enrollment with an indicator equal to one if
44Specifically, I regress each outcome on DPB
′02 values and year indicators among students who accept NCLB-
provided seats to magnet schools in 6th grade.
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the student won a seat in the given magnet school lottery during the first wave of offers.
Panel A displays two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates along with the accompanying first stage
estimates for the pooled sample. The first stage estimates characterize the take-up rate of the
lottery offer treatment. There are many reasons why magnet school enrollment may not perfectly
correlate with initial offers. First, anyone who receives an initial magnet school offer still has the
prerogative to enroll elsewhere. Further, students who do not receive an initial lottery offer may
eventually receive a seat after being waitlisted, letting them gain entry to the magnet despite losing
the initial lottery. Depending on the estimate, students receiving an initial middle school magnet
offer are anywhere from 15 to 19 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in a magnet school.
These take-up rates are comparable to other lottery studies in the literature.45
In columns 1 through 3, I assess the differences between magnet and traditional schools along
several classroom measures. Specifically, among the set of classrooms a given student takes in
6th grade, I calculate the average teacher experience and class size as well as the proportion of
teachers with a Masters degree that the student is exposed to throughout the year. Students that
attend magnet schools are assigned to classrooms where the teachers are no more likely to have a
Masters degree. However, students in magnet schools are taught by less-experienced teachers and
attend classes that are on average about 4 students larger than in traditional public schools. Panel
B displays 2SLS estimates separately for black and non-black student subgroups. Interestingly,
non-black students who attend magnet schools are exposed to a higher fraction of teachers with
Masters degrees, but who are less experienced on average.
Because classroom-specific information is only available from 2000 and later, in columns 4 through
7, I estimate the effect of magnet attendance on peer composition at the school level (as opposed
to the classroom level) to exploit a larger sample more in line with subsequent analyses. These
outcomes are school-year-grade-specific averages of peer compositions that omit the student’s own
characteristic. From the perspective of non-black students, enrollment in a magnet school increases
the proportion of black students in the cohort. Conversely, for black students, magnet enrollment
decreases the share of students in the cohort qualifying for free/reduced lunch (FRL) and increases
45For example, Angrist et al. (2016) estimate that winning an initial lottery seat to attend a Boston charter school
increases subsequent charter enrollment by 15 to 22 percentage points.
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peer baseline academic achievement across both reading and math. In general, exposure to magnet
schools in this LUSD affects teacher- and school-level educational inputs, but the imprecise esti-
mates prevent me from ruling out relatively large differences in the composition of peers between
magnet and traditional schools.
In summary, the effect of attending a magnet school is an amalgamation of school practices, teacher
characteristics, and substantial changes to the composition of a student’s peer group. Each present
possible mechanisms driving the effects estimated in the following sections. While I am unable to
isolate the role of school and teacher inputs, in Section 1.8, I exploit a natural experiment that
isolates the effect of changing the peer racial composition on magnet returns.
1.7.2 Effects of Magnet Enrollment on Student Outcomes
In this section, I test whether magnet school enrollment impacts student outcomes relative to tra-
ditional schools in this LUSD. The value of this analysis in the context of studying the effect of
segregation on student outcomes is twofold. First, because I am exploring how magnet school
productivity changes due to increased racial segregation, baseline estimates for magnet school
productivity relative to traditional schools are useful to interpret subsequent segregation effects.
Second, these estimates help inform whether segregation effects are externally valid. If the returns
to attending a magnet school are similar to that of traditional schools in this district, then the seg-
regation effects that I find in the magnet school setting may more plausibly generalize to traditional
schools as well.
Table 1.6 presents the effect of magnet enrollment on several student outcome summary measures.
Adapting the method used by Billings et al. (2014), I create indices that summarize student achieve-
ment in column 1, postsecondary attainment in column 2, and total student academic outcomes in
column 3. The achievement index is the simple average across student middle school math, reading,
science, and writing achievement.46 The postsecondary index is a simple average over standardized
versions of whether the student enrolled in any postsecondary institution as well as a 2-year, 4-year,
46If a student is missing outcome information for a subject, then the average is taken over the remaining subjects
only.
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or “Top 50” ranked institution.47 In addition to these outcomes, the total index also averages over
standardized versions of high school graduation status, ACT test taking status, and ACT com-
posite scores. Because the focus of this article is assessing how segregation influences education
production, I relegate estimates of magnet effects on individual outcomes and the accompanying
discussion to Appendix B.
Panel A provides estimates for the effect of magnet enrollment on student outcomes among the
pooled regression sample. I am unable to detect statistically significant differences between magnet
and traditional enrollees across all three indices though I am unable to rule out relatively large
effects across each outcome. Panel B presents these estimates among sub-groups by student race,
gender, and whether baseline math achievement is above or below the district’s median.
Magnet attendance improves achievement respectively by .10 and .15 standard deviations for black
and non-black students as well as male and female students though the effect is not statistically
significantly different than zero for most estimates. The achievement gains to magnet enrollment
are primarily driven by improvement in science (see Appendix B). It is worth emphasizing that
magnet school enrollment conditional on being offered a seat varies dramatically for black and
non-black students. Table C.1 shows that winning the magnet lottery increases subsequent magnet
enrollment by roughly 30 and 17 percentage points for non-black and black students, respectively.
Anecdotally, magnet schools in this district were historically marketed to non-black students as a
way to prevent “white flight” to the suburbs, which could help explain the difference in acceptance
rates. As a result, the statistical power of the instrument also varies by student subgroup (e.g.,
Kleibergen-Papp F statistics for tests of weak instruments range from 3 to 12 depending on the
specification – see Table C.3). Thus, caution should be given to interpreting under-powered sub-
group estimates.
I estimate that enrolling in a magnet middle school tends to decrease (increase) postsecondary
outcomes high-aptitude (low-aptitude) students. Again, these estimates are imprecisely estimated
and should only be considered as suggestive. Column 3 shows that across the outcomes explored in
this paper, the returns to magnet schools relative to traditional schools are negligible in the pooled
sample, with imprecise heterogeneous returns to certain subgroups.
47Postsecondary outcomes are based on enrollment decisions made within 18 months after high school graduation.
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Together, these results build upon the findings of the previous section. In general, magnet schools
do not generate educational benefits to students over other traditional public schools in the district.
However, magnet schools generate both positive and negative heterogeneous effects across student
subgroups. The localized and seemingly contradictory nature of these effects could be driven by dif-
ferences in magnet-school-specific teaching strategies and specialties, where particularly (in)effective
schools could be driving estimates for certain student subgroups. However, because the focus of
this paper is estimating segregation effects, I leave the exploration of the heterogeneous impacts
across magnet school types to future work. I read these results as suggestive evidence that magnet
schools generate returns similar to the traditional schools in the district and I argue that studying
the effect of racial segregation within these magnet schools may reasonably provide insight into how
an increase in racial segregation would influence traditional public schools more generally. With
these baseline estimates in hand, I now turn to the focus of this study by estimating the effect of
a sharp increase in school segregation on student outcomes.
1.8 The Effect of Segregation on Student Outcomes
In this section, I explore one of the fundamental assumptions underlying the ruling of the landmark
1954 case Brown v. Board of Education in that school racial segregation negatively impacts minority
student outcomes. I test this assumption by providing a causal estimate of how the peer racial
composition parameter enters into the magnet school education production function.
Table 1.7 presents instrumental variables estimates in Panel A from equation (1.4) of the effect of
a one percentage point increase in the share of black peers at a student’s school on the composition
of other peer characteristics. Recall from Table 2.1 that roughly 80 percent of magnet school
enrollment is comprised of black students. As a result, an increase in the share of black students
attending magnet schools should be thought of as an increase in school segregation. Panel B
provides first-stage estimates as well as F statistics for tests of weak instruments. The interpretation
of the first stage estimate is that winning a seat after 2002 to a magnet school with a one percentage
point larger disparity (DPB
′02) increases the percentage of black peers in the student’s school by
30
roughly two percentage points.48
Increasing the proportion of black students entering magnet schools also shifts the student compo-
sition along the dimensions of socioeconomic status and prior achievement. Segregation increases
the share of free-lunch eligible students at a one-to-one ratio and decreases average peer base-
line achievement in reading, math, and science. A ten percentage point increase in the share of
black peers decreases average peer baseline achievement from 0.11 to 0.14 student-level standard
deviations.
Middle school standardized testing provides an early measure to assess whether education produc-
tion is sensitive to school racial composition. In Table 1.8, I estimate that a 10 percentage point
increase in the share of black peers at a student’s school decreases achievement across math, science,
and writing by 0.12 standard deviations. This is equivalent to the estimated achievement losses
that would accompany permanently increasing class sizes by roughly 6 students (Angrist and Lavy,
1999).49 The current literature estimates segregation-induced-losses to math achievement of 0.04
to 0.07 standard deviations, making my estimates somewhat larger (Hanushek et al., 2009; Billings
et al., 2014). However, direct comparisons are obfuscated by the methodological differences and
the unique educational setting in each study. My estimates are most closely aligned with Hoxby
(2000) who estimates that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of black peers in a student’s
class decreases math achievement by 0.19 points for black students.
Heterogeneous effects also confirm patterns in the segregation literature.50 Math and science losses
estimated among the sample of black students are even more pronounced, though statistically in-
distinguishable, from the pooled sample estimates. This suggests that achievement losses may be
larger for black students than non-black students as in Hoxby (2000) and Hanushek et al. (2009).
Decreases in math and science achievement are concentrated among black students with the high-
est baseline achievement as in Hanushek and Rivkin (2009), while segregation negatively impacts
48The shift in the share of black peers is greater than unity because the lottery consolidation increased the
proportion of black students applying to the magnet lotteries (see Table 1.3).
49Angrist and Lavy (1999) estimate that a class reduction of 8 pupils increases reading achievement by about .18
student-level standard deviations.
50I exclude non-black-student-specific results because I am severely under-powered due to the low counts of non-
black students in the district.
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writing achievement for low-achieving black students the most. Science and writing achievement
losses are larger for black male students, while losses to math achievement for black female students
are slightly more pronounced than for black male students.
Segregation has a clear negative impact on student achievement, but these short-term losses do not
guarantee longer-term penalties to important education milestones such as high school graduation
and postsecondary attainment. However, in Table 1.9, I show that the negative consequences of
racial segregation are visible across several important medium-to-long-run educational outcomes. I
estimate that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of a student’s peers that are black erodes
high school graduation rates by 4 percentage points. These losses are driven by female students
whose high school graduation rates fall by twice the magnitude of the pooled sample.
School segregation also has deleterious impacts on postsecondary attainment. A 10 percentage
point increase in school segregation decreases student enrollment in any postsecondary institution
18 months after high school graduation by 5 percentage points. The magnitude of this effect is
comparable to exposing a student from 6th through 12th grade to teachers having nearly a standard
deviation lower value-added (Chetty et al., 2014b).51 These losses are driven by low-aptitude black
students as well as black female student subgroups and add to the myriad studies showing that the
effects of educational interventions are often driven by particular subgroups, namely by minority
and female students (Hastings et al., 2006; Deming et al., 2014; Anderson, 2008; Angrist et al.,
2009; Angrist and Lavy, 2009; Jackson, 2013b; Andrews et al., 2016). Further, these heterogeneous
effects are interesting because they remove any issues relating to the changing composition of
magnet school applicants after 2002 (see Section 1.6.3).
Unlike in Charlotte-Mecklenburg where Billings et al. (2014) find that school segregation impacts
four-year college attainment, I find that segregation instead discourages prospective college students
from enrolling in 2-year institutions, particularly for black female students. This could be a direct
result of the impact that segregation has on high school graduation rates. Students on the margin
of graduating high school are more likely potential candidates to attend 2-year rather that 4-year
51Chetty et al. (2014b) estimate that one year of being exposed to a teacher with a one standard deviation lower
value-added decreases college enrollment at age 20 by .82 percentage points. If you assume these effects accumulate
linearly over time this yields a decrease of 5.74 percentage points for continual exposure from 6th through 12th grade.
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postsecondary institutions. As a result, because segregation reduces high school graduation rates
it is intuitive that I find that racial isolation subsequently diminishes postsecondary attainment
through 2-year enrollment.
Finally, I assess whether college quality is affected by middle school segregation by estimating the
impact on the probability of a student enrolling in a US News and World Report “Top 50” ranked
university. While I estimate that segregation has no statistically significant impact on general
college quality, I find that a ten percentage point increase in the share of black peers decreases
student enrollment at a “Top 50” institution by 1 percentage point among black female students.
Conversely, I estimate that black, male students are more likely to enroll in a “Top 50” institution
by the same magnitude.
From these results, I conclude that racial balance is a meaningful input into the magnet school
education production function both for immediate achievement as well as for long-run college out-
comes. Magnet schools in this district generate similar returns to the traditional schools, and
further, school-specific contributions to student achievement are intentionally removed by my esti-
mation strategy. As a result, it is plausible that these results are not limited to the magnet school
setting, rather, racial balance is likely an important input in education production functions more
generally.
1.9 Conclusion
The United States education system has grown increasingly segregated since the end of court-
ordered desegregation (Lutz, 2011; Reardon et al., 2012; GAO, 2016; Clotfelter et al., 2006, 2008),
which makes assessing the causal link between de facto racial segregation and student achievement
important to both researchers and policy-makers alike. I isolate how the effect of attending magnet
schools in a large urban school district (LUSD) changes once schools are no longer allowed to
artificially maintain the racial balance of incoming cohorts through race-base admissions lotteries.
This setting provides an excellent natural experiment that reflects the growth in racial imbalance
spreading across the nation’s school system.
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I find that achievement gains to magnet enrollment are local to certain subjects and student sub-
groups. The localized nature of these returns leads me to conclude that, in general, the LUSD
magnet schools have similar returns to other traditional public schools in this district. Further,
my main estimates suggest that racial balance is an important input in the magnet school educa-
tion production function. Exogenously increasing segregation decreases achievement among black
high-achievers and negatively influences postsecondary outcomes among black females and black
low-achievers.
While school assignment policies that explicitly use race in admissions decisions have been declared
unconstitutional (Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 – 2007),
my results suggest that more creative policies aimed at improving racial balance in schools can gen-
erate large improvements in education production. For instance, many districts utilize information
about residence instead of race to ensure their schools enroll a diverse student body from rich and
poor neighborhoods. This work is particularly timely given President Obama’s current “Stronger
Together” initiative that proposes to double the amount of federal funding up to $120 million to
support voluntary integration programs across the United States of which magnet schools are a
part. Education interventions of any variety that incorporate achieving racial balance as either an
explicit goal or simply a byproduct of the policy stand to improve student outcomes.
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1.10 Figures and Tables




































1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
School Year (2005−06 = 2005)
Magnet Traditional
Notes: The figure plots the average black 6th grade enrollment shares across magnet and traditional schools in the
LUSD. The vertical line represents the first year in which race-blind lotteries were used to determine enrollment in
oversubscribed schools.
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Notes: The figures present the distribution of subject-specific standardized achievement for 6th grade
students who applied to magnet school lotteries prior to 2007.
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1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
School Year
Non−Black Students Black Students
Notes: The figure plots the probability of winning an initial seat to attend a magnet school in 6th grade over time for
by student race. The reference line in 2003 denotes the first year that the LUSD utilized the consolidated lottery to
determine magnet seat offers. Prior to 2003, the LUSD ran separate lotteries for black students and non-black students
(i.e. any student not considered a black student).
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1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
School Year
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
Notes: The figure presents the effect of receiving an initial seat offer to a magnet school through a lottery with a 1
percentage point larger disparity between the percentage of black students in the lottery pool and the percentage of
black student receiving offers in 2002 (DPB
′02) on the percentage of black students of the student’s subsequent school of
enrollment. Regressions are estimated using (1.5) as explained in Section 1.6.1. The regression is run using the sample
restrictions in the footnote of Table 1.6. The reference line in 2003 denotes the first year the LUSD implemented the
consolidated lottery system.
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Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
Notes: Each figure presents the effect of receiving an initial seat offer to a magnet school through a lottery
with a 1 percentage point larger disparity between the percentage of black students in the lottery pool
and the percentage of black student receiving offers in 2002 (DPB
′02) on the given current outcome.
Regressions are estimated using (1.5) as explained in Section 1.6.1. Each regression is respectively run
using the sample restrictions for the given outcome in the footnotes of Tables 1.5 through 1.6. Similar
Figures for the remaining outcomes explored in the paper are located in Appendix A. The reference line
in 2003 denotes the first year the LUSD implemented the consolidated lottery system.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics and Balance Test
All LUSD Students Magnet Lottery Sample
Mean N Mean N Initial Offer Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female .482 53,833 .554 6,615 -0.005 (0.012)
Black .620 52,915 .817 6,564 -0.009 (0.007)
White .304 52,915 .155 6,564 0.011 (0.007)
Baseline Math -.011 41,289 .282 5,127 0.001 (0.017)
Baseline Reading .023 44,750 .231 5,205 -0.026 (0.019)
Baseline Science -.000 36,753 .221 4,572 0.013 (0.017)
Baseline Writing .018 31,353 .264 4,440 0.010 (0.016)
Combined p-value: 0.084
Initial Offer Rate: .514
Magnet Attendance Rate: .783
Notes: The sample for columns 1 and 2 includes student-year observations for students attending
a school 6th grade from 1998 to 2007. Columns 3 through 5 further restrict the sample to students
who applied to a magnet school through the lottery and do not come from a sending school with
automatic placement into a magnet school. The sample is further restricted to students without
sibling priority in any lottery application and also to risk sets that have more than one student.
Finally, the sample is further restricted to students with non-missing reading outcome test scores
who are not receiving special education and are not repeating the given grade. Column 5 regresses
each student demographic on an indicator equal to one if the student received an initial offer to
a magnet school and a full set of lottery risk set fixed effects (N = 13, 315). Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered on students. p-values test the hypothesis that all coefficients on initial
offer indicators are zero.
40













Panel A: Baseline Estimates
1(Initial Offer) -0.003 -0.003 -0.020∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
Panel B: Segregation Estimates
DPB
′02 ∗ 1(Post ′02) ∗ 1(Initial Offer) -0.007 -0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Notes: N = 28, 463. The outcomes for each column are respectively a binary for whether the student
appears in the LUSD enrollment records during the year following the 6th grade lottery, whether the
student is missing math achievement information, and whether the student is missing in the National
Student Clearinghouse data. Panel A presents the results from regressing the given outcome on a binary
for whether the student was offered an initial magnet seat and a full set of lottery fixed effects. Panel B
presents the results from a similar regression where instead of a binary for receiving an initial lottery offer,
I include a triple interaction of the differential in 2002 percent black in the pool and winning a lottery
(i.e., DPB), an indicator for if the lottery occurred after 2002, and the initial offer indicator, as well as
the main effects. Standard errors for both regressions are clustered at the lottery level. Together these
regressions show that there are no differential attrition problems in general (Panel A) and specifically for
my racial segregation identification strategy (Panel B). Regressions are limited to observations from the





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
Enrolled in Magnet 0.120 -0.039 0.050
(0.084) (0.128) (0.073)
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Non-Black 0.147 -0.031 0.037
(0.105) (0.218) (0.081)
Black 0.099 -0.060 0.048
(0.091) (0.128) (0.079)
Male 0.151 0.102 0.147
(0.158) (0.169) (0.136)
Female 0.111∗∗ -0.115 -0.005
(0.049) (0.164) (0.054)
Above Median Baseline Math Score 0.135 -0.068 0.007
(0.114) (0.178) (0.087)
Below Median Baseline Math Score 0.067 0.141 0.123
(0.140) (0.218) (0.140)
Black, Male 0.106 0.189 0.182
(0.168) (0.151) (0.158)
Black, Female 0.111 -0.202 -0.037
(0.068) (0.183) (0.058)
Black, Above Median 0.169 -0.116 0.018
(0.151) (0.195) (0.102)
Black, Below Median 0.029 0.150 0.137
(0.152) (0.272) (0.166)
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Regressions
follow equation (1.1) where each outcome is regressed on a indicator equal to one if the student attended a
magnet school during the year following the lottery as well as indicators for student gender, race, and risk-sets.
I instrument for endogenous magnet attendance variable with whether the student receiving an initial lottery
offer. Standard errors are two-way clustered by student and the enrolled school after the lottery. Each regression
sample is limited to baseline sample restrictions i.e., the student must have applied to a magnet school lottery in
the 6th grade from 1998-2007, must be in their first year attending the grade of the lottery application (no grade
retention), and must not be eligible for special education. Further, the baseline sample restriction also excludes
students from a school with automatic placement into a magnet school. Achievement index is the simple mean
of math, science, reading, and writing achievement. Post-secondary index is a simple mean over standardized
versions of whether 18 months after high school graduation the student enrolled in any postsecondary institution,
a 2-year, 4-year, or Top 50 ranked institution. Regressions are weighted by one over the number of lotteries
applied to by the student in the given year. First-stage estimates, observation counts, weak IV tests, and outcome
means are provided in Tables C.1, C.2, C.3, and C.4, respectively. See Appendix B for disaggregated estimates.
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Table 1.7: Lottery Estimates of Effects of School Peer Racial Composition on Peer Characteristics
School Peer Composition
Baseline Testing
FRL Reading Math Science Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates
Fraction Black in School ×100 0.010∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.008
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Non-offer Outcome Mean 0.695 0.170 0.053 0.050 0.108
Panel B: First-Stage Estimates
1(Initial Offer)× 1(Post 2002)×DPB 2.091∗∗∗ 2.087∗∗∗ 2.187∗∗∗ 2.277∗∗∗ 2.275∗∗∗
(0.492) (0.492) (0.496) (0.461) (0.462)
F Statistic (Weak IV) 18.042 17.974 19.424 24.413 24.234
Observations 13,398 13,396 12,930 11,316 11,285
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Regressions follow
equation (1.4) where each outcome is regressed on the percentage of black students in the grade of the school the student
attended during the year following the lottery as well as indicators for student gender, race, year-of-test and lottery. I
instrument for endogenous racial composition with a triple-interaction between whether the student received an initial
lottery offer, whether the observation is after 2002, and by the 2002 difference in percentage of black students (DPB
′02)
between the total magnet lottery pool and the pool of initial offers. Standard errors are two-way clustered both by
student and by school-after-lottery. Because observations are at the student-application level for these regressions, a
given student-year combination can appear multiple times. Each regression sample is limited to the sample restrictions
specified in the notes for Table 1.6. 2SLS estimates and the outcome mean for students not offered a magnet seat are
provided in Panel A. First-stage estimates and weak instrument tests using the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic are
reported in Panel B.
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Table 1.8: Lottery Estimates of Effects of School Peer Racial Composition on Student Achievement
Achievement Testing
Reading Math Science Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
Fraction Black in School ×100 -0.007 -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Black -0.006 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Male -0.007∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.012∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Female -0.007 -0.016∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.011∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Above Median Baseline Math Score -0.008∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.013
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Below Median Baseline Math Score -0.004 -0.008 -0.011 -0.022∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Black, Male -0.005 -0.014∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.013∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Black, Female -0.007 -0.017∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006)
Black, Above Median -0.008∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.010
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Black, Below Median -0.003 -0.007 -0.009 -0.023∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Regressions
follow equation (1.4) where each outcome is regressed on the percentage of black students in the grade of
the school the student attended during the year following the lottery as well as indicators for student gender,
race, year-of-test and lottery. I instrument for endogenous racial composition with a triple-interaction between
whether the student received an initial lottery offer, whether the observation is after 2002, and by the 2002
difference in percentage of black students (DPB
′02) between the total magnet lottery pool and the pool of
initial offers. Standard errors are two-way clustered both by student and by school-after-lottery. Because
observations are at the student-application level for these regressions, a given student-year combination can
appear multiple times. Each regression sample is limited to the sample restrictions specified in the notes
for Table 1.6. First-stage estimates, observation counts, weak IV tests, and outcome means are provided in
Appendix Tables C.5, C.6, C.7, and C.8, respectively.
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Table 1.9: Lottery Estimates of Effects of School Peer Racial Composition on High School Graduation
and Postsecondary Attainment
College Attendance
(18 Months after Graduation)
HS Grad. Any 2-year 4-year Top 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
Fraction Black in School ×100 -0.004∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Black -0.004 -0.006∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Male -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.001∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Female -0.008∗∗ -0.009∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.001∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000)
Above Median Baseline Math Score -0.005 -0.002 -0.007∗ 0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Below Median Baseline Math Score -0.006 -0.010∗ -0.005 -0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001)
Black, Male -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 0.003 0.001∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Black, Female -0.007∗ -0.008 -0.012∗∗ -0.001 -0.001∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000)
Black, Above Median -0.006∗ -0.002 -0.008∗∗ 0.002 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Black, Below Median -0.004 -0.014∗ -0.008 -0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001)
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Regressions follow
equation (1.4) where each outcome is regressed on the percentage of black students in the grade of the school the student
attended during the year following the lottery as well as indicators for student gender, race, and lottery. I instrument for
endogenous racial composition with a triple-interaction between whether the student received an initial lottery offer, whether
the observation is after 2002, and by the 2002 difference in percentage of black students (DPB
′02) between the total magnet
lottery pool and the pool of initial offers. Standard errors are two-way clustered both by student and by school-after-lottery.
Because observations are at the student-application level for these regressions, a given student-year combination can appear
multiple times. Each regression sample is limited to the sample restrictions specified in the notes for Table 1.6. Top 50
denotes an indicator equal to one if the student attends a top 50 ranked school based on the U.S. News and World Report.
First-stage estimates, observation counts, weak IV tests, and outcome means are provided in Appendix Tables C.9, C.10,
C.11, and C.12, respectively.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Charter Competition on
Unionized District Revenues and
Resource Allocation
The charter school movement is rapidly expanding across the United States. Charters are designed
to be innovative laboratories for educational practices and to compete with traditional public
school districts (TPSD) over student enrollment. Proponents argue that these market forces cause
TPSDs to improve student achievement, but the empirical evidence is mixed (Epple et al., 2015).
This literature has focused directly on student outcomes instead of the mechanisms underlying
how districts respond to charter competition. Without understanding how TPSDs respond, it is
difficult to disentangle why competition improves student outcomes in some contexts and reduces
outcomes in others. A primary mechanism by which charter competition may operate is through
its influence on district resources. Competition may impact the level of overall revenues available
to the district and may augment how districts allocate these funds. Moreover, changes to resource
allocation decisions provide insight into which dimension of school quality competition affects. For
example, districts competing over achievement ratings may allocate resources toward instruction
or pupil services, while districts competing over school facility quality may allocate expenditures
toward new capital projects. However, we understand little about the extent to which charters
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influence TPSD expenditure decisions.1
Conversely, critics of the charter movement argue that charter competition puts fiscal stress on
traditional schools making the remaining students worse off. Empirical evidence confirms that
charters place fiscal stress on TPSDs (Bifulco and Reback, 2014) and, in general, decrease the
revenues available to districts (Arsen and Ni, 2012b).2 Yet, we have an incomplete understanding
of why TPSD revenues fall in the presence of charter competition. Some of the decline is mechanical:
TPSDs directly lose state per-pupil funding as students transfer to charter schools and federal per-
pupil funding as vulnerable student populations transfer. However, other mechanisms may be
more nuanced. For example, if charter presence is capitalized into housing values, then charter
entry would indirectly affect the TPSD local revenues raised through property taxes.3
This study addresses these gaps in the literature by exploring potential mechanisms underlying
how charter competition affects TPSD funding and whether districts respond by adjusting the
composition of their expenditures. A core problem this literature has faced is that charter entry
is not exogenous with respect to underlying trends in overall TPSD resource levels and allocation
decisions. I exploit the fact that Ohio charter entry policies create a substantial lag structure
and geographic constraints to isolate plausibly exogenous charter entry variation in a difference-in-
difference-instrumental-variables framework. I document that charter competition directly reduces
state and federal revenues through the expected channels. A key finding of this study is that
charter competition also decreases the TPSD revenues raised through property taxes by depressing
appraised district-level residential property values. I also find that charter competition causes
districts to spend less on instructional and other current expenditures and spend more on new
1The only other evidence on within-district resource allocation comes from Arsen and Ni (2012b) who find that
charter schools have a negligible effect on TPSD resource reallocation in Michigan. Due to data limitations, Arsen and
Ni (2012b) impute charter competition levels for roughly 75 percent of their sample. This can introduce potentially
serious attenuation bias into their results and highlights the value of analyzing this question in a setting with a more
accurate measure of charter competition.
2Additionally, Dee and Fu (2004) find that charter schools increase pupil-teacher ratios in traditional public
schools.
3While Imberman et al. (2016) find no evidence of charter capitalization on average in Los Angeles county, they
find that housing prices outside the Los Angeles Unified School District fall in response to within-district charter
entry.
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construction capital outlays. This reallocation is more than a simple proportional change. A one
percentage point increase in charter competition increases the overall amount that TPSDs spend
on capital outlays by 7.3 percent. This is consistent with qualitative evidence that administrators
in Washington D.C. believe the physical appearance of their school has the greatest impact on
preventing enrollment loss to charters (Sullivan et al., 2008). I discuss further explanations for
these surprising results below. Additionally, I provide evidence that these findings are not driven
by the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act nor the Great Recession.
I also examine the effect of charter competition on collectively bargained teacher salaries. Most
studies of the effect of charter competition on teacher salaries occur in settings where collective
bargaining is prohibited by law, such as Texas (Taylor, 2006, 2010) and North Carolina (Jackson,
2012).4 Thus, I address a gap in the teacher labor market literature by assessing how unionized
markets respond to largely non-unionized charter school competition. A challenge in studying
the effect of charter competition on collectively bargained teacher salaries is that contracts are
negotiated intermittently and can only adjust to charter competition during negotiation years.
Ignoring this problem generates an attenuation bias.5 The bias is similar to the well-known “seam
bias” in popular panel datasets such as the Survey of Income and Program Participation, which
arises when respondents answer retrospective questions using current information (see Ham et al.,
2009; Pei, 2015; Pischke, 1995).
I characterize this bias within my context and use Monte Carlo simulations to demonstrate that
the bias is avoided by restricting the analysis sample to years when the outcome can vary (i.e., ne-
gotiation years). Using this approach and the universe of Ohio teachers’ union contracts, I estimate
that a percentage point increase in charter competition decreases teacher salary contracts at the
top of the pay scale by around 1.0 percent. I also estimate salary decreases for entry-level teachers
but find that charter competition has no effect on mid-career salary contracts. Furthermore, I find
that charter competition causes TPSDs to hire fewer new teachers, which reduces the size of the
teacher labor force to maintain pupil-teacher ratios. I estimate minor teacher mobility between
TPSDs and charters consistent with a model where TPSDs are competing over students instead of
4Notable exceptions include Arsen and Ni (2012b) and Hoxby (2002).
5In my setting, estimates on annual data would theoretically attenuate my results by 7 percent.
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teachers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 overviews Ohio charter school
institutional details, Section 3.4 describes the data, Section 2.3 presents the research design and
evaluates its validity, and Sections 2.4 through 2.7 provide the main results for district revenues
and expenditure allocation emphasizing collectively bargained teacher salaries. Section 2.8 discusses
these results and Section 3.8 concludes.
2.1 Institutional Details
Charter schools are independently run educational organizations that sign a “charter” declaring
their structure and outlining detailed plans for achieving student success. Charter schools in Ohio
differ from traditional public schools in the following ways. While students may only attend a
traditional public school based on the geographic location of their residence, students across the
state are able to attend any charter they desire.6 When a student transfers to a charter from a
public school their per-pupil state funding transfers as well. Any charter failing to attract the
number of students needed to at least fund operating costs will eventually close.
In Ohio, there is an important distinction between a conversion and start-up charter school (ODE,
2014). The conversion schools are created by “converting” all or a portion of an existing public
school into a charter school. These schools must obtain a majority vote at the school board to
convert. Public schools can convert at any time across the state, conditional on receiving the nec-
essary votes. These districts operate independently from their sponsor school district. Conversion
charter schools are free to decide if they want to remain unionized.
Start-up schools on the other hand are new educational institutions and differ from conversion
schools in a variety of ways. First, start-up charters can be sponsored by a larger set of entities.
Sponsors for start-ups can include teachers, parents, communities, private organizations, Ohio
universities, and even the Ohio Department of Education (ODE). Start-ups must privately fund
6Local school districts are required to provide transportation to any student living more than two miles away from
their desired charter school as long as the charter is no further than 30 minutes away from the school of residence.
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a majority of the charter’s expenses including the large entry costs. As a result, they often try
to renovate and locate in closed-down schools or shopping centers (Imberman, 2011) instead of
constructing new buildings. Unlike conversion schools, start-ups are not able to open freely across
the state. There is a complicated legislative history (see Section 2.3.2) that dictates in which
districts start-up charters are permitted to open during any given year.
Ohio charter schools can be further categorized as either a traditional “brick-and-mortar” or a
“digital” charter. Digital charter schools face the same legislation and requirements as traditional
“brick-and-mortar” charters; however, all instruction occurs online, and schools are required to
provide each student with a laptop. Ohio has the second-largest (second to Arizona) online charter
presence in the nation, with over 30,000 students enrolled in a digital school in 2011-12. This
represents rapid growth considering the first digital charter school opened in the 2000-01 school
year. While there are a handful of digital charter schools that limit enrollment to district residents
only, nearly every digital charter allows students from across the state to enroll.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Data Description
To test the effect of charter competition on district revenues, resource allocation, negotiated contract
outcomes, and teacher employment requires several datasets, each of which are summarized below
in turn. Additional information is presented in Online Appendix A, which summarizes the details
of each dataset including important data cleaning procedures.
Digitized union contracts are provided by the Ohio State Employment Relations Board (SERB).
I observe all contracts from 1982 through the 2012-13 school year. About 95 percent of TPSDs
first began collective bargaining negotiations between 1984 and 1987. The unit of observation in
these data is a district, contract, salary-track observation, where salary tracks are broken out by
teacher education (e.g., bachelor’s or master’s degree). To make this explicit, I present a fictitious
contract in Online Appendix Table A.2. A teacher’s pay is determined solely based on their years
of experience and education level. Notice that payment increases may not necessarily occur each
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year, for example, consider the payments for years of experience 14-15. For each district’s contract,
I observe the entry- and top-level salaries (those corresponding with experience rows 0 and 28 in
Table A.2). However, for most contracts, SERB data custodians instead recorded the top-level
salaries as the first year in which a salary does not change with experience, introducing additional
noise into this measure. In Table A.2, this corresponds to the bold values, i.e., 8 years of experience
for “Non-degree” teachers and 14 years of experience for all other education categories. Beyond
salary information, I observe contract information concerning the negotiated number of hours in
the work week, and the number of steps and years to reach the top of the pay scale.
In order to fill in information for mid-range and true top-level negotiated salaries, I turn to
restricted-access, teacher-level data provided by the Ohio Department of Education (ODE). These
data include teacher salary, experience, education, and current school of employment. Importantly,
these data follow teachers as they move between public schools within the state, including char-
ters. Furthermore, I observe all necessary information (i.e., teacher experience and education) to
determine each teacher’s particular position on their district’s pay scale. As a result, I can use
SERB contract negotiation dates in tandem with these teacher-level data to back out entire salary
structures for each negotiated contract. This allows me to estimate the effect of charter competition
across the entire negotiated salary distribution (see Online Appendix B).
To measure charter competition, I collect public school finance reports for the universe of Ohio
school districts from the ODE’s school finance website. In Ohio, when a student decides to attend
a charter school instead of his or her default public school, the district must directly pay the
baseline per-pupil state funding amount to the charter. The ODE finance reports capture these
exact payments as well as a full-time-equivalency count of the number of students each district
sends to each charter school in the state, including digital charters.
In addition, I employ information from three National Center for Education Statistics data sources:
the School District Universe Survey, School Building Universe Survey, and School District Finance
Survey. The first two datasets provide information about student enrollment and teacher employ-
ment (see Online Appendix Table A.1 for specifics). The School District Finance Survey provides
TPSD revenue and expenditure information.
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Finally, I utilize property tax data from the Ohio Department of Taxation, which includes annual
property valuations broken out at the district level. These valuations determine the property tax
base for TPSD local revenue calculations.
2.2.2 Measuring Charter Competition
I measure charter competition using information about the number of students transferring from
TPSDs to charter schools (Linick, 2014).7 Specifically, my preferred measure of charter competition
is the fraction of a district’s potential membership that instead transfer to a charter school in the
given year, i.e., # Transfers to Charter# Students Enrolled in TPSD+# Transfers to Charter .
8 This measure of competition includes
student transfers to conversion, start-up, digital, and brick-and-mortar charters (see Section 2.1).
In 2001, the ODE began generating “District Foundation Settlement Reports” that record the
number of students and accompanying funds sent by each district to each charter school across the
state, including digital charters. For 2001 and later, I use this full-time equivalency count as my
measure of the number of students transferring to charters from each district.
From 1998 to 2001, in order to estimate a proxy for charter transfers, I use information from several
sources. Competition is proxied using the amount of district-aggregated funds transferred to charter
schools each year as recorded in the Common Core of Data (CCD) School District Finance Survey.
To convert these dollar values into counts of transferring students, I collected information on the
baseline formula dollar amounts paid to a charter school for transferring a single student each year.
Note that unlike the post-2001 data, these measures only provide the general competition a specific
district faces making it impossible to disaggregate transfers between digital and brick-and-mortar
charters. For twenty-one district-year observations with missing CCD charter payment information
prior to 2001, I fill in the district’s charter transfers with the cumulative enrollment counts for all
charters “serving” the given district.9
7Notice that student-transfer measures do not capture charter threat. For example, a charter opening within
TPSD boundaries that was unable to recruit students from the given TPSD would be measured as contributing no
competitive pressure. In Online Appendix C, I show that my main estimates are robust across a variety of charter
competition measures.
8Potential enrollment and charter transfers are in full-time equivalency terms.
9While students are free to attend any charter across the state, charters are tied to a “serving” district. The
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In Figure 2.1, I plot the aggregated enrollment counts from the CCD LEA Universe Survey for all
charter schools in the state, as well as an aggregated version of my measure of charter transfers.
From 2001 onward, even though my measure of charter competition is not based on CCD data,
I am able to closely mirror aggregated CCD charter enrollment. I take this as evidence that my
measure of charter competition adequately captures statewide charter enrollment. For 2001 and
later, Figure 2.1 also decomposes the number of charter transfers into the number transferring to
brick-and-mortar and digital charter schools. In 2001, charter transfers were almost entirely made
up of brick-and-mortar schools, with the share of the charter market captured by digital charters
steadily growing over time.
The spatial growth as measured by the fraction of TPSD enrollment that instead transfers to a
charter school is shown in Figure 2.2. Because the most urban districts have always been eligible for
charter entry, charter school hot-spots appear in Ohio’s largest cities. However, legislation passed
in 1999 and 2002 that allowed charters to open in struggling districts across the state coupled with
statewide digital charter admissions generate large increases in the fraction of charter transfers
across rural Ohio in later years.
Taken together, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show why Ohio is an excellent state to assess the effects of
charter competition. There has been rapid and relatively recent charter introduction and expansion,
which provides the necessary treatment variation. These facts coupled with the policy structure
that generates exogenous variation in the timing and location of charter entry make Ohio an ideal
setting to study the competitive effects of charter schools.
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for TPSDs broken out by various levels of charter competi-
tion intensity. The top panel reports district characteristics and finance information for outcomes
that vary at the district-year level. Column 1 provides the mean and standard deviation for the
full sample of district-year observations that have non-missing values for all variables in the panel.
Columns 2 through 4 present summary statistics for district-year combinations facing no charter
competition, non-zero levels of competition, and the top quartile of charter competition, respec-
eligibility of this district originally determines whether the charter could open. This assumption is reasonable par-
ticularly for the earlier years of charter entry. In 2001 and 2002, over three-fourths of all districts sent 65 percent or
more of their charter transfers to charters specifically serving their district.
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tively.
Comparing across columns, districts facing higher levels of competition are larger (enroll more
students and employ more teachers), have higher assessed total property values, have a higher
proportion of black students as well as students qualified for free lunch, spend more overall, and
have higher instructional and capital expenditures. I also report descriptive statistics for the amount
of charter competition faced by each TPSD. It is worth noting that for the full sample, on average,
the fraction of potential enrollment transferring to charters is roughly 0.014. This fraction more
than triples for districts facing the top quartile of competition. In the bottom panel, I report entry-
and top-level salaries negotiated between districts and unions. The unit of observation in this panel
is a contract-education cell. The pattern is not as clear across these variables, but districts facing
competition tend to negotiate higher salaries. Overall, the main empirical results of this paper are
not visible in these simple tabulations.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Baseline Estimates: Difference-in-Difference Framework
To understand the intuition behind my baseline empirical setup, consider two districts within
the same local economy in a given year where one experiences increased charter competition in the
following year and the other does not. My baseline estimation strategy simply compares the change
in outcomes over time between these districts. Specifically, I estimate the following model:
yict = α+ βCit + γct + φi + ict (2.1)
where yict is the outcome of interest for district i during school year t in commuting zone c, γct are
commuting-zone-by-school-year fixed effects, φi are district fixed effects, and ict is an idiosyncratic
error term.10 Cit denotes the charter competition faced by district i during the school year t.
10Year 2000 Commuting Zones are downloaded from the Department of Agriculture (website), which are designed
to delineate the local economies where people work and live.
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Standard errors are clustered on districts. This setting accounts for year-specific shocks affecting
all districts across a given commuting zone as well as time-invariant district characteristics. The
identifying assumption of equation (2.1) is that conditional on the fixed effects, charter competition
is uncorrelated with any other determinants of the outcome.
Because students choose which school to attend as well as the timing of transfers, any trends in
factors driving these choices that also correlate with trends in district outcomes are sources of bias.
For instance, suppose that charters tend to locate near districts with downward trending student
performance. Further, suppose that these districts experience state sanctions that restrict their
budgets and induce changes to resource allocation. Without accounting for district performance
trends, charter entry into these downward-trending districts would correlate spuriously with changes
in district fiscal outcomes. The commuting-zone-by-school-year fixed effects γct help account for
unobservable factors potentially correlating with trends in outcomes and charter entry by forcing
comparisons only to be made between districts within the same commuting zone.11 In the previous
example, shifts in quality that affect all districts within a commuting zone are absorbed by γct, but
differential quality shifts within a commuting zone would still potentially induce biases.
2.3.2 Preferred Estimates: Instrumental Variables Framework
To account for potential unobservable trends that would bias my baseline estimates, I exploit
both the lengthy charter approval process as well as plausibly exogenous changes to policies that
determine the location and timing of charter entry in an instrumental variables framework.
In 1997, Ohio legislators passed a bill that, in addition to piloting a new start-up charter program
in Lucas county, allowed new start-ups to open in the “Big 8” urban districts (Ohio HB 55).12
This bill also allowed conversion charter schools the option to open across the state. In 1999,
another bill (Ohio HB 282) passed that allowed start-up charters to open in the twenty-one largest
11A specification only including year fixed effects would implicitly be assuming that charter transfer intensity
varies exogenously across the entire state. Including commuting-zone-by-school-year fixed effects instead relies on the
assumption that charter transfer intensity varies exogenously across school districts within commuting zones.
12The “Big 8” urban districts are comprised of Akron, Canton, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Toledo,
and Youngstown.
58
urban districts. Further, starting in the 2000 school year, start-ups across the state could open
in any district rated as “Academic Emergency” (AE) in the previous school year based on Ohio’s
performance index rating system.13 In 2003, legislation passed that allowed start-up charters to
open in any districts rated as “Academic Watch” (AW) or AE in the previous school year, but
the bill again limited new start-up charters to open in the “Big 8” districts (down from 21 eligible
districts) without regard to the previous year’s performance rating (Ohio HB 364 and HB 3). These
designations only affect whether charters are permitted to enter a particular district. Once opened,
charters are allowed to persist without regard to their district’s current eligibility status.
Table 2.2 provides the number of districts eligible for new charter entry in the given year based on
“Urban 8/21” policies in column 1 and district ratings during the previous school year in column
2.14 Column 3 presents the total number of districts eligible for new charters to begin the approval
process to eventually open within the TPSD. It is worth noting that most of my identifying variation
is coming from the 2000-2005 school years, which corresponds to the years with the largest amount
of charter growth (see Figure 2.1). Column 4 presents the number of new charters that actually open
during the subsequent school year based on district eligibility during the given year. As expected,
the number of new charters tracks closely with the number of eligible TPSDs. For example, 2003
was the first year that districts with a lagged AW designation were eligible for charter entry, which
led to the sharp increase in number of eligible districts. Based on the eligibility of these 78 districts
in 2003, 90 new charters opened up in 2004, representing roughly a three-fold increase over the
previous year.
In order for a start-up charter school to open, there is a very specific timeline that must be followed.
This timeline is graphically depicted in Figure 2.3a for district-year outcomes. In general, Ohio
policies create a one-year lag from when a district is eligible for charter entry to when the new
charter can open its doors.15 Thus, denoting time with respect to an outcome in school year t,
13Performance Index ratings are calculated by taking a weighted average of the fraction of students who passed
different statewide goals. See Online Appendix D for a detailed explanation of the ratings designation system in
Ohio.
14“Urban 8/21” districts that are also rated as AE/AW only appear in column 1.
15Charter schools are required to first enter into a Preliminary Agreement with an authorizer before proceeding
to finalize a charter or contract. When a charter enters into a Preliminary Agreement, they must identify their
intended district of residence, which must be eligible for charter entry at the time the Preliminary Agreement is
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a new charter opening in period t would have needed to initiate the filing process in the previous
school year (denoted t − 1). Further, district eligibility in t − 1 depends on whether it is a “Big
8”/“Urban 21” district in t − 1 or based on the district’s academic rating in the previous school
year, t− 2.
I use as instruments the change in the differential effects of being rated in AE(AW) before and
after the introduction of the 2000(2003) policies that introduced using district rating criteria to
determine charter eligibility. I operationalize this by interacting both t − 2 lagged district rating
indicator variables with an indicator for whether the given policy had been implemented prior to or
concurrent with the t− 2 school year. I then use both interactions as instruments for charter entry
and include the main effects as controls. As my third instrument, I include a binary for whether
the district was eligible for charter entry during the previous year based on urban district policies
(“Big 8/Urban 21”).
While the timing of the urban district eligibility policies are arguably exogenous, it is plausible
that districts receiving an AE/AW rating during the previous year could be subject to correctional
responses that possibly correlate with district resource allocation and negotiated salaries (see Craig
et al., 2013; Chakrabarti, 2014). Suppose that outcomes react directly to t − 2 AE/AW ratings.
In my empirical framework, I control for this directly and assume that there is no other structural
break besides from the policy introduction. The identifying assumption underlying this strategy
is that the only thing changing the relationship between t − 2 AE/AW ratings and subsequent
outcomes is the passage of the relevant charter law.
executed. Because district ratings are released September 15th each year, TPSD eligibility is based off ratings during
the previous school year. Even if the district’s status changes with the release of the next state Report Card, the new
charter school is still permitted to open. The Preliminary Agreement must be signed by the end of the December
preceding the school year in which the new charter plans to open. Typically, Preliminary Agreements do not extend
beyond twelve months. However, the contract/charter has a very specific time frame – it must be adopted no later
than March 15th prior to the school year in which the school intends to open, and must be executed by May 15th
following the March adoption date.
The school must open by September 30th following the contract execution date, unless it is a school serving
primarily dropout prevention and recovery students, in which case the contract is valid for 12 months from the
execution date. Generally the whole process takes less than 12 months.
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In addition, I exploit the delay in the charter approval process. Suppose that poor district perfor-
mance affects outcomes through two channels: first, through its effect on charter entry several years
into the future, and second, through its more immediate, direct effect on district outcomes. The
first channel provides useful identifying variation. To isolate this variation, I include two binary
controls, each respectively equal to one if the given district receives an AE or AW rating during
the previous period, t − 1.16 In this setting, the more immediate, direct effects of poor district
performance are absorbed by the t− 1 district rating indicators and the IV is identified off of the
lagged structure of charter entry.
Specifically, I regress:
yict = βCict + δ11(AW )i,t−1 + δ21(AE)i,t−1 (2.2)
+ φ11(AW )i,t−2 + φ21(AE)i,t−2 + γct + ηi + ict
using the corresponding first stage
Cict = κ11(AW )i,t−1 + κ21(AE)i,t−1 + ξ11(AW )i,t−2 + ξ21(AE)i,t−2 (2.3)
+ θ1 1(AE)i,t−2 · 1(Post 1999)t−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
HB 282
+θ2 1(AW )i,t−2 · 1(Post 2002)t−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
HB 364
+ θ3 1(U)i,t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
HB 3, 55, 282
+Γct + ψi + νict ,
where y is an outcome for district i in school year t and commuting zone c. C is a measure of charter
competition faced by district i in year t.17 1(AW ) is a binary equal to one if the district was in
“Academic Watch” one period ago, denoted with subscript t− 1 or two periods ago, denoted t− 2.
1(AE) is similarly defined, but for districts previously rated as being in “Academic Emergency”.
1(Post 1999/2002) denote binaries equal to one if the t − 2 school year occurred on or after 1999
16Recall that charter potential during period t− 1 is a function of t− 2 district ratings, allowing me to separately
control for period t− 1 academic ratings.
17Charter competition is measured with error. To the extent that the instruments are correlated with the true
level of charter competition and are uncorrelated with measurement error, estimating (2.2) will correct for the
mismeasurement.
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and 2002, respectively.18 1(U) denotes a binary for whether the district qualified for new charter
entry in the previous year by being one of the urban eight/twenty-one districts or a district in
Lucas county. All other variables are as previously defined.
This setup is embedded within the baseline difference-in-difference framework from (2.1). Thus, the
remaining threat to validity comes from any change in the relationship between lagged AE(AW)
status and outcomes before and after 1999(2002) that is not due to the introduction of the given
charter policy across districts within a given commute-zone.
No Child Left Behind and the Great Recession
In 2002, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) was signed into law as an update to the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Because the introduction of NCLB accountability measures
overlap with the implementation of the aforementioned Ohio charter policies, NCLB presents a
potential concern for the validity of my identification strategy. Under NCLB, districts were rated by
whether they met indicators based on the percent of various student subgroups passing standardized
tests. Districts were considered to be on an acceptable trajectory if they met their “Adequate Yearly
Progress” (AYP) requirements and schools/districts consecutively failing to meet AYP requirements
received increasingly harsh federal sanctions as failing tenure increased.19
AYP criteria play only a minor roll in the determination of AE/AW ratings in Ohio and thus have
limited potential to affect TPSD charter eligibility.20 However, because NCLB was implemented
within a similar window to the charter policies I exploit, it is plausible that the introduction of
NCLB could directly affect how TPSDs allocate their resources outside of its effect on charter school
18The 2000 law used AE status as a criterion for TPSD charter eligibility starting with the 1999 school year. The
2003 policy made TPSD charter eligibility reliant on AW status starting with the 2002 school year. Hence, I interact
t− 2 TPSD ratings with t− 2 1999 and 2002 indicators.
19Sanctions included setting aside part of a school’s Title I funding to allow students to transfer out of their school
of residence and to provide free tutoring. Schools consecutively failing AYP even risked closure.
20Specifically, districts with Ohio-specific state indicators between 50-74.9 percent or that have a performance
index score of 80-89.9 are rated as “Continuous Improvement” if they meet AYP or “Academic Watch” if they fail
AYP. For all other cases, AYP status cannot change a district’s final categorical rating (See Online Appendix Figure
D.1).
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transfers creating a potential bias in my instruments. With that said, my t−1 lagged district rating
information will partially control for any NCLB direct effects. Further, while NCLB was signed
into law in 2002, many of the sanctions could not be implemented until schools/districts repeatedly
failed AYP, potentially making the full-impact of NCLB not felt until around 2004 to 2005.
In order to test the sensitivity of my estimates to potential NCLB contamination, in Online Ap-
pendix E, I present two sets of robustness checks. The first set attempts to control directly for
NCLB policies using the entire regression sample, while the second uses my original specifications
but limits the sample to pre-NCLB school years. Incidentally, because the Great Recession oc-
curred several years after the passage of NCLB, this set of specifications also tests the extent to
which the Great Recession may be driving my results. Estimates are stable across both sets of
robustness checks providing evidence that NCLB sanctions and the Great Recession do not present
a first-order validity concern.
Interpreting the Local Average Treatment Effect
Due to the complicated instrument structure, it is worth carefully describing the subset of districts
that identify the local average treatment effect (LATE) (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). My empirical
strategy estimates a LATE from the population of schools that were eligible in the previous period
for new charter entry based on either low academic ratings or large urban district categorical
eligibility. As a result, my estimates provide the causal effect of charter competition specifically for
these low-performing districts and will miss any heterogeneous charter effects at different points of
the district performance distribution.21
Further, I am only identifying the effect of charter entry from charters serving a given TPSD.
Specifically, the instruments leverage only increased charter transfers resulting from the charter
potential status of the given district. To see this, consider a TPSD that was ineligible for new
charter entry last period but is neighboring a district that recently opened a new charter school.
Even if the TPSD sends students to the new charter in the neighboring district, because the TPSD
21Specifically, the LATE is an efficiently weighted average of the causal effects for districts made eligible from
either low academic ratings or urban district categorical eligibility (Angrist et al., 2016). However, because urban
districts often receive poor academic ratings, my estimates will primarily reflect effects for low-performing districts.
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was ineligible for new charter entry these transfers do not contribute identifying variation. Thus,
my strategy also abstracts from estimating the effect of any inter-district spill-overs of charter
competition.
2.3.3 Adjusting Methodology for Contract Outcomes
Union contract outcomes have a fundamentally different data structure than the district-by-school-
year outcomes discussed in 2.3.2. As a result, to estimate the effect of charter competition on
contract outcomes, I must augment the estimation procedure. One important difference between
contract outcomes and district-by-school-year outcomes is that union contracts are negotiated in-
termittently instead of annually. Below, I describe the bias that would result had I attempted to
assess annual teacher salary measures from staff data instead of intermittent contract measures.
Following this discussion, I detail how I adjust my estimation framework for collectively bargained
contract outcomes.
Mechanical Bias from Partially Fixed Outcomes
In this section, I demonstrate that even ignoring the biases arising from selection concerns, a
standard approach to estimating the effect of competition on negotiated salaries is mechanically
biased if the researcher treats salaries as though they vary annually when in reality the contracts are
negotiated intermittently.22 In Online Appendix F, I derive a closed-form solution for the amount
of mechanical bias that results from treating the dependent variable as though it can vary in each
period, when in reality, it only varies periodically.
Specifically, if I denote β as the true parameter value for the variable of interest, x, with the
accompanying estimate β̂, the mechanical bias is given by
β̂ = β[1− δ (1− ρx(g))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mechanical Bias
] (2.4)
22For example, Vedder and Hall (2000) study the effect of private school competition on teacher salaries in Ohio
and treat salaries as if they vary annually.
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where δ is the fraction of outcome observations fixed in the sample, but treated as if they vary and
ρx(g) is the correlation coefficient between x and g lags of x. Because ρx(g) ∈ [−1, 1] the estimate
can either overstate or understate the truth depending on the autocorrelation in x. However, in
applications using data with a positive serial correlation in x, the bias attenuates estimates. Notice,
that the bias disappears if δ = 0, i.e., that all outcomes vary annually, or if ρx(g) = 1, i.e., x is
perfectly serially correlated so that x values during a year when the outcome can vary are a perfect
representation of the x values during the fixed outcome years. In Online Appendix F.1, I provide
evidence from Monte Carlo simulations that the predicted bias from (2.4) matches the estimated
bias when the truth is known. I also show that restricting the sample to only observations in which
the outcome can vary completely mitigates the bias.23
This bias is similar to the well-known “seam bias” arising from telescoping behavior of respon-
dents in important retrospective panels such as the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(see Pischke, 1995; Ham et al., 2009; Pei, 2015).24 While not directly applicable to duration or
event study models as estimated in Ham et al. (2009) and Pei (2015), any researcher interested in
estimating the effect of some x on y using retrospective panels can potentially mitigate the bias
resulting from telescoping behavior by restricting the sample only to observations from the month
the survey was collected and omit observations from retrospective months. However, further work
is needed to formalize this extension and fully characterize its implications for retrospective panels.
In the setting of this study, contracts are negotiated roughly every three years (i.e., δ ≈ 0.667¯)
and the serial correlation in charter competition between non-contract years and the corresponding
previous negotiaion year is roughly 0.9 (i.e., ρx ≈ 0.9). Thus, estimates of the effect of charter
competition on annual measures are predicted to be attenuated by about 7 percent. In order
to avoid this mechanical bias when estimating the effect of charter competition on collectively
bargained wage contracts, the researcher must observe the contract negotiation dates to correctly
specify the years in which observed outcomes are able to adjust. As a result, my empirical analysis
for contract outcomes will be conducted on only the years with newly negotiated contracts.
23For example, Card (1990) studies the effect of previous collectively bargained wage rates on subsequent wages
by assessing union contract outcomes directly.
24Telescoping occurs when respondents answer retrospective questions using information from the present.
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Difference-in-Difference Framework
A contract-start-year-by-district uniquely identifies a particular contract. Further, there is a sepa-
rate salary structure for teachers with different levels of education.25 For brevity, I designate each
of these categories as different “salary tracks.” Thus, the unit of observation for a given pay scale
step (e.g., entry or top salary) is at the district-by-salary-track-by-contract-start-year level and
regressions are limited only to the start years of new contracts. For my baseline specification, I
estimate a model similar to equation (2.1). Specifically, I estimate
yiscτ = α+ β · Ci,τ -1 + γcτ + ξs + φi + iscτ (2.5)
where yiscτ is a contract outcome variable occurring during the contract-start-year τ for district i,
commuting zone c, and salary track s, γcτ are contract-start-year-by-commuting-zone c fixed effects,
φi and ξs are respectively district and salary-track fixed effects, and iscτ is the error term. Ci,τ−1
denotes the charter competition faced by district i during the school year prior to the contract start
year τ (denoted τ − 1). The construction of this variable accounts for the fact that contracts are
negotiated during the year prior to the contract start year. I choose to model charter competition
as the amount that would be faced during the year that the contract is negotiated as opposed to
the year the contract is enforced. Standard errors are clustered by district.
Instrumental Variables Framework
For contract outcomes, I adjust (2.2) by adding salary track fixed effects ξs. Further, I add an
additional lag for all right-hand-side variables because the relevant charter competition is now in
the school year prior to the contract-start-year τ − 1 (see Figure 2.3b). Specifically, I regress:
yiscτ = βCisc,τ -1 + δ11(AW )i,τ -2 + δ21(AE)i,τ -2 (2.6)
+ φ11(AW )i,τ -3 + φ21(AE)i,τ -3 + γcτ + ξs + ηi + iscτ .
25There is a separate salary schedule for teachers with no degree, a Bachelor’s Degree, a Bachelor’s Degree and
150 semester hours, a Master’s Degree, a Master’s Degree and 15 additional graduate semester hours, a Master’s
Degree and 30 additional graduate semester hours, and a Doctoral Degree.
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The first stage is given by
Cisc,τ -1 = κ11(AW )i,τ -2 + κ21(AE)i,τ -2 + ξ11(AW )i,τ -3 + ξ21(AE)i,τ -3 (2.7)
+ θ11(AE)i,τ -3 · 1(Post 1999)τ -3 + θ21(AW )i,τ -3 · 1(Post 2002)τ -3
+ θ31(U)i,τ -2 + Γcτ + ϕs + ψi + νisc,τ -1 .
2.3.4 Validating the Instrumental Variables Strategy
Because my instruments largely exploit variation in districts at the bottom of the performance
distribution, one concern about my identification strategy is that these districts are trending down-
ward for reasons outside of charter competition and that these unobservables correlate both with
trends in charter transfers and district finance.
I validate my empirical strategy by comparing the effects of a district receiving an “Academic
Watch” (AW) rating before and after the introduction of the 2003 charter entry policy for a variety
of outcomes. Recall the 2003 policy authorized charters to open within districts receiving an AW
rating during the previous school year. If my empirical strategy successfully isolates the variation
in charter entry driven by lagged AW status, then the effect of lagged AW ratings on any outcome
relative to 2003 should be zero for 2002 and earlier and then potentially non-zero thereafter. I
focus on the 2003 policy because I have the longest panel of pre- and post-policy data. Ohio first
began implementing this particular rating system in 1998, making 2000 the first year I am able to





{βt1(AW )i,t−2 × 1(Year = t)}+ δ1(AW )i,t−2 + γct + ηi + εict , (2.8)
where yict is the given outcome for district i during school year t, in commute zone c, and 1(AW )
and fixed effects are defined as in (2.2). Fixed effects are included to net out unobservables already
accounted for by the baseline difference-in-difference specification.26 Each βt captures the year-
specific effect of receiving an AW rating two years prior to school year t. In 2003, TPSDs were
26The year main effects are absorbed by γct.
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first eligible for charters to begin the paperwork to enter based on AW status. Thus, new charters
entering from the 2003 law would be able to open as early as the 2004 school year. As a result, I
benchmark all estimates relative to 2003. For contract outcomes, I adapt equation (2.8) using the





{βτ1(AW )i,τ−3 × 1(Contract-start-year = τ)} (2.9)
+ δ1(AW )i,τ−3 + γcτ + ηi + ξs + εiscτ .
Notice that these validity checks only exploit a portion of my identifying variation. The full speci-
fication benefits from the additional power provided by the urban district and 2000 AE eligibility
policies.
Figure 2.4a displays the time-varying effects of receiving an AW rating two years earlier on the
fraction of students transferring out of the district. The difference between the average effects
before and after 2003 provide a visual for the first-stage estimates of the policy. For earlier school
years, the differential effects of a lagged AW rating on charter entry is statistically indistinguishable
from the 2003 effect. For 2004 and later, a lagged AW rating generates significantly more charter
entry than in 2003. This pattern supports the validity of my instrument because charter entry is
only driven by lagged AW ratings after the relevant policy change.
In the subsequent panels of Figure 2.4, I present the differential effects of lagged AW status on
various outcomes, which depict the reduced-form estimates of the AW policy. While individual
estimates are often underpowered, the overall trends are still illuminating.27 First, in Figure 2.4b,
I plot the effect of a district receiving an AW rating on the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of district-
level appraised property values.28 This measure could reflect information about how the economy
as a whole is affected over time. For the pre-2003 years, the effect of being rated in AW two years
27For the later years in the sample, few districts were eligible for charter entry based on lagged AW ratings (see
Table 2.2).
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as y →∞ (see footnote 17 of Cascio and Narayan,
2015). I use the IHS instead of the standard log transformation to avoid dropping observations with null values.
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earlier is not statistically different than the 2003 effect, but post-2003 the effects inversely track
the estimated charter entry effects. This figure foreshadows the result in Section 2.5 that charter
competition depresses the appraised property values used to compute district local revenues.29 The
absence of a pre-trend during the pre-2003 years suggests that this effect is attributable to the
increase in charter competition accompanying a lagged AW rating instead of other unobserved
trends not handled by my estimation strategy.
Figures 2.4c and 2.4d depict the same test on instructional expenditures and capital outlays. Over-
all, there is little evidence of pre-trends prior to 2003 providing support for the efficacy of the
identification strategy. Further, I find evidence of negative post-2003 effects on instructional spend-
ing and noisy, positive effects on capital outlays. Finally, the results for the rest of the outcomes
explored in this paper are presented in Figures G.1 through G.7 of Online Appendix G. Overall,
these tests support the instrumental variables framework from (2.2) as a plausibly valid estimation
strategy.
2.4 Student and Teacher Mobility Responses
Before looking at how charter competition affects the budget and resource allocation among tra-
ditional public school districts, it is helpful to assess how charter competition influences student
and teacher mobility. There is a mechanical relationship between charter transfers and the sending
district’s total enrollment. Losing one student to a charter school will mechanically decrease the
sending district’s enrollment by one. If not, then charter transfers likely correlate with other types
of either student entry into or exit from the TPSD suggesting that my estimation strategy is unable
to fully isolate the effect of charter transfers. To test this directly, I estimate equation (2.2) using
“potential enrollment” (i.e., actual enrollment + charter transfers) as the outcome; however, I in-
stead measure charter transfers and “potential enrollment” in levels. Theoretically, this regression
should yield a null coefficient if charter competition does not induce any other type of entry into or
exit from the district. Indeed, I estimate that the effect of transferring a single student to a charter
29While the effect of lagged AW ratings on property values are the most extreme during the Great Recession, I
show in Online Appendix E that the Great Recession does not drive my results.
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school on the district’s overall “potential enrollment” is statistically indistinguishable from zero (a
0.099 point estimate with a standard error of 0.235). This is consistent with the idea that charter
competition is not inducing additional exit to private schools for example (Chakrabarti and Roy,
2016) or exit from the state.
Table 2.3 displays the effect of a one percentage point increase in the fraction of TPSD students who
transfer to charters on a range of mobility outcomes. The table shows the results from baseline OLS
estimates of equation (2.1) and my preferred instrumental variables (IV) estimates of equation (2.2).
The accompanying first-stage estimates and the weak instrument test are located in the table notes.
To better understand what types of students are leaving the districts, columns 1 and 2 respectively
present the effect of charter transfers on the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of free/reduced-price
lunch (FRL) eligible and special education student enrollment. Because these and other outcomes
can take on null values, I use an IHS transformation to give the coefficients a similar interpretation
as a log transformation without losing null observations. I estimate that a one percentage point
increase in the fraction of charter transfers reduces FRL eligible and special education student
enrollment by 6.9 percent and 3.2 percent, respectively.
In response to the overall decline in the number of enrolled students, if districts did nothing to
adjust teacher labor supply, then student-teacher ratios would decrease. However, columns 3 and 4
show that districts respond to the decrease in enrollment by reducing the size of the teaching force
in lock-step. Student-teacher ratios are preserved by a 3.3 percent reduction in overall teaching
staff. Column 5 reveals that this reduction is partly driven by hiring 7.6 percent fewer new teachers.
Finally, columns 6 and 7 show the effect of charter competition on teacher exit and entry between
charter schools and TPSDs. As is pointed out by Jackson (2012), because teachers can only move
between charters and TPSDs when charters are present, there will be a mechanically positive
relationship between charter competition and these measures of teacher mobility. I estimate that
a percentage point increase in charter competition increases teacher exit to charters by 9.5 percent
and increases teacher entry into TPSDs from charters by 4.7 percent. However, note that these
estimates are off of an extremely small base. Specifically, districts at the 99th percentile of the
TPSD-charter teacher mobility distribution only lose 1 teacher to charters and also only gain 1
teacher from charters. Overall, the evidence from this table supports a conceptual framework
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where districts are competing with charters over students instead of over teachers.30 Further note
that across the table, the baseline estimates are qualitatively similar to my preferred specification
though are more precisely estimated and are smaller in magnitude.
All three of the instruments generate statistically significant increases in charter entry (see the
table note).31 For example, a district with a two-period lagged “Academic Emergency” rating
after the 1999 policy experiences roughly a 1.5 percentage point increase in the fraction of students
attending a charter school compared to an equally-rated district prior to 1999. The table note
also provides a weak instrument test. The large F statistic for the excluded instruments show that
these regressions do not suffer from weak instruments. Hansen J statistics and p-values for tests
of overidentification are provided in Online Appendix Table H.1 for all outcomes explored in this
paper. The null hypotheses for these tests are that the instruments are valid. Across the different
outcomes, I find suggestive evidence supporting the validity of my instruments.
2.5 District Revenues
With the responses of student and teacher mobility to charter transfers in mind, I now analyze
how charter competition influences TPSD revenues. In Ohio, when a student transfers to a charter
school, the state funding is still paid to the student’s district of residence as if the student were
still enrolled. However, the district is then required to transfer a formula-derived amount of state
funding directly to the charter. This transfer is recorded as an expenditure.
Panel A of Table 2.4 presents baseline OLS estimates from equation (2.1) and my preferred IV
estimates from equation (2.2) for the IHS of real total, federal, and local revenues.32 Due to the
30In nearly every dimension, employment at a TPSD dominates employment at a charter school. Pay is often
better, there is superior job security due to union affiliation, and work hours are often shorter. As a result, it is
plausible that TPSDs will not be competing with charters to retain their teachers.
31The urban district instrument is only marginally significant in these specifications. For the remaining specifi-
cations in Tables 2.4 to 2.6, this instrument is significant at the 1 percent level because I utilize a slightly larger
regression sample.
32Since the treatment is a loss of students to charter schools, in order to avoid a mechanical denominator bias
in my results Tables 2.4 through 2.6 present estimates for total revenue/expenditure categories instead of per-pupil
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slightly increased sample size as compared to the student and teacher mobility regressions from
Table 2.3, the first-stage estimates are even more precisely estimated (see table notes). I find
that increasing the fraction of students transferring to a charter school by one percentage point
decreases total revenues by 1.8 percent. To put the size of this effect into context, a percentage
point increase in the fraction of students transferring to a charter represents an increase of roughly
half of a standard deviation (see Online Appendix Table H.2) or about half of the growth in average
charter competition from 1998 to 2010.33
Decomposing total revenues by government level (columns 2 and 3) reveals that charter competi-
tion induces revenue losses at both the federal and local levels. However, I estimate that charter
competition has little effect on state revenues.34 The lack of impact that charter transfers have
on state revenues is not surprising. Because state funding is paid to the sending district and then
transferred to the charter as an expenditure, there is no mechanical link between charter transfers
and state revenues. However, while technically counted as an expenditure, these charter payments
should be thought of as effectively decreasing the state funding available to TPSDs.
The negative effect of charter competition on federal funding is also not surprising. Major federally
funded programs contained in the Child Nutrition Act and the Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act for example provide per-pupil funding for certain eligible student groups. Distribution
of these federal entitlement grants to school districts are formula-based. Thus, when a student
funded under any of these federal programs transfers to a charter school the accompanying federal
revenues are deducted from the TPSD and are instead allocated to the charter. Recall from Table
2.3 that charter competition decreases the TPSD enrollment of FRL-eligible and special education
students. As a result, charter competition should mechanically decrease federal revenues.
To see these channels empirically, I further decompose federal revenue effects in Panel B. Columns
5 and 6 present estimates for two large federal programs and column 7 presents the effect on all
other federal revenues. Federal funding is decreasing across both programs.
values.
33The fraction of students transferring to charters in 2010 was roughly 0.03 among districts in the regression
sample.
34For my IV specification, I estimate that a one percentage point increase in charter competition decreases state
revenues by a statistically insignificant 1.0 percent.
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Unlike the effects of charter competition on federal and state revenues, the negative effect on local
revenues is unexpected. I explore potential mechanisms in Panel C by decomposing local revenues
into the contribution of local property taxes, school lunch funding, and all other local revenues
in columns 8 through 10. While local revenues are decreasing across all three measures, I focus
my discussion on local property taxes because they comprise 96.5 percent of local revenues (LSC,
2011). Charter competition can affect local property taxes through two main channels. First,
competition can directly decrease appraised property values and, in turn, the base valuation being
taxed. Second, charters can decrease the levied millage rates (i.e., one-tenth of one percent) that
determine the fraction of the base property values being taxed.
I test these potential mechanisms in columns 11 through 13 of Panel D. In column 11, I present the
effect of charter competition directly on the total appraised property values within the TPSD. My
estimates suggest that a percentage point increase in the fraction of TPSD students transferring
to charters decreases real appraised property values by 2.5 percent. This property value measure
aggregates residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial, and mineral properties, as well as other
public properties (LSC, 2011).35
Column 12 presents the effect of competition solely on appraised residential property values. Char-
ter competition generates nearly identical percent losses for both total property values and resi-
dential property values.36 In column 13, I find that the millage rates tend to decrease as charter
competition increases. A simple back-of-the-envelope decomposition reveals that a majority of the
decrease in total revenues is driven by the change in total property values.37
Property values are appraised every six years by a county auditor through visual inspection. Every
three years, the appraised value is updated using market transaction data and forecasting algorithms
to estimate the value of the property (Sullivan and Sobul, 2010). As a result, the decrease in
35Residential and agricultural properties make up 79.1 percent of total property values in 2008 (LSC, 2011).
36In Section 2.3.2 and Online Appendix E, I present evidence that these depressed housing values are not driven
by the Great Recession.
37Local revenues (LR) are calculated using LR = millage
1000
× Property Values. The marginal effect of charter
competition on property values relative to the average is roughly a $10,200,000 decrease. Relative to average millage
rates, a decline in property values of this magnitude decreases local revenues by roughly $300,000. Conversely, relative
to average property values, a 0.219 drop in the millage rate decreases local revenue by approximately $90,000.
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appraised residential property values could reflect true depreciation of underlying housing values as
well as changes in the appraisal process. To rigorously assess the housing capitalization of charter
schools I would need parcel-level housing sales data as in Imberman et al. (2016).
Still, the negative effect of charter competition on appraised housing valuation is unexpected. If
there is an excess demand for schooling, one might suppose that additional schools would positively
capitalize into local housing values. However, competing forces plausibly exist. There is evidence
in the literature, and I find evidence in Ohio that charter school transfers generate fiscal stress
for the sending TPSDs (Bifulco and Reback, 2014; Arsen and Ni, 2012b). In the spirit of Bifulco
and Reback (2014), I estimate that for each student transferring to a charter school, the sending
TPSD will on average save $4,027 in variable costs from not having to educate the transferring
student.38 However, this savings only accounts for roughly two-thirds of the state revenue reductions
accompanying each charter transfer yielding a net loss. If fiscal stress lowers perceived TPSD quality,
then housing prices within the TPSD would also likely decrease to reflect these perceptions (Black,
1999). Thus, the direction of the effect of charter competition on housing prices depends on which
force dominates.
There are several reasons to believe that the negative pressures could plausibly dominate in Ohio.
First, if charter quality is low, then opening new charters may not generate positive housing cap-
italization. The Ohio Department of Education places relatively few restrictions on the eligibility
of charter school authorizers and implements limited restrictions to ensure quality control.39 As a
result, the quality of the average Ohio charter school may be lower than in other states and may
be negatively capitalized into housing values.
Second, positive effects likely apply generally across large geographic areas, while negative pressures
are likely district-specific. Neither brick-and-mortar nor digital charter schools have geographic
38I separate variable costs into rough measures related to student- and teacher-related per-unit expenditures (e.g.,
pupil services vs. teacher salaries). I then convert my measure of per-teacher variable costs to per-pupil variable
costs by multiplying by 0.441, my IV estimate for the effect of a single charter transfer on total employed teachers.
My final variable costs measure then combines the per-pupil variable costs with this measure of per-teacher variable
costs converted to per-pupil units.
39Ohio has been referred to as the “Wild, Wild West” of charter schools by organizations such as the National
Association of Charter School Authorizers (O’Donnell, 2014).
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enrollment boundaries allowing the potential capitalization gains to spread across district borders.
As a result, charter presence may provide a general housing value premium across districts and only
a negligible relative premium between nearby districts. Conversely, any housing valuation penalties
due to charter-related fiscal stress on local TPSDs would show up as differences in relative housing
values between districts. This is relevant for my setting because if new charter entry in a given
district improves school choice for parents across all districts in the commuting-zone, this general
effect will be subsumed by my commute-zone-by-year fixed effects.40
Third, housing prices within the subset of districts identifying the LATE might be more sensitive
to charter loss than the average district. In an unpublished working paper, Buerger (2014) finds
negative effects for charter competition on housing prices in poorer neighborhoods. In Section 2.3.2,
I described how my IV strategy provides LATE estimates for low-performing school districts and in
Ohio the most economically disadvantaged districts also tend to be the lowest performing. Thus,
consistent with Buerger’s findings, my negative housing capitalization effects are local to poorer
neighborhoods.
There is additional evidence in the literature that charter competition may put downward pressure
on residential property values. Imberman et al. (2016) study housing sales price responses to
charter competition in the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and find no effect on
average. However, upon restricting attention to houses outside of the LAUSD, Imberman et al.
(2016) find that additional charters entering within a household’s TPSD boundary have a negative
effect on housing sales prices.
As students transfer to charter schools, the only mechanical effect on a district’s budget is the
required transfer of state funding to the charter. A tempting yet spurious conclusion would be to
infer that charters only reduce the overall size of the budget through this mechanical increase in
charter-transfer expenditures. However, the main takeaway from Table 2.4 is that charter compe-
tition places additional fiscal stress on TPSDs as federal revenues decline from “at-risk” student
transfers and local revenues are lost from depressed residential housing valuations.
40Regressing the main IV specification in (2.2), but substituting year fixed effects for commute-zone-by-year fixed
effects generates statistically indistinguishable estimates. As a result, this concern is not likely a first-order issue.
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2.6 Collectively Bargained Teacher Contracts
In Ohio, instructional expenditures alone make up over half of total expenditures. Further, Ohio
is a heavily unionized state and teacher pay is determined through collective bargaining between
TPSDs and teachers’ unions. As a result, before assessing the effect of charter competition on
general district resource allocation, I first highlight the effect of charter competition directly on
collectively bargained contract outcomes.
Table 2.5 presents the results from estimating the OLS and IV specifications respectively from
equations (2.5) and (2.6) for several collectively bargained contract outcomes. Column 1 reports
that a percentage point increase in the fraction of TPSD students attending a charter decreases
real entry-level salaries by 0.2 percent though this effect is not statistically significant. Column 2
presents the effect of charter transfers on top-level salaries. In both specifications, I estimate that
competition does not affect top-level salaries. Recall that in the SERB data, top-level salaries are
often coded as the lowest value for which an additional year of experience has no effect on salary.41
As a result, in column 3, I present results for top-level salaries imputed from ODE teacher-level
data using the algorithm detailed in Online Appendix B.42 For my preferred estimates, I find that
a percentage point increase in the fraction of students transferring to charter schools decreases
imputed top-level salaries by 1.0 percent. Relative to the average imputed top-level salary, this
translates to a $599 annual salary decrease for teachers at the top of their pay scale.
While these decreases may appear an individual teacher’s perspective they reflect non-negligible
instructional expenditure reductions for the district as a whole. The average TPSD employs 176
teachers implying that a percentage point increase in charter transfers induces instructional cost re-
ductions up to roughly $100,000.43 To further put these effect sizes into context with the literature,
Hoxby (1996) estimates that initial unionization increases subsequent teacher salaries by 5 percent.
Using this estimate as a baseline for the union wage premium, I estimate that a percentage point
41For example, in Online Appendix Table A.2 the top salaries for non-degree, BA, and MA teachers would be
coded respectively as $29,265, $40,401, and $46,616.
42Specifically, this measure is the created by taking the maximum salary from the 15-20th imputed pay scale steps
using the method in Online Appendix B and filling in missing values with SERB top-level contract outcomes.
43Potential cost reduction is calculated assuming that all teachers are at the top of the pay scale.
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increase in the fraction of charter transfers erodes about 20 percent of the union wage premium for
the most experienced teachers.
Column 4 characterizes whether charter competition changes the slope of the negotiated salary
profile. In these regressions the outcome is the difference between real top- and entry-level salaries
divided by the number of steps it takes to reach a top-level salary. I estimate that charter compe-
tition flattens the pay scale, though the effect is only significant for the baseline OLS specification.
In addition to affecting the negotiated salaries directly, charter competition could also change the
length of time it takes to ascend the pay scale ladder. Column 5 shows the effect of charter compe-
tition on the number of steps required to fully ascend the pay scale. While marginally statistically
significant, these estimates represent economically insignificant increases seeing that on average
teachers face 15 pay scale steps.
Next, I estimate the effect of charter competition on the entire negotiated salary distribution rather
than solely focusing on the top and bottom of the pay scale. This analysis assesses the degree
to which the previous negative salary effects generalize across the rest of the pay scale. Even
though SERB-provided data only include salary information for entry and top pay scale steps, I
approximate the negotiated salaries for each intermediate step using teacher-level wage data to
estimate equation (B.1) in Online Appendix B.
Figure 2.5 presents the results from estimating equations (2.5) and (2.6) for each imputed pay scale
step. The baseline OLS estimates show almost no response across the pay scale. However, my
preferred IV estimates suggest that both entry-level and top-level salaries decrease in the presence
of charter competition. I estimate that a percentage point increase in the fraction of charter
transfers decreases collectively bargained entry-level salaries by 1.8 percent and top-level salaries
by 2.3 percent. Interestingly, charter competition has almost no statistically significant effect across
the middle of the pay scale distribution. One explanation is that a majority of the teaching staff is
comprised of new teachers at the bottom of the pay scale and veteran teachers who have already
reached the top-level salaries. By decreasing salaries for these two groups, districts would be able
to enjoy the largest savings.
Overall, finding that charter competition decreases collectively bargained salaries may seem un-
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expected, especially considering the positive effects found in non-union settings by Taylor (2006,
2010) and Jackson (2012). However, there are a few ways to frame these findings. First, because
charter schools often pay lower salaries to their teachers (Arsen and Ni, 2012a), competition over
students may put downward pressure on TPSD-negotiated salaries to match charter salaries.
Second, this could be a story of union/TPSD negotiating power. Recall Table 2.3 showed that as
districts lose students to charter schools, the size of the teaching labor force reduces in lock-step.
As a result, charter competition could give TPSDs leverage in contract negotiations. If TPSDs
cannot decrease teacher salaries and reallocate resources to prevent student transfers, then the size
of the teacher labor force represented by the unions will drop. If the threat of downsizing provides
leverage for TPSDs, then the loss of union bargaining power may reduce the artificially high union
monopoly wage.
2.7 Resource Allocation
Table 2.6 presents the effect of charter competition on district expenditures. Column 1 provides
an estimate of the financial burden placed on TPSDs from charter transfers. Increasing the frac-
tion of students transferring to a charter by one percentage point, increases the amount of money
transferred to charters by roughly $200,000. On average, a percentage point of a district’s po-
tential enrollment is about 30 students, which equates to roughly $6,600 transferred per student,
approximately the baseline formula amount in 2010.
To see how total expenditures are influenced by charter competition beyond the mechanical charter-
transfer increase, column 2 presents the IHS of total expenditures after netting out any payments
to charter schools. IV estimates suggest that total expenditures fall by 1.7 percent which matches
up closely with the estimated 1.8 percent decrease in total revenues from Table 2.4.
Columns 3 through 5 present estimates for the effect of charter competition on the allocation of
remaining district resources. I show above that increased charter transfers decrease both negotiated
teacher salaries as well as the size of the overall teaching force. As a result, we should expect to
see fewer resources spent on teaching expenditures in the presence of charter competition. Indeed,
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IV estimates suggest that TPSDs facing a percentage point increase in the fraction of students
transferring to charters spend 2.3 percent less on instructional expenditures. Curiously though,
these districts spend 7.3 percent more on capital outlays while spending 2.8 percent less on all
other expenditures. To explore the mechanism driving the surprising increase in total capital
outlays, columns 6 and 7 respectively present estimates for the IHS of new construction capital
outlays and all other capital outlays. Increases in capital outlays are driven by new construction
expenditures (a 11.3 percent increase). These effects are robust across a variety of alternative
measures of charter competition (see Online Appendix Table C.1).
2.8 Discussion
There are several reasons why TPSDs might allocate resources toward capital outlays in response
to charter competition. First, suppose principals believe that capital outlays enhance subsequent
student performance and school ratings.44 Because parents factor school ratings information into
student enrollment decisions (Cullen et al., 2006; Hastings and Weinstein, 2008; Hanushek et al.,
2007), charter competition provides incentives for district administrators to allocate resources to
areas that generate gains to student achievement and boost subsequent enrollment. Thus, if capital
outlays improve student performance, then charter competition creates incentives for TPSDs to
boost student achievement in ways predicted by traditional school choice theory (see Friedman,
1955, 1997; Hoxby, 2003a,b).
Second, the literature provides no clear suggestion for the ideal combination of school expenditures
to optimize student achievement and subsequent school ratings given a fixed budget.45 Thus, it
44The literature is mixed regarding whether capital spending resulting from narrowly approved local capital bond
referenda affect subsequent student achievement. Martorell et al. (2015) find precisely estimated null effects, while
Cellini et al. (2010) and Hong and Zimmer (2016) provide evidence that capital outlays can have positive achievement
effects several years after the bond passage.
45“Unfortunately, identification of truly exogenous determinants of ... resource allocations ... is sufficiently rare
that other compromises in the data and modelling are frequently required. These coincidental compromises jeopardise
the ability to obtain clean estimates of resource effects and may limit the generalisability of any findings” (Hanushek,
2003, pg. 83).
79
is plausible that district administrators may also be unsure how to boost achievement through
resource allocation. If administrators believe that parents value facility condition, then resources
may be channeled to capital outlays where each dollar spent is clearly linked to visible facility
improvement regardless of subsequent student achievement. This type of allocation is consistent
with qualitative survey evidence on how principals in D.C. try to insulate against charter transfers.
“The physical appearance of school buildings was said to have the greatest impact on enrollment
trends... We noted that principals did not tend to focus on test scores or academic achievement in
their lists of attributes that parents sought when selecting schools” (Sullivan et al., 2008, p. 20).
If administrators are spending money on capital because parents value it directly (Cellini et al.,
2010) and not because administrators believe it improves student performance, then in this sce-
nario, charter competition does not necessarily improve TPSD achievement efficiency. However,
competition is still efficiency-enhancing in the sense that it causes districts to spend in areas valued
directly by parents.
Finally, allocation toward capital outlays may be the result of information acquisition costs. Sup-
pose parents value student achievement, but signals of school quality vary in their acquisition costs.
While motivated parents will seek out already available school quality information when provided
school choice (Lovenheim and Walsh, 2014), low-cost albeit noisy signals of school quality such
as facility condition potentially inform even the time-constrained or less motivated parents. In
this case, TPSDs may respond to competition by allocating resources toward these salient sig-
nals regardless of the impact on subsequent achievement. This behavior is again consistent with
qualitative survey evidence from D.C. principals.46 If parents only value facility condition because
they mistakenly infer information about a school’s potential education production and if capital
outlays do not affect achievement, then charter competition actually exacerbates the misallocation
of resources. Under this framework, simple policies can potentially correct this incentive structure
to instead encourage TPSDs to allocate resources in ways that improve student achievement.47
46“According to our sample, it appears that most of the changes that schools are making in order to attract more
students [from charters] have more to do with services for parents and the image of the school than with improving
the educational attainment of students” (Sullivan et al., 2008, p. 21).
47Reducing the cost to obtain school achievement information may help correct competitive incentives (Hastings
and Weinstein, 2008). For example, adding simple statistics comparing academic ratings between the schools in
the parent’s choice set onto any required school choice form could provide such salient and relevant school quality
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These three scenarios highlight that charter competition has the potential, but is not guaranteed to
encourage TPSDs to reallocate resources in ways that enhance student achievement as predicted by
economic theory. Disentangling the mechanisms underlying why charter competition causes TPSDs
to reallocate resources is a rich area for future work. Overall, because facility condition is likely
valued by parents, as measured by positive housing capitalization (Cellini et al., 2010), I interpret
my results as evidence that charter competition causes TPSDs to allocate resources toward areas
that are likely valued directly by parents, but that do not necessarily improve student achievement.
2.9 Conclusion
The charter school movement is one of the fastest growing education reforms in the Unites States.
Charters are designed in part to inject competition into the education market to boost TPSD stu-
dent achievement. There is a large and mixed literature assessing the effect of charter competition
directly on TPSD student achievement (Epple et al., 2015). However, little attention has been
given to potential mechanisms. I fill this gap in the literature by analyzing the effect of charter
competition on TPSD revenue and resource allocation. I also pay special attention to how charter
competition affects collectively bargained teacher compensation in a strongly unionized state. To
accomplish this, I exploit both the long charter approval process as well as plausibly exogenous
variation in policies that determine the location and timing of Ohio charter entry in an instrumental
variables framework. I collect and merge together several datasets, including the universe of Ohio
public school teachers’ union contracts as well as district-level charter school transfer information
from Ohio Department of Education financial reports.
I find that charter competition directly decreases TPSD revenues in excess of the mechanical loss
of state resources due to lower enrollment. As vulnerable student populations transfer to charters,
TPSDs lose the federal funding designated to help educate these students. Further, I show that
charter competition indirectly decreases TPSD revenues by depressing the appraised value of res-
idential properties, thus lowering the base from which local revenues are taxed. To help mitigate
the erosion of TPSD local revenues, states could consider providing countervailing aid to districts
information.
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facing heavy charter competition.48
Other key findings include that charter competition causes districts to negotiate lower unionized
teacher salaries, spend less on instructional and other expenditures, and spend more on new con-
struction expenditures. Determining whether this type of charter-driven resource allocation im-
proves student achievement is an important area for future work.
48For example, districts facing heavy charter transfers in New York receive state transitional aid designed to
mitigate negative fiscal impacts (Bifulco and Reback, 2014).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics by Charter Competition Categories
Charter Transfers
Full Sample None Some
Top
Quartile




2,884 2,364 3,026 4,724
(4,951) (3,849) (5,202) (9,086)
Teachers per School
176 147 184 283
(313) (256) (326) (570)
Real Total Property
Value (in thousands)
427,855 329,178 454,770 616,449
(729,160) (506,929) (776,704) (1,257,359)
Fraction Black
Students
0.054 0.041 0.057 0.134
(0.133) (0.116) (0.137) (0.217)
Fraction FRL Students
0.202 0.148 0.216 0.323
(0.155) (0.118) (0.161) (0.182)
Fraction Student
Transfers to Charter




33,876 23,651 36,665 61,227
(67,749) (42,098) (72,955) (131,343)
Instructional Spending
(in thousands)
16,509 12,046 17,727 28,576
(32,033) (22,136) (34,139) (60,771)
Capital Outlays (in
thousands)
3,780 2,568 4,110 7,075
(9,904) (4,487) (10,902) (18,574)
N 8,474 1,816 6,658 1,664
Contract Characteristics
Entry-Level Salary
34,816 33,336 36,875 36,212
(5,097) (4,641) (4,986) (4,603)
Top-Level Salary
57,754 54,696 62,013 61,657
(11,348) (10,358) (11,320) (10,521)
N 15,948 9,286 6,474 1,296
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are presented. Contract-by-Salary-Track obser-
vations represent a given district-by-contract-start-year-by-education-level cell for either entry or top
levels of experience. Column 1, provides information on all district-years (contracts) missing none of the
variables in the table. Columns 2 and 3 further conditions on whether a given district has transferred no
students and any students to charter schools, respectively for the given year/contract-start-year. Col-
umn 4 only includes districts/contracts where the district faces the top quartile of charter competition
in the given year.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
1996 0 0 0 0
1997 18 0 18 13
1998 18 0 18 25
1999 31 0 31 17
2000 31 21 52 33
2001 31 3 34 47
2002 31 6 37 34
2003 18 60 78 90
2004 18 31 49 69
2005 18 21 39 21
2006 18 4 22 26
2007 18 8 26 20
2008 18 6 24 14
2009 18 7 25 37
2010 18 8 26 32
2011 18 4 22 –
Notes: The table shows the number of districts eligible for charters to begin the
process of opening in each given year. Column (1) shows the number of districts
eligibile based on urbanicity, i.e., whether the district is in Lucas county, or is one of
the Big 8 or Urban 21 districts during a year that policy allows charter entry. Column
(2) presents the number of districts eligible for new charter entry in the given year
based exclusively on eligibility determined by academic ratings during the previous
year. If a district is eligible for charter entry based on the criteria in both Columns
(1) and (2), the district is only counted in Column (1). Column (3) gives the total
number of eligible districts. Column (4) presents the number of new charter schools
that will open in the subsequent year due to eligibility in the given year. For example,
25 charter schools opened in 1999 based on district eligibility during 1998. In 2011






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4: Effect of Charter Transfers on District Revenues
Panel A: IHS of Total Revenues Total Federal Local
(1) (2) (3)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – OLS -0.007
∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – IV -0.018
∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006)







Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – OLS -0.033
∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗
(0.011) (0.022) (0.005)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – IV -0.045
∗∗∗ -0.068 -0.003
(0.016) (0.073) (0.010)







Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – OLS -0.020
∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.008
(0.003) (0.009) (0.007)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – IV -0.028
∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗
(0.005) (0.016) (0.015)
Panel D: Property Tax Decomposition IHS of Property Value
Total Residential Millage
(11) (12) (13)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – OLS -0.023
∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.086)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – IV -0.025
∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.219∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.121)
Notes: N= 11,449 district-year observations. Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered by
district. First-stage estimates (and standard errors) for excluded instruments are: Post 1999τ−2 ∗
1(Acad. E.)τ−2 =2.306∗∗∗ (0.691); Post 2002τ−2 ∗ 1(Acad. W.)τ−2 =3.573∗∗∗ (0.649); and t − 1
Char. Elig. (Urban 8/21)=2.471∗∗∗ (0.927). See footnote 28 on page 68 for details on the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation (IHS). The F statistic for excluded instruments is 10.315∗∗∗. This
table reports OLS (see equation (2.1)) and 2SLS (see equation (2.2)) estimates for the effect of
charter competition on district revenues. The endogenous variable is the fraction of the district’s
membership attending charter schools times 100. Each cell provides the result of a separate
regression. See Online Table H.2 for the mean of each dependent variable and Online Table H.1
for tests of overidentification. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Effect of Charter Transfers on Collectively Bargained Contracts










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
t-1 Fraction Charter
Transfers ×100 – OLS
-0.004∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 -8.647∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (3.321) (0.072)
t-1 Fraction Charter
Transfers ×100 – IV
-0.002 -0.001 -0.010∗∗ -6.910 0.168
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (5.939) (0.104)
Notes: N = 13, 930 contract observations. Standard Errors are in parentheses and are clus-
tered by district. First-stage estimates (and standard errors) for excluded instruments are: Post
1999τ−3 ∗ 1(Acad. E.)τ−2 =3.877∗∗∗ (1.427); Post 2002τ−3 ∗ 1(Acad. W.)τ−2 =3.403∗∗∗ (0.750); and
τ − 2 Char. Elig. (Urban 8/21)=2.481∗∗∗ (0.859). See footnote 28 on page 68 for details on the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation (IHS). The F statistic for excluded instruments is 10.285∗∗∗. This table
reports OLS (2.1)) and 2SLS (see equation (2.2)) estimates of the effect of charter competition on
negotiated pecuniary and non-pecuniary contract outcomes. Imputed Top in Column (3) is calculated
by using the maximum salary from the 15th through 20th imputed payscale estimates as calulated
from the procedure detailed in Appendix B and filling in missing values with SERB top-level contract
outcomes. The endogenous variable is the fraction of the district’s total enrollment lost to any charter
schools, i.e., # transferred / (# in district + # transferred). See Online Table H.2 for the mean of
each dependent variable and Online Table H.1 for tests of overidentification. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimated Brick & Mortar Estimated Digital
Figure 2.1: Charter Growth
Notes: Data for students attending any charter from 1998-2001 are from CCD payments
to charter schools, divided by the baseline amount transferred per student in that year.
From 2002 on, charter schools transfers are the sum of student transfers to digital and brick
and mortar charters collected from District Foundation Settlement Reports from the ODE.
Actual charter counts are the total number of students attending charter designated LEAs
from the CCD LEA Universe Survery.
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(a) 1998 (b) 2001
(c) 2005 (d) 2011
0 ≤ Fraction Charter Transfers ≤ 0.005
0.005 < Fraction Charter Transfers ≤ 0.01
0.01 < Fraction Charter Transfers ≤ 0.02
0.02 < Fraction Charter Transfers ≤ 0.1
0.1 < Fraction Charter Transfers
Figure 2.2: Ohio Charter Entry for 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2011
Notes: Ohio district boundaries are plotted and each district is shaded based on the frac-
tion of potential student enrollment that instead transfers to charters for the given year,
# Transferring to Charter
# Enrolled in District+# Transferring to Charter
. See Section 2.2.2 for a detailed explanation for






















































































































































(d) IHS of Total Capital Outlays
School Year
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
Figure 2.4: Lagged “Academic Watch” Event Study: Various Outcomes
Notes: Each figure presents the effect of receiving an “Academic Watch” rating two years
earlier on the given current outcome, estimated from (2.8) as explained in Section 2.3.4. Each
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(b) IV Estimates
Experience Cell
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
Figure 2.5: Full Imputed Salary Schedule Estimation
Notes: The figure presents the OLS/IV estimates of a 0.01 increase in the fraction of potential
district enrollment that transfers to charters on imputed salaries for each experience pay scale
step using regressions from equations (2.5)/(2.6). See Online Appendix B for an explanation










How should principals allocate teachers to courses so as to maximize the teachers’ contribution to
student achievement? The optimal course assignment depends on teachers’ existing comparative
advantages in different courses or classroom environments, as well as the extent to which current
assignments will increase teachers’ future productivity (or the principal’s information about such
productivity). However, the large literature on teacher value-added and the returns to teaching
experience (discussed below) has focused primarily on estimating variation in teacher productivity
that is assumed (or restricted) to be common to all course or grade assignments. If this assump-
tion is true, then any allocation of existing teachers with fixed course loads will feature the same
distribution of value-added contributions to achievement. However, if this assumption is false, then
improving the mechanism by which teachers are assigned to courses may yield significant gains at
potentially low cost (Jacob and Rockoff (2011)).
To see this, suppose first that teachers have pre-determined comparative advantages for particular
subjects or difficulty levels. Then course swaps among teachers could produce efficiency gains if
both teachers move toward their relatively more effective courses. Furthermore, if principals cannot
ascertain teachers’ relative strengths at the time of hire, then the optimal assignment strategy
might involve rotating teachers across several different classroom contexts early in their careers so
as to produce information about the courses the teachers will be particularly effective at teaching.
Permanent subject-specific skill might exist, for example, if a teacher’s choice of undergraduate
major leads to a deeper understanding of the content in a particular subject (e.g. Physics rather
than Biology). Permanent level-specific skill might exist, for example, if a teacher’s natural charisma
or sense of humor leads to strong classroom control skills that are comparatively more important
in the remedial or basic level courses where students may tend to be less engaged.
Now suppose instead that task-specific skill is primarily learned through experience rather than
predetermined prior to the time of hire. Then rotating the classroom environments to which teachers
are assigned will waste a component of each teacher’s skill, and slow each teacher’s progress toward
his/her full potential. Subject-specific experience might be important, for example, if a teacher’s
knowledge of the subject content deepens with each opportunity to teach it. Track- or level-specific
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experience might also be significant if the appropriate pace at which to deliver content depends
on student skill and is slowly calibrated with practice. In addition, experience teaching a certain
subject-level combination (e.g. honors biology) might be particularly valuable if it allows teachers
to hone particular lectures over time that would be inappropriate for either a different level or a
different subject.
More generally, knowledge of the importance of task-specific talent and task-specific experience is
essential for any employer wishing to maximize the productivity of his/her workforce. For tasks
with larger potential experience gains and smaller variance in task-specific innate talent, the key to
a productive workforce is employee retention: the optimal strategy is to keep employees of all talent
levels at their originally assigned tasks to benefit from experience. Conversely, for tasks featuring
smaller experience gains and a larger variance in task-specific talent, the optimal strategy is to
lay off or reassign low performing workers in an attempt to either improve general worker skill or
identify superior worker-task matches.
Thus, in this paper we introduce a method for decomposing worker productivity into components
relating to general talent, task-specific talent, general experience, and task-specific experience. Our
decomposition requires data featuring (1) signals (possibly noisy) of individual workers’ task-specific
output, (2) histories of worker task assignments, and (3) frequent rotation of workers across tasks.
We implement our method using the context of high school teachers, in which tasks consist of
teaching particular subjects in particular tracks (difficulty levels).1
Specifically, we use administrative panel data from the North Carolina Education Research Data
Center (NCERDC) to decompose teacher effectiveness at improving student achievement into (1) a
set of permanent components capturing general talent, subject-specific talent, level-specific talent,
and subject-level specific talent, and (2) a set of functions capturing returns from general expe-
rience, subject-specific experience, level-specific experience, and subject-level-specific experience.
The data track teachers and students in the universe of public high schools in North Carolina from
1997-2009. Critically, the data feature over 24,000 within-teacher changes in subject assignments
1Throughout the paper below, we use the term “task” to refer to a subject-level combination, while we use the
term “context” more generally to refer to particular characteristics or features of the classroom environment, which
include but are not limited to the subject and level.
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and over 18,000 changes in academic-level assignments. Such rich data permit estimation of an
education production function that features general, subject-specific, level-specific, and subject-
level-specific experience profiles as well as a full set of school-teacher-subject-level fixed effects.
The flexibility of our model allows us to control for many potential biases that might otherwise ac-
company endogenous course assignment decisions. We then use our results to project the potential
student achievement gains that could be reaped by better utilizing knowledge about course-specific
experience and skill relative to the course assignment patterns observed in the data.
Myriad papers have estimated education production functions featuring both teacher fixed effects
and a common experience profile. The bulk of the evidence suggests that the standard deviation of
permanent teacher quality is between .1 and .2 test score standard deviations at both the primary
or secondary school levels.2 Similarly, the existing literature suggests that while teachers tend to
improve with experience by around .05 test score standard deviations in their first year, another
.03 to .05 over the next couple of years, and another .03 to .05 over the next several years, with the
profile for mid-career teachers flattening out at between .1 and .2 standard deviations better than a
novice teacher.3 More recent studies relax the functional form assumptions imposed in these early
studies and find somewhat larger returns to high levels of teaching experience.4
However, this literature has generally ignored the possibility that the baseline effectiveness of a
teacher and/or the gains to teaching experience might be specific to a particular classroom en-
vironment. In such a context, models that impose homogeneity of productivity across different
classroom environments will return a weighted average of teacher productivity across the environ-
ments each teacher actually faced (weighted by the fraction of time spent in each environment). To
the extent that teachers face different classroom contexts over their careers, models that impose
homogeneity of returns to experience across different classroom environments may underestimate
the gains to context-specific experience. Similarly, to the extent that teachers’ classroom environ-
2For primary school estimates, see, for example, Rockoff (2004), Hanushek et al. (2005), Clotfelter et al. (2006),
Sass et al. (2014), Boyd et al. (2008), Jackson and Bruegmann (2009), Harris (2009), Harris and Sass (2011), and
Jackson (2013a). For secondary school estimates, see, for example, Aaronson et al. (2007), Jackson (2014), and
Mansfield (ming). Harris (2009), by contrast, finds little evidence of returns to experience using high school data
from Florida.
3e.g. Rivkin et al. (2005), Clotfelter et al. (2007).
4Wiswall (2013) and Papay and Kraft (2015).
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ment remain somewhat stable during their career, such models may overestimate the returns to
general experience.
A few papers, though, have addressed various aspects of the context-specificity of teacher produc-
tivity, mostly using elementary or middle school data. Jackson (2013a) shows that a substantial
portion of the variation in teacher contributions to student achievement is specific to the school
in which a teacher has taught. Lockwood and McCaffrey (2009) and Aucejo (2011) examine the
degree to which teachers have comparative advantages at teaching relatively high versus low ability
students, and find evidence that a small component of teaching productivity is specific to student
ability level. Perhaps more closely related to our paper is work by Ost (2014) showing that teachers
who always repeat elementary grade assignments improve 35% faster than teachers who never re-
peat grade assignments. Similarly, Master et al. (2012) show that the efficacy of a teacher teaching
English-language learners (ELL) depends on his/her experience teaching the ELL population. The
paper most closely related to ours is Condie et al. (2014), who also consider subjects as tasks.
They demonstrate the existence of meaningful comparative advantages of elementary teachers at
teaching English vs. math. These papers, however, focus either on context-specific experience or
context-specific skill, rather than providing a unified treatment of both factors.
Given the applicability of our methodology to the broader worker-to-task assignment problem, our
paper also contributes to a growing literature on task-specific human capital, brought to the fore-
front by Gibbons and Waldman (2004), which considers the possibility that a considerable portion
of a worker’s human capital might be specific to the particular tasks the worker has performed
at the jobs the worker has held.5 Part of the literature on task-specific human capital either has
assumed that only the experience component of human capital is task-specific (e.g. Gibbons and
Waldman (2004), Clement et al. (2007), and DeAngelo and Owens (2012)). Alternatively, Polataev
and Robinson (2008) assume that the degree of task-specificity is common between the talent and
experience components of human capital, while Gathmann and Schoenberg (2010) instrument to
remove the influence of the task-specific talent component in order to focus on task-specific expe-
rience. Yamaguchi (2012) allows for both task-specific talent and gains to task-specific experience,
5See, for example, Yamaguchi (2012), Clement et al. (2007), Polataev and Robinson (2008), Gathmann and
Schoenberg (2010), DeAngelo and Owens (2012).
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but does not have productivity data, and thus must infer the size of each component indirectly
from observed sequences of occupational choices.
To preview our results, we find that about a quarter to a third of the returns to years of experience
are actually specific to the subject that the teacher taught. We find little evidence of returns to
level-specific experience and no evidence of returns to subject-level experience. In agreement with
the rest of the value-added literature, we find that the variation in fixed teaching skill is comparable
in magnitude to the gains to experience. While 74% of the variance in permanent skill is general
to all subjects and levels, we find a small but meaningful role for subject-specific (17%) and level-
specific (9%) teaching talent: receiving a teacher whose subject-specific (level-specific) talent is one
standard deviation above his/her average among all subjects (levels) he/she teaches increases a
student’s expected test score by .063 (.046) standard deviations.
We test for and fail to find convincing evidence of estimation biases driven by dynamic assign-
ment responses to teacher-year or school-year shocks or unmodeled teacher-specific heterogeneity
in gains from experience. Backcasting tests for bias from non-random student sorting to teachers
suggest that, if anything, the significant gains to both general and subject-specific experience that
we estimate may be understated. Split-sample forecast tests suggest that our estimates of teachers’
combined general and task-specific talent have considerable out-of-sample predictive power, though
admittedly slightly less than what a model with no bias or misspecification would imply. While sim-
ilar split-sample forecast tests for teachers’ estimated task-specific comparative advantages (more
important for teacher assignment) are underpowered, they do not find evidence of any forecast bias
in subject-specific talent estimates, though level-specific talent estimates do not seem to predict
out-of-sample comparative advantages nearly as well.
Of course, the knowledge that a large fraction of the gains from experience are subject-specific
may be of limited value to principals if most changes in course assignments are driven by necessity.
For example, parental leave or teacher retirements may require principals to reassign teachers to
unfamiliar subjects or tracks. Using our estimated experience profiles, we address this possibility by
performing counterfactual simulations in which we reassign the teachers observed teaching in each
school-field combination in the chosen year to the courses that were offered at their school at the
time in order to maximize student performance, given posterior beliefs about the teachers’ course-
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specific talent as well as the four-dimensional stocks of general and context-specific experience that
these teachers possessed at the beginning of the year.
Our simulations indicate that efficient use of task-specific experience and talent can, in principle,
increase student achievement non-trivially: relative to random assignment of teachers to classrooms,
the efficient allocation raises mean test scores by as much as .04 student-level standard deviations
for school-field combinations with seven or more teachers. The degree to which principals’ classroom
assignments already effectively incorporate information about teacher comparative advantages is
difficult to discern; however, under the strong assumption that the information about teachers’
subject-specific and level-specific talent reflected in our statewide panel of 1997-2009 test scores is
a superset of the information available to principals, our simulations suggest that efficient use of
context-specific experience might increase mean test scores in larger high schools by as much as
.02-.03 student-level standard deviations relative to the observed patterns of teachers’ classroom
assignments. Furthermore, since we hold the teaching load fixed for each teacher, these efficiency
gains could potentially be reaped with near zero cost.6 These simulated gains are comparable in
magnitude to the gains from subject-specialization in elementary school projected by Condie et al.
(2014). We also show that they are comparable in magnitude to the gains administrators could
expect to reap from a policy in which the least effective 10% of teachers are removed and replaced
by average teachers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the education production function
whose parameters we estimate. Section 3.3 describes how comparisons of teachers with differ-
ent course assignment histories can provide joint identification of both school-teacher-subject-level
fixed effects and general, subject-specific, level-specific, and subject-level-specific experience pro-
files. Section 3.4 discusses the North Carolina administrative data and provides summary statistics
illustrating the variation in teacher course assignments. Section 3.5 presents the parameter esti-
mates from our main specifications. Section 3.6 presents tests for possible threats to our identifying
assumptions and demonstrates the robustness of our results to alternative choices regarding sample
6Note that we cannot address the possibility that proposed reallocations would either detract from competing
non-test score objectives or carry compensating differential costs (e.g. if teachers have strong preferences for teaching
courses in their comparative disadvantages).
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selection, variable definition, and model specification. Section 3.7 describes and presents results
from the counterfactual simulations that gauge the test score gains that might be achievable through
effective use of a teaching staff’s context-specific talent and experience. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Model Specification
Because our goal is to determine the relative importance of context-specific teacher skill and expe-
rience for test score performance, we craft our specification of the achievement production function
in a fashion that permits us to isolate the contribution of these components. Let Yict represent the
standardized test score of student i in classroom c at time t. Let r(i, c, t) denote the teacher that
taught student i in classroom c at time t. Similarly, let s(i, c, t) denote the school at which student
i experienced classroom c at time t, let j(i, c, t) denote the subject taught in student i’s classroom
c at time t, and let l(i, c, t) denote the difficulty level or track associated with the classroom (Basic
or Honors).7 Since North Carolina used different test forms for each subject in each year, we stan-
dardize each test score Yict so that the distribution of test scores in each subject-year combination
has zero mean and unit variance.
By suppressing the dependence of s, r, j, and l on (i, c, t), we can represent the production of test
score performance compactly via:
Yict = Xictβjl + δsjl + µsrjl + d
gen(expgenrt ) + d
j(expjrt) + d
l(explrt) + d
jl(expjlrt) + ict (3.1)
Because we estimate the model at the classroom level, we aggregate this production function and
focus our attention on the classroom-mean of test score performance, denoted Yct:
Yct = Xctβjl + δsjl + µsrjl + d
gen(expgenrt ) + d
j(expjrt) + d
l(explrt) + d
jl(expjlrt) + ct (3.2)
Xct represents a vector of class-averages of student observable characteristics and middle school
reading and math test scores, along with other classroom characteristics (e.g. class size |Ic|) and a
full set of calendar year indicators. We allow the coefficients on Xct, βjl, to differ across subject-
7Section 3.4.2 describes how we assign courses to difficulty levels.
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level combinations.8 This allows for the possibility that a high class average of 8th grade math
scores might be a stronger predictor of class performance in Algebra 1 than in English 1. Similarly,
classroom composition might matter more in a particular subject or level if more group work
takes place in say, basic biology (e.g. labs) than in honors math. Xct is included to control for
non-random sorting of students to particular teachers within school-subject-level cells (discussed
further in Section 3.3.2).9
δsjl represents inputs provided by the school-subject-level combination. The set of {δ} parameters
will not only capture the contribution of any school-level inputs such as principal quality, neighbor-
hood quality, or quality of the school facilities, they will also capture any variation in the quality of
curricula or textbooks across subjects and levels within the school. δsjl will be estimated via a full
set of school-subject-level fixed effects, δˆsjl. These fixed effects will capture the average residual
achievement at each school-subject-level combination, after removing the part of achievement that
can be predicted based on observable classroom characteristics. Importantly, in practice they will
also reflect the contribution of average unobserved inputs of the students who sort into particular
school-subject-level combinations. Thus, the school-subject-level design matrix also acts as a con-
trol function that absorbs school inputs as well as any potential sorting biases that might otherwise
be created by students’ endogenous choices of school, subject, and level.
µsrjl captures the experience-invariant component of teacher r’s ability to increase student achieve-
ment in subject-level (j, l) at school s. µsrjl will be estimated via a full set of school-teacher-
subject-level fixed effects, µˆsrjl. The average school-teacher-subject-level will be normalized to 0
for each school-subject-level in our baseline specification (see Section 3.3.2 for further discussion),
so that µˆsrjl can be interpreted as the deviation of a particular teacher’s performance in a particular
subject-level combination from the mean (student-weighted) performance of all teachers that taught
8The coefficients on the calendar year indicators are restricted to be the same across all subject-levels to improve
efficiency.
9Given that we include classroom averages of student inputs to better control for sorting on unobservable student
characteristics (Altonji and Mansfield, 2014), aggregation of our outcome test scores to the classroom level is essentially
without loss of generality. This is because the student-level observables are orthogonal to all the inputs of interest
once class averages of these student observables have been conditioned on, since the inputs of interest display no
within-class variation.
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in the chosen teacher’s school-subject-level combination during the sample (e.g. how a particular
honors biology teacher’s students performed relative to the honors biology students of his/her col-
leagues). This specification of the contribution of teacher quality allows the estimation of a fully
non-parametric joint distribution of general teacher talent and subject-specific, level-specific, and
even subject-level-specific permanent comparative advantages within and across teachers. Note
that by including the identity of the school in the definition of the fixed effect, we are allowing
each teacher’s mean contribution and comparative advantages for particular subjects and levels to
be different at each school at which they teach (a teacher who teaches in two schools is essentially
treated as two different teachers).
expgenrt represents the total number of years of general teaching experience that teacher r possessed at
the beginning of year t, defined as the number of previous years in which the teacher taught at least




rt represent previous years of experience teaching at
least one course in the subject, level, and subject-level combination associated with classroom c,
respectively. dgen(∗) is a function that captures the part of the gains from years of teacher experience
that are portable (“general”) across all subjects and levels. The dj(∗), dl(∗), and djl(∗) functions
capture how additional years of subject-specific experience, level-specific experience, and subject-
level-specific experience affect a teacher’s ability to increase student test scores. dgen(∗), dj(∗),
dl(∗), and djl(∗) are each flexibly parameterized using indicators for narrow ranges of experience.
Because the estimates from the “baseline” specification in (3.2) prove to be somewhat sensitive to
choice of controls and the exact parametrization of the experience profiles, we also devote consid-
erable attention to a less volatile “restricted” specification in which we constrain µsrjl = µsr ∀(j, l)
and (s, r), allowing us to replace the school-teacher-subject-level fixed effects with school-teacher
fixed effects only:
Yct = Xctβjl + δsjl + µsr + d
gen(expgenrt ) + d
j(expjrt) + d
l(explrt) + d
jl(expjlrt) + ct (3.3)
Finally, ct represents the class average of an error component ict that combines time-varying
inputs not captured by the other components of the model. In particular, we model the class-level
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error component as:






φst captures year-specific deviations in school inputs relative to the sample-wide average for the
school-subject-level (e.g. due to school renovation). νrt represents year-specific deviations in a
teacher’s quality from what would be expected based on the teacher’s time-invariant skill and
context-specific experience (e.g. due to teacher illness). ζct captures classroom level shocks, such as
an uncontrollably disruptive student or the archetypal dog barking outside the classroom window
on test day. Finally, eict represents the contributions of residual student-level inputs that are
unpredictable based on observables as well as measurement error reflecting the extent to which the
student’s exam performance deviates from what the student could have expected to score, given
his/her accumulated knowledge in the subject.
3.3 Identification
3.3.1 Identifying the Returns to General and Task-Specific Experience
Let Exp = [Expgen, Expj , Expl, Expjl] represent the random vector of general and context-specific
experience stocks for classroom teachers accumulated as of year t, of which each observed combi-






rt] is a draw. Similarly, let M and D represent random vectors of
school-teacher-subject-level and school-subject-level cell indicators, respectively. Each draw from
M and D represents a row of the design matrices corresponding to the fixed effects capturing
{µsrjl} and {δsjl}, respectively. Finally, let X represent the random vector of observed classroom
characteristics, and let  represent the random variable of which ct is a draw. To identify the
functions mapping experience stocks to productivity, {dgen(∗), dj(∗), dl(∗), djl(∗)}, we assume that
the following condition holds:
Assumption 1: Conditional Mean Independence of
Time-Varying Unobserved Inputs and Teacher Experience
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E[  |Exp,M,D,X] = E[  |M,D,X] (3.5)
Assumption 1 states that knowledge of the four-dimensional experience stock of the teacher does
not provide further information about any unobserved inputs, conditional on observed classroom
inputs and the identity of the school, teacher, subject, and level. Put another way, the timing of
experience accumulation in each dimension of experience is assumed to be exogenous.
Recall from (3.4) that the regression error contains school-year, teacher-year, and classroom shocks





Thus, there are a number of sources of possible threats to the validity of Assumption 1, each of which
relates to the exact timing of changes in experience. For example, suppose that when a school is in
decline, teacher turnover begins to increase, and the teachers that remain are forced to teach both
new subjects and new difficulty levels more frequently. In this case, we may be more likely to ob-
serve zero subject-specific or level-specific experience when the contribution of time-varying school
inputs φst is low. Since year-specific deviations in school quality from the sample-wide average are
included in ct, this scenario violates Assumption 1 and could potentially produce an overestimate
of the returns to task-specific experience. Alternatively, suppose principals are reluctant to force a
teacher to take on new subjects or levels when the teacher faces other short-term obstacles (such
as illness or pregnancy). In that case, zero subject-specific or level-specific experience may be
observed more frequently when the value of the teacher-year shock νrt is high. This scenario also
violates Assumption 1, and might cause an underestimate of the returns to task-specific experience.
Similarly, if teachers respond to a particularly unruly classroom by quitting teaching, or switching
levels or subjects, we might underestimate the returns to experience (since those who survive to the
next year of experience will have experienced above-average classroom shocks the previous year,
thereby hiding the gains to the next year of experience). Finally, returns to experience could also
be overestimated if students with superior unobserved inputs systematically sort into classes within
subject-levels taught by teachers with high general or context-specific experience. We address the
possibility of such violations of Assumption 1 in Section 3.6 and find little evidence of violations of
sufficient magnitude to produce a substantial bias to any of our profiles.
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Despite these concerns, however, note that Assumption 1 is still much weaker than the assumptions
required to identify experience profiles in most of the literature, since it conditions on the combined
identities of the school, teacher, subject and level. Essentially, the inclusion of school-teacher-
subject-level fixed effects (µsrjl) controls for any arbitrary selection of teachers into experience
categories based on the fixed component of general or context-specific productivity. Conditioning
on the identity of the teacher accounts for the possibility that better teachers persist long enough
to gain more experience. Similarly, conditioning on the teacher-subject combination accounts for
the possibility that the teachers allowed to gain more subject-specific experience in a particular
subject are those with comparative advantages in teaching the subject, while conditioning on the
teacher-level combination accounts for the possibility that persistence at teaching honors courses
might signal a comparative advantage for teaching such courses.
Even if the timing of experience accumulation is conditionally independent of the error components,
the simultaneous identification and estimation of each of the four experience profiles also requires
considerable variation in the history of subject and level assignments across teachers. Such variation
is necessary to satisfy the OLS rank condition and, more importantly, to produce sufficiently precise
estimates. A illustrates how identification of the context-specific experience profile in each context
dimension might be secured for our baseline model, and provides insight into the patterns of student
performance in the data that inform estimates of the experience profile parameters.
The examples in A reveal that the experience profiles are fully identified from comparisons of
different teachers’ rates of performance growth (divergence/convergence of average student resid-
uals) across years in which the same subject-level combination was taught. Because the average
performance of each teacher in each school-subject-level combination is perfectly fit by the unre-
stricted school-teacher-subject-level and school-subject-level fixed effects, such cell averages provide
no identifying variation for the experience profiles. Put another way, the inclusion of these fixed
effects forces the identification of the experience profiles to be delivered exclusively from the path
of productivity growth within school-teacher-subject-level combinations.
106
3.3.2 Identification of the General and Context-Specific Components of Fixed
Teaching Skill
Identifying fixed or pre-determined general and context-specific teaching skill is more difficult. In
particular, there is a fundamental identification problem that our model cannot overcome: we
cannot distinguish average teaching quality in a particular school-subject-level from school or un-
observed student inputs that vary across school-subject-level cells. For example, suppose a school’s
students score 0.1 student-level standard deviations higher in Biology than in Chemistry. In the
absence of restrictions on the distribution of subject-specific teacher skill, we cannot tell whether
all the teachers at the school are particularly effective at teaching Biology relative to Chemistry,
or if instead the Biology textbook is superior to the Chemistry textbook (or many of the stu-
dent’s parents are biologists). To address this issue, we perform a sensitivity analysis in which
we introduce two polar opposite assumptions and one moderate assumption for apportioning the
between school-subject-level achievement variation between teachers and other inputs. We decom-
pose the variance in teacher time-invariant productivity into general, subject-specific, level-specific,
and subject-level-specific components under each assumption.
The first extreme assumption is that average teacher effectiveness is uniform across all levels,
subjects, and schools:





µˆsrjl = k for some constant k, ∀ (s, j, l) ∈ SJL (3.6)
where |Isjl| is the number of students observed taking subject j in level l at school s and SJL is the
set of all school-subject-level combinations. This assumption will hold (with a sufficiently large pools
of teachers) if the relatively more effective teachers do not sort into particular schools, subjects,
or levels. Assumption 2A implies that all the variation in average residual student performance
across subjects, levels, and schools (after removing the part that is predictable based on classroom
observables) can be attributed to either school inputs or unobserved student inputs. Assumption 2A
can be imposed on the model by estimating a full set of school-subject-level fixed effects (δˆsjl), and




(i,c,t)∈(s,j,l) µˆsrjl = 0 (note that the common mean k does not contribute
to variance estimates). Under Assumption 2A, if the school average performance difference between
Biology and Chemistry is 0.1 standard deviations then a teacher whose Biology students perform
0.1 standard deviations better than her Chemistry students will be assumed to be equally effective
at teaching both Biology and Chemistry.
A second intermediate assumption assumes that between-school variation in residual test scores is
fully attributable to school quality and student sorting, but that the variation in residual perfor-
mance that is within-schools but across subject-level combinations is fully attributable to differences
in average teacher quality across these combinations:
Assumption 2B: Uniform Teacher Quality Across Schools, Uniform Student/School
Quality Across Subjects and Levels





µsrjl = k for some constant k, ∀ s ∈ S (3.7)
Estimates from such a model are useful for a principal who needs to determine classroom assign-
ments for his/her existing stock of teachers. The principal will only require the decomposition
of the within-school variance in time-invariant teacher productivity, and may believe that school
inputs are divided relatively equally across subjects and levels. Assumption 2B is implemented by
replacing the school-subject-level effects with school fixed effects only, and restricting the average
school-teacher-subject-level effect to be 0 at each school.
Finally, the opposite extreme approach is to assume that all the variation in average residual student
performance across subjects, levels, and schools can be attributed to differences in average teacher
quality:
Assumption 2C: Uniform School and Unobserved Student Quality Across Contexts
δsjl = k for some constant k, ∀ (s, j, l) ∈ SJL (3.8)
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Assumption 2C will hold if students sort into high schools, subjects, and levels based only on ob-
servable characteristics and past performance, and all high schools and subject-level combinations
within high schools provide the same contribution to student achievement. Assumption 2C can be
imposed on the model by excluding school-subject-level fixed effects entirely (δˆsjl = 0 ∀ (s, j, l)),
and matching the between school-subject-level residual variation using a full set of teacher-school-
subject-level fixed effects (without any normalizations). Under Assumption 2C, a teacher whose
Biology students perform 0.1 standard deviations better than her Chemistry students will be as-
sumed to be 0.1 standard deviations more effective at teaching Biology than Chemistry if the school
average performance difference between Biology and Chemistry is 0.1 standard deviations. In other
words, even though the teacher is at the mean of the performance distribution in both subjects, the
comparison set of Biology teachers is assumed to be 0.1 standard deviations superior on average to
the comparison set of Chemistry teachers.
While Assumptions 2A-2C allow us to separate school inputs from teacher inputs, identification
of {µsrjl} also requires that other unobserved inputs are not correlated with the observation of a
particular teacher in a particular subject-level combination. As before, M and D represent the
random vectors of school-teacher-subject-level and school-subject-level cell indicators, while Exp
represents the random vector of teacher experience stocks and X represents the random vector of
observed classroom characteristics. Similarly, let S represent the random vector of school indicators
(draws of which would represent a row of a design matrix for a set of school fixed effects). Then
assumptions 3A-3C capture this additional condition for each of the three cases considered:
Assumption 3A-3C: Conditional Mean Independence of
Students’ Unobserved Inputs and Teacher Identity
3A : E[|M,Exp,X] = E[|D,Exp,X]
3B : E[|M,Exp,X] = E[|S,Exp,X]
3C : E[|M,Exp,X] = E[|Exp,X] (3.9)
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Assumption 3A states that the identity of the teacher does not provide further information about
any unobserved inputs, conditional on the identities of the school, subject, and track, along with
the levels of general and context-specific experience of the teacher and the observable classroom
characteristics. Note that by conditioning on all four dimensions of teacher experience, we re-
move the concern that a teacher will be perceived to have greater general skill because he/she has
more general experience, or that a teacher will be perceived to have a comparative advantage at
teaching in a particular context because many of the test-score observations from that context are
accompanied by considerable context-specific experience. Assumption 3B is much stronger, since it
conditions on the school rather than the school-subject-level, while Assumption 3C, which condi-
tions only on teacher experience stocks and observed classroom inputs, is the strongest assumption
of all.
There remain several potential threats to the validity of the fixed effect estimates even in the case
of Assumption 3A. Suppose, for example, that a particular teacher is assigned to a room with
broken air conditioning each time the teacher teaches honors physics, but is assigned to functioning
rooms whenever the teacher teaches honors chemistry. In this case, conditioning on context-specific
experience will not remove the correlation between the classroom-level error component ζct and
the indicator for the school-teacher-subject-level combination associated with the chosen teacher
teaching honors physics. Similarly, a teacher who happens to be assigned to basic English 1 classes
during the years her kids are young (when she has little time to prepare for class) might exhibit a
correlation between the unobserved teacher-year shock νrt and the indicator for the school-teacher-
subject-level combination associated her basic English 1 course.
Perhaps the most serious concern stems from the possibility that unobservably superior students
are able to disproportionately select a particular teacher.10 This possibility is somewhat less likely
at the high school level, since class assignments are frequently generated by scheduling algorithms
(given students’ subject-level choices), making it difficult for students to select into particular
classrooms within a subject-level. We rely on classroom averages of student covariates to absorb
10Rothstein (2010) documents non-random student sorting into particular classrooms within North Carolina ele-
mentary schools. However, Kinsler (2012) retests the same data, accounting for small sample sizes, and fails to reject
such non-random sorting.
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any within-subject-level sorting based on student inputs. Altonji and Mansfield (2014) show that
classroom averages of observable characteristics can in theory absorb all the bias from sorting on
both observables and unobservables, if the set of observables is diverse enough to span the set of
classroom amenities that are driving students to sort. Furthermore, Mansfield (ming) and Jackson
(2014), using the same NCERDC dataset we employ here, find little evidence of remaining student
sorting after controlling for track. In Section 3.6.2, though, we investigate further the possibility
that sorting of students to teachers could bias our estimated production function.
B provides a concrete example that illustrates the kinds of moments in the data that identify time-
invariant teaching skill. The example in B reveals that each school-teacher-subject-level fixed effect
µˆsrjl will be estimated using only a single teacher’s performance during the few years in which
they taught the subject-level associated with the fixed effect. As such, sampling error for any given
fixed effect estimate µˆsrjl will not converge to zero even with the fairly long panel we employ.
Consequently, we do not focus on individual µˆsrjl estimates, but instead seek to characterize the
joint distribution of the components of time-invariant teaching skill. Specifically, we decompose
the variance in performance across teachers and contexts into components attributable to general
teaching talent, subject-specific talent, level-specific talent, and subject-level-specific talent.
To see how this may be done, note first that we can rewrite the true value of teacher r’s context-
specific productivity µsrjl via:
µsrjl = µsr + (µsrjl − µsr) (3.10)
The first component in (3.10) can be interpreted as the contribution of teacher talent that may be
school-specific, but is general or portable across tasks (subject-level combinations) within the school.
We will refer to V ar(µsr) as the variance in general teaching talent. The second component contains
the teacher’s persistent subject-level-specific deviation in quality from the teacher’s average across
all subject-level combinations. This can be interpreted as the teacher’s comparative advantage
or disadvantage at teaching subject-level combination (j, l). This second component can then be
decomposed into three further components:
(µsrjl − µsr) ≡ µ˜srjl = µ˜srj + µ˜srl + (µ˜srjl − µ˜srj − µ˜srl) (3.11)
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The first component of (3.11) can be interpreted as the part of the teacher’s comparative advantage
at subject-level combination (j, l) that is portable across levels but not subjects. We will refer to
V ar(µ˜srj) as the variance in subject-specific teaching talent. The second component of (3.11) can
be interpreted as the part of the teacher’s comparative advantage at subject-level combination
(j, l) that is portable across subjects but not levels. We will refer to V ar(µ˜srl) as the variance in
level-specific teaching talent. The third component of (3.11) is the part of a teacher’s comparative
advantage at (j, l) that is not portable across levels or subjects, and thus could not have been
predicted based on the sum of the teacher’s subject-specific skill and the teacher’s level-specific
skill. We will refer to V ar(µ˜srjl− µ˜srj− µ˜srj) as the variance in subject-level-specific teaching skill.
Note that we do not observe the true variance of school-teacher-subject-level effects, V ar(µsrjl), but
rather the sample variance, which contains sampling error: V ar(µˆsrjl). To recover the true latent
variance decomposition, we follow the method of Aaronson et al. (2007) and Mansfield (ming). C
describes this sampling error correction in detail.
Because we can only estimate a value of µˆsrjl for those school-teacher-subject-level combinations
that we actually observe in the data, the variance in subject-specific and level-specific skill that
we estimate will represent the variance among the range of subject and level combinations that
principals actually assign.
While we are likely to underestimate the variance in subject-specific (or level-specific) talent across
the full range of possible subjects (or levels), the estimates we do obtain are more relevant and
interesting to principals and administrators. Much of the missing variance stems from variation in
the strength of teacher’s comparative disadvantages among classroom assignments that are never
seriously considered by principals (i.e. variation among English teachers in their ability to teach
physics). Rather, the choice principals generally face is between hiring a new teacher to teach
exactly the courses taught by an exiting teacher and hiring a new teacher to teach different courses
while rotating existing teachers who are certified in the chosen field to new subjects or levels within
that field (for example, rewarding stayers by letting them teach the honors class that was vacated
by the exiting teacher).11 Given the limited support for the distribution of comparative advantages
11Teacher certification in North Carolina, as in most states, is at the level of the field (math, science, history, etc.)
rather than the subject (Biology, Chemistry, Physics), and is not specific to a level of difficulty (special education
112




The decomposition of worker productivity developed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 requires that the data
1) contain signals of worker output in each task, 2) allow the construction of accurate measures
of general and task-specific experience, and 3) exhibit considerable worker rotation among tasks.
We employ administrative data provided by the North Carolina Education Research Data Center
(NCERDC) that satisfies each of these three conditions for the context of high school teaching.
3.4.2 Task-Specific Output and Sample Restrictions
The NCERDC data consists of standardized test scores for the universe of public high school
students in North Carolina from 1997 - 2009 in eleven subjects and two course difficulty levels.12
During the sample period, North Carolina provided a standardized curriculum in each subject
and assessed achievement via statewide end-of-course tests.13 The eleven subjects, which can be
excepted).
12 The student-level End-of-Course test data provide a set of four difficulty level categories (honors, AP, college
placement, and other) that do not perfectly match the difficulty level categories provided with the beginning-of-year
classroom data (Special Education, Remedial, Basic, Applied/Technical, Honors, Cooperative Education, Advanced
Placement, International Baccalaureate, and Non-Classroom), which contain the correct teacher ID (on which the
level-specific experience stocks are based). In order to minimize the probability that the relevant level-specific
experience of the teacher is mismeasured, we drop student observations coming from classes labeled as Special
Education, Cooperative Education, and Non-Classroom. We classify Remedial, Basic, and Applied/Technical classes
as “basic” and Advanced Placement, International Baccalaureate, and Honors as “honors”. In the rare cases where
schools offer distinct Advanced Placement and Honors courses in the same tested subject we drop observations from
classrooms where the teacher’s relevant level-specific experience depends on whether these two difficulty levels are
combined during the construction of level-specific experience stocks.
13Note that these tests are subject-specific but not level-specific.
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grouped into four fields based on common certification requirements, are as follows: Math: Algebra
1, Algebra 2, Geometry; Science: Biology, Chemistry, Physical Science, Physics; Social Studies:
Econ/Law/Politics, Civics and Economics, U.S. History; English: English 1.14 Because statewide
achievement tests were administered immediately at the conclusion of each year-long course, and
the subjects are (largely) distinct from one another, average student performance in each course
represents a signal (albeit a noisy, possibly biased one) of the task-specific output of the teacher.
15
In our framework, accurately distilling the signal of a teacher’s task-specific productivity from
student sorting requires rich data on student inputs. Fortunately, the NCERDC data contain
information about a variety of current student inputs (or proxies for such inputs), as well as past
student inputs.16 In addition, we also include in Xct the number of classes and number of distinct
courses taught contemporaneously by the student’s teacher in order to capture teacher workload,
and include indicators for whether the student’s teacher taught the current subject, level, and
subject-level (and whether he/she taught at all) in the previous year to capture depreciation of
human capital. We also include in Xct a full set of dummies for the calendar year t in which the
test was taken, as emphasized by Papay and Kraft (2015).
Properly measuring teacher contributions to achievement also requires that each student test score
14Testing began for Physics, Geometry, Chemistry, Physical Science, and Algebra 2 in 1999. In addition,
Econ/Law/Politics was discontinued in 2004 and replaced by Civics and Economics in 2006. U.S. History was
not tested between 2004 and 2005.
15In principle, one might worry that differences in teacher performance may be reflecting the extent to which
teachers adhere to the state curriculum rather than differences in ability to foster learning. Fortunately, several
features of the North Carolina context mitigate such concerns. First, in recent years No Child Left Behind legislation
has put pressure on principals to ensure that teachers teach the standard curriculum, since schools that fail to meet
state standards are subject to sanctions and possible closure. Second, the North Carolina end-of-course exam scores
we use as outcome measures must comprise 25% of the student’s year-end grade in a given subject, so that parents
are likely to complain about teachers that ignore the standard curriculum. Finally, during the sample period, teacher
bonuses of up to $1,500 were linked to average test scores of the students in the school at which they teach.
16Observable current student inputs include indicators for parental education, race, gender, gifted status, current
grade, and current Limited English Proficiency status. Observable past student inputs include the student’s 7th and
8th grade math and reading scores (though to reduce the influence of missing data we only include 7th grade test
scores as a robustness check in Section 3.6.4).
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observation be matched to the teacher who taught the class in which the student’s test score was
generated. We utilize the fuzzy matching algorithm developed by Mansfield (ming), which exploits
the fact that classroom-average demographics can be constructed and compared for both the test-
score-level data and the classroom-level data (which contains the valid teacher ID).17
Our original dataset consists of 8,407,382 test scores from 460,792 classrooms, 28,347 teachers, and
1,307 high schools. We drop from the sample 2,878,254 test score observations for which we cannot
match a teacher and 794,541 for which we cannot verify a difficulty level (discussed in footnote (12)
above).
In addition, recall that the second key data requirement is that measures of both general and
task-specific experience can be accurately constructed. The NCERDC data contain all classroom
assignments (subject and level) for each teacher for the years 1995-2009, even in non-tested sub-
jects. However, complete histories of classroom assignments, necessary to construct subject-specific,
level-specific, and subject-level-specific experience, can only be assembled for teachers who began
teaching after the data collection commences in 1995 (as indicated by an entry level paycode).
Because our identification strategy relies on observing each teacher’s full history of subject- and
level-specific experience at each point in time, we drop an additional 2,364,544 test scores associ-
ated with teachers for whom we cannot properly construct context-specific experience stocks. Note
that we cannot distinguish novice teachers from teachers who previously taught outside of North
Carolina unless such transferring teachers are given partial credit for their prior experience (and
thus would not have an entry level paycode). Nonetheless, the problem of accurately constructing
stocks of context-specific experience would be considerably more severe in contexts where data exist
only for a single school district (even a large one).
After several other sample restrictions, our final sample consists of 1,126,300 test scores aggregated
to 61,993 classroom-level observations, from 8,750 teachers, and 596 high schools.18 Basic summary
17See Mansfield (ming) for a full description of the algorithm and summary statistics regarding its efficacy.
18We restrict the sample in several additional ways. First, we drop 21,915 scores from classes with fewer than 5
students (since these are likely to represent data entry errors). Given our focus on high schools, we also drop 263,893
test scores from students in grades 6-8. We also drop test scores with invalid or outlier values, as well as all scores from
1997 and from Physical Science in 1999 due to concerns about data quality (270,395 scores). Since past test scores
are critical for controlling for student sorting, we also drop 685,116 observations for students with missing 8th grade
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statistics comparing the original and final samples are presented in Table 3.1.
3.4.3 Generating the Experience Profile
For the baseline specification we construct flexible experience profiles by creating indicators for
eight experience categories: 0 years of experience, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, 5-6 years, 7-10
years, and 11 or more years of experience. In our featured specifications, experience is measured
as the number of prior years in which at least one classroom was taught in the relevant context
for the chosen experience dimension. We posit that teaching a second classroom in the same year,
when there is no opportunity to alter the lesson plan or assignments, is likely to provide negligible
experience value relative to teaching a classroom in a different year. However, as a robustness check
we also present results from specifications in which experience is measured using the total number
of classrooms taught prior to the year of the observation.
We also assume that teachers’ general and context-specific experience is fully portable across
schools. This assumption is partly driven by the existence of a statewide testing regime that
is tied to students’ course grades, so that curriculum differences between schools should be min-
imal. Further, since only 16% of our classrooms are taught by a teacher who in his/her second
(or greater) school, we also have limited variation with which to test this assumption. However, in
Section 3.6.4 we examine the sensitivity of our results to this assumption by estimating our general
and context-specific experience profiles for only the subset of classrooms featuring teachers in their
initial schools.
To capture depreciation in teachers’ “experience capital”, we include in Xct a set of indicators for
whether the teacher of the classroom taught the subject, level, and subject-level in the previous
year, as well as an indicator for whether the teacher taught at all in the previous year. We also
include a second set of analogous indicators for whether the teacher of the classroom taught in the
math or reading test scores. Finally, identification of experience cell fixed effects (estimated in our “full specification”
discussed in section 3.6.4 below) requires that four-dimensional experience cells and school-teacher-subject-level cells
form a connected graph, with the experience cells as vertices and school-teacher-subject-level cells as edges (or vice
versa). We drop 2,424 test scores that are associated with school-teacher-subject-level combinations not contained
within the largest connected component of the graph.
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relevant contexts two years prior.
Finally, to account for possible decreases in teacher effort prior to an assignment change (explained
further in Section 3.6.1) we also include four indicators that equal one if the observation is from
a classroom that represents the teacher’s last year teaching the school-subject combination, the
school-level combination, the school-subject-level combination, and at the school in any classroom,
respectively.
3.4.4 The Frequency of Teacher Assignment Rotations
The third data requirement for our decomposition is that we observe considerable worker rotation
across tasks. Table 3.2 depicts teacher rotation across subjects in our final sample. The top
(bottom) entry in each cell (i, j) represents the number (fraction) of teachers in our sample who
ever taught in subject i that also taught in subject j. The table reveals that there is considerable
rotation across subjects, though the vast majority of rotations occur within fields. This reflects the
fact that certification is field-specific. Teacher rotation across levels is also substantial. The vast
majority (87%) of teachers who ever teach an honors class also teach at least one basic class during
their career. The converse is not true; only 43% of teachers observed teaching at least one basic
class are also observed teaching an honors class at some point during their careers. This finding
partly reflects the fact that there tend to be more basic courses than honors courses to staff at
most schools, but is also driven by a substantial fraction of schools that do not track their classes
(so that all classrooms at the school are coded as being taught at the basic level).
Table 3.3 displays the pattern of rotation across subject-level combinations for teachers in the field
of mathematics. The table illustrates that teachers do not merely teach either multiple levels of the
same subject or multiple subjects at the same level, but rather are frequently observed teaching at
the basic level in one subject and at the honors level in a different subject. It is this variation that
allows us to distinguish the returns to subject-level-specific experience from the returns to subject-
specific and level-specific experience, respectively. Taken together, these tables demonstrate that
rotating across multiple subjects, levels, and subject-levels during one’s career is the norm, rather
than the exception.
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As the example in A makes clear, identification of all four dimensions of experience relies on teachers
continuing to introduce new subjects and levels into their repertoire after their career is already
underway, as well as taking single year or multi-year breaks from teaching particular subjects before
returning to them later.19
Figure 3.1 shows, for each level of general experience, the fraction of teachers who teach a subject,
level, or subject-level for either the first time (3.1a) or last time (3.1b), as well as the fraction of
teachers who leave teaching in North Carolina altogether (“General” in 3.1b). Figure 3.1 reveals
that introducing new courses is quite common even in mid-career: 19% of teachers with seven prior
years of experience teach a new subject for the first time in their eighth year, while 11% teach a
new level and 29% teach a new subject-level combination.
Gap years in which teachers fail to teach (and then return to) a particular subject or level are
also quite common. 22.5% of unique teacher-subject-level combinations exhibit one or more gap
years at some point during our sample, while 19.9% and 14.1% of teacher-subject and teacher-level
combinations exhibit at least one gap year. By contrast, 10.2% of observed teachers leave public
school teaching entirely for at least a year before returning. These statistics reveal that there is
more variation available to identify the returns to subject- or level-specific experience than there is
to identify gains that are portable across all contexts (Wiswall (2013), Papay and Kraft (2015)).
Finally, Figures 3.2a and 3.2b display the distributions of subject-specific, level-specific, and subject-
level specific experience for classrooms taught by second and third year teachers in our final sample.
The data underlying these figures are presented in Appendix Table F.2. About 71% of classrooms
taught by 2nd year teachers are in subject-level combinations that these teachers taught in their
first years, while 55% of classrooms taught by 3rd year teachers are in subject-level combinations
that these teachers taught in both of their first two years.
19To see this clearly, note that if every teacher taught the same exact subject/level combinations each year for
their entire career, level-specific, subject-specific, and subject-level-specific experience would all increment by one
every year, and would thus be perfectly collinear with general experience. By contrast, the relative within-teacher
performance among multiple courses taught simultaneously provides an important source of variation in identifying
the variance in permanent task-specific talent.
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3.4.5 Estimation and Calculation of Standard Errors
We estimate the model at the classroom level via weighted OLS by exploiting the sparsity of the
design matrices for the school-subject-level and school-teacher-subject-level fixed effects. Weights
for each classroom observation are proportional to the number of students in the classroom, so that
the variances in teacher productivity presented below capture the variation in teacher contributions
across student-course combinations. Cluster-robust standard errors are calculated for each param-
eter. We cluster at the teacher level in order to accommodate the possibility of autocorrelated
teacher-year shocks.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Variation in the General and Context-Specific Components of Time-Invariant
Teacher Productivity
Table 3.4 contains the results of the decomposition of the variance in time-invariant teacher pro-
ductivity (“talent”) into general, subject-specific, level-specific, and subject-level-specific compo-
nents using the baseline specification (3.2). The first column displays the decomposition obtained
from imposing Assumption 2A, in which all between school-subject-level variation in student per-
formance is attributed to differences in school and unobserved student inputs. The row labeled
“School-Teacher-Subject-Level Combos” provides the total estimated variance (and corresponding
standard deviation) in time-invariant teacher contributions to test scores across randomly sam-
pled student-course combinations, which combines all four components of time-invariant teacher
productivity. A one standard deviation increase in combined permanent teaching effectiveness is
associated with a .154 standard deviation increase in expected student performance. 74% of this
variance in permanent teacher quality can be attributed to general teacher talent that is portable
across all subject-level combinations (see the row labeled “General Talent”). A student assigned to
a teacher whose average effectiveness across the subject-level combinations he/she teaches is one
standard deviation above the school average can expect a .132 standard deviation increase in test
score performance relative to being assigned the average teacher at the school in the absence of
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knowledge about the chosen teacher’s experience or level-specific and subject-specific skill.
Subject-specific skill and level-specific skill make up about 17% and 9%, respectively, of the total
variance in permanent teaching effectiveness across randomly chosen student-course combinations
(tests). Receiving a teacher whose subject-specific skill in the selected subject is one standard
deviation above the teacher’s subjectwide average increases expected student achievement by about
.063 test score standard deviations. Note that this is still enough to move a student who would have
otherwise scored at the 50th percentile to the 53rd percentile statewide. Getting a teacher whose
level-specific skill is one standard deviation above his/her levelwide average increases expected
performance by .045 test score standard deviations, enough to move a student from the 50th to the
52nd percentile.
Finally, the subject-specific, level-specific, and general components of time-invariant teacher pro-
ductivity combine to explain nearly the full variance in time-invariant teacher productivity across
classroom contexts. Subject-level-specific talent does not seem to exist. In other words, a teacher’s
permanent talent for teaching, say, honors biology, can be fully explained by the teacher’s gen-
eral teaching talent across subjects and levels, combined with the teacher’s talent for teaching
honors-level courses and the teacher’s talent for teaching biology courses, respectively.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.4 display the alternative decomposition of permanent teacher skill that
comes from imposing Assumption 2B, in which all the variation in average student performance
across subject-level combinations within schools is also attributed to differences in average teacher
quality. Not surprisingly, this increases each of the variance components substantially. Note,
though, that the fractions of variance in teacher productivity explained by each component stay
roughly similar to what they were under Assumption 2A. Under Assumption 2B, a one standard
deviation increase in general teacher talent is associated with a .192 increase in average student
performance, while a one standard deviation increase in subject-specific (level-specific) teacher
talent is associated with a .077 (.058) increase in expected student performance relative to a subject
(level) in which the teacher has no comparative advantage or disadvantage. Subject-level-specific
talent does not appear to exist under Assumption 2B either. These results are roughly in line with
those of Mansfield (ming).
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The results under Assumption 2C (Columns 5 and 6) assign all the between school-subject-level
variation in student performance to differences in teacher inputs rather than school or student
inputs. They provide an upper bound estimate of the standard deviation in general teacher talent
of .225 test score standard deviations.
Overall, we conclude that most of the time-invariant variation in teacher productivity is portable
across all subjects and levels, but that there is a non-negligible achievement gain from being taught
by a teacher who is relatively well-matched to the level and particularly the subject associated with
the classroom.
3.5.2 General and Context-Specific Experience Profiles
Table 3.5 presents the estimated experience profiles for each type of experience from the baseline
specification (3.2).20 Panel A of Figure 3.3 displays these experience profiles graphically. Column
1 of Table 3.5 contains estimates of the part of the returns to teaching experience that are portable
to all subject-level combinations, while Columns 2-4 contain estimates of the part of the returns
to teaching experience that are subject-, level-, and subject-level-specific, respectively. There are
considerable gains from the first two years of general experience, such that teachers teaching in
their third year can expect to improve student performance by .085 test score standard deviations
more than a novice teacher, even if they are teaching at a new level in a new subject. These gains
grow to .113 by 7 years of experience, but seem to plateau thereafter. However, the results become
quite noisy for higher levels of experience; since we must observe the entire history of teacher
assignments, only the cohorts of new teachers from the late 1990’s are observed at the higher levels
of experience in our sample.
Row 1 of Column 2 indicates that teaching a subject for the second time increases the teacher’s
expected performance by .014 test-score standard deviations within that subject, relative to the first
attempt. An additional year of subject-specific experience increases performance by an additional
.019 standard deviations, while a third year of subject-experience adds an additional .016 standard
20The coefficients on our controls for teacher workload and depreciation of experience capital for this specification
are presented in Appendix Table F.3.
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deviations. Gains seem to slow beyond the third year of subject experience. Overall, teachers with
more than 7 years of subject-specific experience are between .046 and .067 student level standard
deviations more effective than teachers with the same total years of general teaching experience
but who are teaching the subject for the first time.
The results in Column 2 suggest that part of the returns to experience generally estimated in the
literature are actually specific to the subject taught. Since teachers frequently reteach the same
subject many times, subject-specific experience and overall (general) years of experience are highly
correlated. Thus, when returns to subject-specific experience are not separated from returns to
general experience, the returns to subject-specific experience will generally be reflected in larger
estimated returns to general experience.
Columns 3 and 4, by contrast, show that the returns to level-specific and subject-level-specific
experience seem to be virtually non-existent, once years of subject-specific and general experience
have been taken into account. In fact, the returns to subject-level-specific experience seem to be
negative. Note that such negative returns are not implausible in principle: teaching the exact same
course again and again could cause teachers to lose enthusiasm or to stop updating course materials
(even as the state curriculum drifts slightly).
That said, this negative profile might also be spurious if it is merely the product of overfitting;
while including a full set of school-teacher-subject-level fixed effects removes potential bias from
teachers systematically repeating the courses at which they are relatively effective more frequently,
it also considerably limits the remaining variation in experience stocks that can be used to identify
gains from experience.21 Given that subject-specific and subject-level-specific experience are very
highly correlated, OLS may be able to reduce squared residuals more by fitting sampling error than
by fitting true productivity gains.
To address concerns about overfitting, we turn attention to our “restricted” specification (3.3)
that replaces the school-teacher-subject-level effects µsrjl with school-teacher fixed effects only.
22
21Specifically, the inclusion of these fixed effects implies that only relative growth rates in performance within a
school-teacher-subject-level cell provide identifying variation.
22Consistent estimation of experience profiles in the restricted specification requires that teachers do not systemat-
ically gain more general or context-specific experience in the subjects or levels in which they have experience-invariant
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Because the results from the restricted specification have proven to be more robust to alternative
sample restrictions and the inclusion of additional controls, we focus primarily on experience profiles
that maintain these restrictions for the remainder of the paper.
Table 3.6 displays the estimated general and context-specific experience profiles for the restricted
specification (with Panel B of Figure 3.3 providing a graphical depiction). The results for general
and level experience are essentially unaffected by the restrictions, but the negative effects of subject-
level-specific experience disappear, while the gains to subject-specific experience are somewhat
diminished. Specifically, a teacher with two (four) prior years of subject-specific experience could
be expected to increase achievement by .023 (.041) test score standard deviations relative to the
teacher’s expected performance when teaching the subject for the first time (holding the other
experience components fixed).
Column 5 in Table 3.6 sums across the first four columns to provide the returns to experience for a
teacher who never changes the subject-level he/she teaches. After two (four) years, such a teacher
is predicted to perform .118 (.138) standard deviations better than a novice teacher. Since many
teachers teach the same subject-level every year (perhaps in addition to other courses), this sum is
particularly well identified. Most of the sampling error in the estimates comes from decomposing
this sum into the four experience components.
Given the failure to observe meaningful level-specific and subject-level-specific experience effects,
the first two columns of Table 3.7 display results from a yet more parsimonious specification in
which the level-specific and subject-level specific experience profiles are constrained to be zero ev-
erywhere. The basic pattern of results for total and subject-specific experience exhibit little change;
there are still meaningful gains from the first several years of both total experience and subject-
specific experience. Imposing these further restrictions increases the precision of the estimates
considerably, however, so that experienced teachers are statistically significantly more effective
than novice teachers for all categories of general experience and for all but the highest experience
category of subject-specific experience.
comparative advantages. However, given that the previous sub-section revealed relatively small variances in subject-
and level-specific permanent talent, even substantially elevated rates of re-assignment of teachers to their more effec-
tive subjects and levels would produce minimal bias.
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The fourth column of Table 3.7 presents estimates from the standard specification in the literature,
in which only a single “general” experience term enters the production function. This standard
experience profile, which is driven by both general and specific returns, matches fairly closely those
found in the literature.
Overall, the relative magnitudes of the coefficients for the different dimensions of experience par-
allel the results for context-specific talent presented in Section 3.5.1: a large role for the general
component, with a moderate role for the subject-specific component and small-to-nonexistent roles
for the level-specific and subject-level-specific components.
3.6 Tests of Identifying Assumptions and Robustness Checks
3.6.1 Testing for Dynamic Classroom Assignment Responses to Unobserved
Shocks
Assumption 1, which is necessary for consistent estimates of experience profiles, will be violated if
particular experience profiles are more likely to be observed during years in which either teachers or
their schools are experiencing positive or negative year-specific deviations in productivity relative
to what could be predicted given their full sample performance and teachers’ observed levels of
each dimension of experience.
There are a variety of scenarios that could bring about such a correlation. Some involve endogenous
allocation responses to idiosyncratic shocks, and may not exhibit any pre-trend. For example, a
teacher who is less effective while pregnant may quit teaching after the baby arrives. Scenarios such
as these would imply that the set of teachers who make it to the next year of teaching (or perhaps
teaching in a particular context) are those whose teacher-year (or perhaps classroom) shocks were
not too negative. Thus, the expected change in the teacher-year error component would be negative
among those who persist, creating a potential downward bias in our estimate of the return to general
experience.
We address endogenous responses to idiosyncratic shocks by including in all our specifications four
indicator variables that are set to one if the observation is from a classroom that represents the
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teacher’s last year teaching at the school in any classroom, in the current school-subject combina-
tion, in the current school-level combination, and in the current school-subject-level combination,
respectively. These indicators capture the extent to which the year before an assignment change
tends to exhibit particularly low performance, thereby preventing such dips from being fit by the
experience profile parameters of interest. In addition to controlling for the most plausible dynamic
response to health shocks, these dummies also control for the possibility that teachers who antici-
pate quitting put forth less effort in their final year (which could also bias downward the estimated
general experience profile). Indeed, the coefficients on the dummies corresponding to the last year
in the school-subject and school-subject-level (Appendix Table F.4) are negative and statistically
significant.
However, other scenarios that produce violations of Assumption 1 might involve trends over time
in error components rather than merely single-year idiosyncratic shocks, so that our “last year”
indicators are inadequate controls. One particularly plausible mechanism stems from the possibility
of heterogeneity in the gains to experience among teachers.23 Since both our baseline and restricted
specifications constrain the gains from general experience to be common to all teachers, any het-
erogeneity in rates of growth among teachers in the sample will be reflected in the teacher-year
error component, νrt.
Thus, our context-specific experience profiles could be biased upward if teachers with faster than
average growth rates are more likely to stay in the courses and levels they are teaching: the average
value of the teacher-year error component νrt would be higher for higher values of subject-specific
or level-specific experience. This might occur if rapidly improving teachers are rewarded with the
opportunity to continue teaching their courses (while forcing others to adjust to changing classroom
demand created by, say, teacher turnover or variation in student cohort size).
An analogous bias could be created by endogenous responses to school-year shocks. For example,
teachers may be more likely to quit a declining school, thereby creating holes in subject or level
offerings that other teachers must be forced to fill. In this case, the school-year error component φst
would be positively correlated with levels of context-specific experience, leading to overestimates
of the gains to experience.
23Atteberry et al. (2013) finds evidence of heterogeneous teacher growth in New York City.
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We can test both of these hypotheses jointly by examining whether the trend in a teacher’s perfor-
mance (relative to the estimated experience profile) predicts the teacher’s future teaching assign-
ments. Indeed, such a test will also reveal the potential bias from any other sources of dynamic
assignment patterns that involve a time trend in the composite error ct within a teacher.
Specifically, we first identify all teacher-year combinations in which a teacher fails to teach any
classroom in the following year. We then calculate and plot in Appendix Figure F.1a the average
test score residuals across all classrooms of students taught by the teachers from these teacher-year
combinations in the years leading up to their breaks from teaching (denoted t in event time). We
see no evidence of any trend in teacher-year residuals in advance of the break from teaching. In
order to distinguish quits/retirements from parental leave, Figure F.1e plots the same time path
of teacher-year residuals leading up to the smaller sample of teacher-year combinations in which
a teacher fails to teach in any classroom in any future year in the sample. No obvious trend is
observed.
We then perform the analogous exercise for changes in subject, level, and subject-level assign-
ments. Specifically, for Figure F.1b (F.1f) we identify all teacher-subject-year combinations in
which the teacher fails to teach any classrooms in the chosen subject in the following year (any fu-
ture year), and plot the time path of average teacher-subject-year residuals leading up the change
in subject assignment. Figures F.1c - F.1h plot the analogous trends in teacher-level-year and
teacher-subject-level-year residuals leading up to breaks from teaching a given difficulty level or
subject-level combination. None of the Figures F.1a-F.1h show any evidence of a significant trend
in residuals preceding an assignment change that might suggest biases from dynamic reallocations
of teacher assignments in response to unobserved shocks/input trends.24
3.6.2 Testing for Dynamic Student Sorting
In this subsection, we focus our attention specifically on violations of Assumptions 1 and 2 that are
caused by nonrandom student sorting. To gauge the possible severity of the problem, we implement
a “backcasting” test in the spirit of Rothstein (2010) in which we replace class averages of students’
24The point estimates that underlie these figures are presented in Appendix Table F.5.
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contemporaneous test scores with class averages of their math standardized test scores from 7th
grade.25 The intuition behind the test is that if students were randomly assigned to teachers
conditional on controls, current teacher identity or experience should not predict past student
performance. To the extent that it does, part of the estimated gains to teacher experience could
simply be capturing the ability of more experienced teachers to attract/be assigned to unobservably
superior students.
The results of this exercise for the restricted specification 3.3 are presented in Appendix Table F.6.
While the estimates are generally relatively small in magnitude, a number of estimates are statis-
tically significantly different from zero, creating some cause for concern. A closer look, though,
reveals that teachers with more general and subject-specific experience seem to be attracting stu-
dents with inferior 7th grade math scores (conditional on 8th grade scores and the other controls),
while teachers with more level-specific and subject-level specific experience seem to be attracting
students with superior past test scores. Thus, the backcasting test suggests that the substantial
gains to general and subject-specific experience reported above are, if anything, understated. By
contrast, the gains to level-specific and subject-level specific experience could be slightly negative.
Thus, these results do not undermine the qualitative conclusions of Section 3.5.2.
Furthermore, while such backcasting tests are well known in the literature and are valuable for
flagging potential selection and sorting biases, recent research by Kinsler (2012) and Goldhaber
and Chaplin (2015) suggest that these tests may find evidence of significant dynamic student
sorting even where none exists. For example, suppose that classroom assignment in 9th or 10th
grade is partially based on 7th grade test scores (perhaps because these test scores still affect
principal or student beliefs about student ability), but that the part of persistent student inputs
captured by 7th grade test scores is fully reflected in the included controls. In this case, current
teacher assignments could significantly predict past test score noise or transitory student inputs,
25These test scores are not included in our baseline specification because 7th test scores are missing for our first
cohort (since they had already reached 8th grade the first year the statewide database was constructed). We wanted
a consistent set of controls for all cohorts in our sample, and did not want to exclude our earliest student cohort,
since their 1997 performance creates a baseline of productivity for the 1997 cohort of new teachers, which permits
estimation of the gains to the 14th year of teacher experience and generally increases the precision of estimates of
mid-career teaching (to which few cohorts of teachers contribute).
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yet estimates of teacher value-added and gains from experience would nonetheless be unbiased.26
Indeed, when we add 7th grade math and reading scores as controls as a robustness check in the next
section, we find negligible changes in estimated gains from general and context-specific experience.
3.6.3 Evaluating Forecast Bias in Estimates of Context-Specific Teacher Talent
While the previous subsections have investigated several sources of potential bias in our estimated
experience profiles, in this section we seek to determine the degree to which our estimates of teacher
talent, the estimated fixed effects {µˆsrjl}, properly capture the true talent contributions {µsrjl}.
Following Chetty et al. (2014a), we do this by measuring forecast bias: the degree to which teachers’
context-specific talent estimates from one partition of our data predict mean residual achievement
in the same context in a second, left out partition. The implementation of our tests for forecast
bias, which mirrors Chetty et al. (2014a), is described in detail in Section E.
We first test for forecast bias in our estimates of combined general and task-specific talent {µˆsrjl}.
This involves regressing differences in the performance of pairs of teachers within the same school-
subject-level context from a left-out sample of classrooms on our posterior mean belief about the
difference in the two teachers’ talent in the chosen context. This empirical Bayes (EB) posterior
belief is formed by multiplying the difference in estimated fixed effects µˆsrjl−µˆsr′jl from the primary
sample by a reliability ratio that shrinks the estimated difference toward zero. If the estimated
variance in teachers’ talent contributions across randomly chosen test scores presented in Table 3.4
is valid, multiplying by this reliability ratio removes the attenuation bias created by sampling error
in the fixed effect estimates {µˆsrjl} that would otherwise occur in a forecast regression of outcome
differences from one sample on outcome differences in a second disjoint sample. Consequently,
under the null hypothesis that the estimated (lower bound) teacher talent variance across tests
is valid, the coefficient on the EB posterior mean from the forecast regression should converge in
probability to 1.
26Similarly, Chetty et al. (2016) point out that track-level, field-level, or school system-level shocks that are
correlated across years could produce sampling error that is correlated across students’ current and past classroom
observations. This represents an additional mechanism by which backcasting tests could yield spurious “evidence” of
bias.
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The actual estimated regression coefficient (Appendix Table F.7, Column 1) is 0.825, with a stan-
dard error of 0.019. While this exercise reveals that our estimates of teacher talent can be used to
forecast contributions to student performance out-of-sample fairly accurately, our estimator does
not seem to be “forecast unbiased”. The most straightforward explanation for a coefficient below 1
is that our estimate ˆV ar(µstcl) slightly overstates the true variance in teacher talent contributions
ˆV ar(µstcl), so that the reliability ratio we use in shrinkage overstates the degree of signal in the
fixed effect differences. However, a couple of alternative explanations exist. First, the reliability
ratio could also be overstated if we are underestimating the standard errors used to construct the
estimated “noise”. Second, the subsample of school-teacher-subject-level combinations that satisfy
the criteria for eligibility for the forecast sample (See Section E) might feature a slightly lower true
variance in teacher talent contributions than the population.
While this test captures the model’s ability to consistently estimate the combined general and
context-specific talent that a teacher contributes to a given context, the ability to improve the
efficiency of teachers’ classroom assignments only depends on the model’s success in isolating and
consistently estimating the context-specific components of teacher talent. Thus, we also construct
two additional forecast tests that measure the degree to which our estimates of subject-specific and
level-specific talent can forecast out-of-sample teachers’ subject-specific and level-specific compar-
ative advantages, respectively.
Unlike our tests of the consistency of our combined talent estimates, which could be performed using
differences among teachers who taught in the same school-subject-level context, evaluating our
comparative advantage estimates requires measuring the degree to which difference-in-differences
between teachers who taught the same two courses at the same school can be forecast. This
necessitates restricting the forecasting sample to pairs of teachers who each taught multiple classes
in the same two subjects within the same school-level combination (or, for the second test, both basic
and honors in the same school-subject combination). Only 205 and 289 difference-in-differences
exist on which to perform the forecast test for subject-specific and level-specific talent estimates,
respectively. In essence, there is far less overidentifying variation available to test the model’s
ability to detect true variation in subject-specific and level-specific talent.
The methodology for the context-specific forecast tests is otherwise perfectly analogous to the
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forecast test for combined teacher talent. Difference-in-differences in residual mean test scores
from among the left-out classrooms in the forecasted sample across teachers and either subjects
or levels (conditioning on the same school-level or school-course environment as appropriate) are
regressed on empirical Bayes estimates of difference-in-differences in the teachers’ context-specific
talent from the forecasting sample.
The regression coefficient on the forecasted difference-in-difference from the subject-specific forecast
sample is 1.013, with a standard error of 0.242. Thus, while the point estimate suggests negligible
forecast bias in estimates of subject-specific talent, the confidence interval is quite wide: only values
below 0.539 can be ruled out with 95% confidence. Nonetheless, the test provides some reassurance
that the kind of achievement data available to principals can provide some meaningful signal of
subject-specific skill that might be used to guide classroom assignments.
The regression coefficient from the level-specific forecast regression is 0.456, with a standard error
of 0.333. The point estimate indicates that our ability to infer level-specific talent is less strong
than what our estimate of the true variance in level-specific talent would suggest. However, the test
is severely underpowered: both 0 and 1 are within the 95% confidence interval. The large standard
errors are partly due to the limited overidentifying variation just discussed, but are also attributable
to the small estimated variance in level-specific skill: each classroom provides an extremely weak
signal of level-specific skill relative to the “noise” stemming from the contributions of general teacher
talent and other student and school inputs.
3.6.4 Further Robustness Checks
This subsection aims to provide a broader sense of the robustness of the main results to the array
of difficult choices regarding specifications, variable definitions, and sample restrictions described
in sections 3.2 and 3.4.
First, so far we have defined experience in a given context as the number of previous years in which
the teacher taught at least one classroom in that context. This assumes that additional classes
taught simultaneously in a context within a year (e.g. two periods of honors Biology classes) do not
provide additional productivity value, which is based on the idea that teachers often have little time
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to alter materials between classes in a given day. However, Appendix Table F.8 presents estimated
experience profiles in which experience in each context is defined as the total number of classrooms
taught in the chosen context in prior years. While the scales are difficult to compare, the results
based on the classroom-based definition of experience are qualitatively very similar to those based
on the year-based definition: substantial gains to general experience, moderate gains to the first few
years of subject-specific experience, and negligible gains to level-specific and subject-level specific
experience. Due to the near perfect correlation between year-based and classroom-based measures
of experience, we are unable to determine which measure better captures the true accumulation
of productivity gains from experience. Appendix Table F.9 shows that the decomposition of the
variance in teacher talent is insensitive to the definition of experience.
Second, while we allow the permanent component of teacher productivity to be school-specific, to
this point we have assumed that gains from general experience and from each dimension of context-
specific experience retain their full value at new schools. Appendix Table F.10 presents estimated
experience profiles based on the subsample of classrooms associated with teachers teaching in their
first schools, where there is no concern about mismeasurement of experience stocks due to imperfect
portability across schools. This subsample comprises 83.5 percent of our full sample of classrooms.
The experience profiles remain essentially unchanged. Similarly, the decomposition of teacher talent
for this subsample (Appendix Table F.11) is nearly identical to its full sample counterpart.
Third, Appendix Tables F.12 and F.13 present results from a specification in which we alter our
controls for depreciation in experience-based human capital. Specifically, we replace indicators for
whether the teacher taught the chosen subject, level, and subject-level (and whether the teacher
taught at all) in the last year with linear controls for the number of years since having taught the
relevant subject, level, or subject-level (or taught in any classroom). The estimates of the returns
to experience are not sensitive to our handling of depreciation in experience-based human capital,
and our depreciation controls are generally close to zero and statistically insignificant.
Fourth, Section 3.6.2 revealed that the identities of students’ high school teachers can partially
predict their prior 7th grade test scores, suggesting that 7th grade math and reading test scores
might be valuable controls for student sorting. Thus, Appendix Table F.14 reports estimated
experience profiles from a specification that includes class-averages of 7th grade math and reading
131
test scores as controls (and sets missing 7th grade test scores to the samplewide mean of zero).
Inclusion of 7th grade math and reading scores has almost no impact on the estimated profiles.
These results reinforce the idea that failure of a backcasting test need not imply substantive bias
in estimates.
Fifth, the baseline and restricted specifications presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 impose that the
returns to general and subject-specific experience are the same across fields. In Appendix Table
F.15, we present separate estimates of general and subject-specific experience profiles for math,
science, social studies, and English subjects. Comparing across columns, we see that general and
subject-specific returns to experience are fairly similar across all four fields, providing support
for the pooled specifications above. However, there is some variation in experience gains across
fields. In particular, the gains to general experience appear highest in math, and the gains to
subject-specific experience appear to be highest in science.
Sixth, up to this point we have combined years of experience 5 and 6, 7 through 10, and 11 and
beyond into bins rather than introducing separate indicator variables for each year of experience.
We did this because we expected gains from experience to slow down at higher levels of experience
(as our estimates suggest they do), and combining multiple years into bins allows us to reap
additional efficiency gains and identifying power (necessitated by the need to observe teachers’
full teaching histories in order to construct their stocks of general and task-specific experience,
which removes most well-experienced teachers from the sample). However, Wiswall (2013) points
out that grouping experience levels into broad bins imposes arguably unrealistic restrictions on
the experience profile that can potentially produce substantial bias. To address this concern,
Appendix Table F.16 presents estimated general and context-specific experience profiles from a
version of the restricted specification in which indicators are included for years 1 through 14 of
experience.27 While the estimates become prohibitively noisy beyond six or so years of experience,
the results for the first several years of experience are extremely similar to those presented in Table
3.6 across all four dimensions of experience, suggesting that pooling multiple years of experience
27When the full set of dummies is introduced into the baseline specification, the results become nonsensical, with
enormous offsetting positive and negative effects across dimensions. This is not surprising, as combining multiple
years into bins was helping to break the collinearity between the various dimensions of experience, so that the
overfitting/collinearity problem discussed in Section 3.5.2 now becomes even more severe.
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into experience category indicators is not generating substantial bias, at least for the unpooled
experience categories.
Along the same lines, Appendix Table F.18 displays predicted values for the first ten years of
experience in each dimension from a specification in which the set of indicators for each number of
years of experience is replaced by a quartic in each experience dimension (general, subject-specific,
level-specific, and subject-level specific). The gains to each dimension of experience are again
similar, illustrating that a smoother, more parsimonious specification can still capture the basic
qualitative results.
Finally, both the baseline and restricted specifications impose that the separate components of
experience are additively separable in the education production function:
d(expgen, expj , expl, expjl) = dgen(expgen) + dj(expj) + dl(expl) + djl(expjl) (3.12)
However, general experience and different dimensions of context-specific experience may interact
with one another. For example, perhaps students only learn if the teacher has developed effective
ways to both explain a subject’s content and maintain control of the classroom. Lectures that
deliver content effectively may require subject-specific experience, whereas classroom control skills
may be learned through general or level-specific experience. Alternatively, perhaps a teacher can
keep student attention by either having exceptional command of the content or by having excellent
classroom control skills, in which case the different components of experience would be substitutable
rather than complementary.
We relax the additive separability assumption by estimating a “full” specification that captures
the contribution of experience to teacher productivity via a non-parametric function of the four
experience components:








rt) + ct (3.13)
We implement this specification by replacing the four dimension-specific experience profiles with
a full set of four-dimensional experience cell fixed effects.28 This specification is isomorphic in
28For example, the vector of experience stocks (expgen, expj , expl, expjl) = (2, 1, 1, 1) is captured by a different
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structure to a model with worker and firm fixed effects. Since the estimated experience cell fixed
effects are measured with considerable sampling error, to better reveal the underlying structure of
the experience contributions we smooth estimates for each experience cell by using a normal kernel
to give weight to “nearby” estimates.29
We then take partial derivatives of this smoothed non-parametric experience production function
with respect to each dimension of experience and integrate over these dimension-specific partial
derivative functions to construct a set of standard experience profiles analogous to those from our
additively separable baseline and restricted specifications. Section D.2 describes this procedure in
further detail.
The results of this exercise are displayed in Table F.19, while Table F.20 displays the corresponding
marginal effect estimates from a “restricted” version that a replaces school-teacher-subject-level
fixed effects with school-teacher fixed effects. Compared to the additively separable results from
Table 3.6, the results in Table F.20 feature quite similar general and subject-level experience profiles,
but somewhat larger gains to both subject-specific and level-specific experience. Overall, though,
accounting for possible misspecification from ignoring interactions among experience components
does not change the basic qualitative conclusion that the bulk of the gains from experience stem
from general and subject-specific experience.30
indicator variable than (2, 1, 2, 1).
29D.1 provides a more detailed explanation of this smoothing procedure.
30Previous versions of this paper attempted to use the full specification to characterize the nature of complemen-
tarity present in the experience production function. While such attempts produced suggestive evidence that general,
subject, and level experience are substitutes rather than complements, identification and estimation of the degree of
complementarity places extremely strong demands on the data, so that the results were both noisy and fragile. Thus,
we have chosen to remove the full discussion of sub/supermodularity of the production function in this version.
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3.7 Projecting the Achievement Gains from Efficient Use of Context-
Specific Teacher Experience and Talent
3.7.1 Methodology
The moderate variance in subject- and level-specific time-invariant productivity differences among
teachers, combined with the estimated gains to subject-specific experience, suggest that fully ex-
ploiting a teaching staff’s task-specific human capital could potentially generate non-trivial effi-
ciency gains. In this section we develop a set of counterfactual simulations to gauge the magnitude
of the performance gains that could be achieved statewide if each principal exploited the full value
of the stocks of task-specific experience and talent of the members of his or her teaching staff.
To see how such simulations might be implemented, consider the allocation of teachers to classrooms
that takes place at a particular school in a particular field over the set of years in our sample.
Ideally, we would solve the dynamic problem of choosing sequences of yearly allocations to maximize
the average test score performance over the entire sample (and perhaps beyond). However, the
state space of such a dynamic problem is prohibitively large: it must include, for each teacher in
the school, both the teacher’s stock of task-specific experience as well as posterior beliefs (with
corresponding precisions) about the teacher’s talent in each subject and level.
Consequently, we instead simulate the dynamic effects of re-solving each year the static optimization
problem in which the expected average test score for the year is maximized, taking the set of
classrooms and teachers to be matched in the chosen year as exogenously given at the start of
the year. Four-dimensional experience stocks are then updated for the next year based on the
efficient static allocation. While this approach necessarily understates the true gains to dynamic
optimization, it represents an allocation rule that principals can automatically implement each fall
with minimal computational burden and without making any projections about enrollment and
teacher attrition. By evaluating the dynamic implications of static optimization, we can ensure
that the short-run efficiency gains from implementing the statically optimal allocation are not
undermined by long-run efficiency losses.
Even static optimization, however, requires specifying the principal’s belief about each teacher’s
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time-invariant task-specific productivity for each subject-level combination to which the teacher
could potentially be assigned. Thus, we calculate empirical Bayes posterior beliefs about each
teacher’s task-specific talent based on our school-teacher-subject-level fixed effect estimates and
their standard errors, and use these for any school-teacher-subject-level combinations that are
observed in our sample. We assign task-specific productivities of 0 (the population mean) to any
school-teacher-subject-level combination that we do not observe.
These posterior beliefs are designed to make efficient use of the information about teacher compara-
tive advantages contained in the student test score data, given our assumed achievement production
function. However, a major concern is that the principal may have information about teachers’
subject-specific or level-specific talent that is not reflected in the test score data, and is therefore
unobserved by the econometrician. Such information might be derived from classroom observations
or from knowledge of the teacher’s college preparation (e.g. a biology major might be likely to have
a comparative advantage in biology relative to chemistry). If such additional sources of principal
information exist, then allocations that are optimal based on the posterior beliefs we calculate
may identify spurious efficiency “gains” in which teacher assignments that were driven by the un-
observed component of principal’s information are altered to better fit the noise in our empirical
Bayes estimates of task-specific talent, and thus would in fact represent achievement losses.
In light of this concern, we compare our simulated “optimal” allocations to two different baselines
representing different informational assumptions. The first baseline consists of the achievement
contribution of actual teacher assignments in our sample under the assumption that the information
available to the principal at the time of allocation is a subset of the information contained in our
entire sample of test scores for all public school teachers in North Carolina. Under this assumption,
the gains we identify from teacher reallocations should be correct in expectation; we are as likely
to understate as to overstate the gains from our alternative allocation.31
31 Given that the fixed effect estimates are based on the entire sample, one could argue that they are partially
based on information (teachers’ average test score performance from future years) that principals cannot possibly
have observed at the time of allocation, so that the gains we compute overstate gains from a feasible allocation
algorithm even if principals do not have other sources of information on teachers’ task-specific talent. However, for
highly experienced teachers that are included in only a subset of our simulations (but would make up a substantial
fraction of the principals actual staff), the principal will generally have many years of test-score data on which to
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However, since this assumption may cause us to overstate (possibly dramatically) the potential
efficiency gains from effective use of test-score-based information about task-specific experience
and talent, we also compare the achievement gains from our “optimal” allocations to a baseline
in which teachers are randomly allocated to classrooms within field. This random baseline allows
the reader to gauge the potential importance of utilizing information about task-specific experience
and talent contained in test score data without making any assumption about the degree to which
this and other sources of information are already being used by principals. Principals and other
administrators may simply wish to know whether it is worth the time and effort to track task-
specific experience and generate beliefs about task-specific talent and to incorporate these pieces
of information into classroom assignments, or if instead they should allocate classrooms based on
other objectives that may be nearly orthogonal to the short run maximization of test scores (e.g.
minimizing parent dissatisfaction).
To ensure that the simulation captures feasible reallocations, we hold fixed the number of class-
rooms of each subject-level combination at the levels that actually prevailed at each school in each
year. Furthermore, we also hold fixed the total number of classrooms taught by each teacher in
each year, since principals may have been constrained in the workload they could assign to their
more experienced teachers.32 This counterfactual simulation can be rewritten as a binary integer
programming problem. The formal presentation of the problem is located in F.
Since our estimated gains from general and task-specific experience are based on only the 11 tested
subjects, our simulations only consider efficiency gains from reallocating classrooms in which the
tested subjects were taught. We also do not reallocate classrooms in which English 1 was taught,
since this is the only tested subject in English. In addition, because we do not observe the full
base posterior beliefs, so that their posterior beliefs may closely correspond to our empirical Bayes posterior beliefs.
Another possible approach would have been to calculate posterior beliefs for each teacher in each year based on their
performance record up to that date. This would be quite computationally costly for us, since it requires re-estimating
the model (and calculating standard errors) for each year in our sample, but would likely be feasible for an actual
school that is allocating only a handful of teachers. Thus, even our richer static optimization program could be
fairly easily implemented by any school, given accurate records on the teachers’ past course assignments and student
performance.
32For example, these teachers may also have been teaching untested classes, or performing other valuable services
to the school, such as lunchroom monitoring, advising student clubs, or coaching student athletic teams.
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teaching histories of any teacher who began teaching before the sample begins in 1995, for some
of our simulations, we do not reallocate the classrooms taught by such teachers; for other simula-
tions, we impute the full teaching histories for such teachers. We use the estimates from the full
specification in equation (3.13) for both the posterior beliefs about context specific talent and the
predicted contributions of each four-dimensional vector of experience stocks.33
Our simulation procedure captures the gains that could have been reaped by the end of each year
had the principal maximized the value of context-specific experience and context-specific talent in
each school starting in 1995 (the first year of the sample). However, estimates in the first few years
of the sample conflate the fact that past rotations have limited potential gains from re-optimizing
with the fact that relatively few teachers are being reallocated.34 Thus, we focus on efficiency
gains among classrooms assigned in the last 5 years of the sample, when a substantial fraction of
teachers are eligible for reassignment. We do not extend our simulations beyond the last year of
the sample, so that the gains we report may not fully capture the very long run (steady state) gains
from repeated optimization. We hold the allocation of teachers to schools fixed (thus ignoring any
possible effects of classroom reassignments on teacher turnover), and we continue to assume that
context-specific experience is fully portable across schools.
We also compare the results of the “dynamic” simulation to a fully static simulation that solves
the binary integer programming problem in each year t holding fixed observed teacher assignments
up through t − 1. These results reflect the payoff to the first year of optimal static reallocation.
The static simulation serves to illustrate the decomposition of gains into the part stemming from
initial reassignment to better match teachers’ context-specific experience and talent to the courses
33We smooth the nonparametrically-estimated experience function to a greater degree for the simulations to ensure
that our simulated efficiency gains do not stem from better exploiting the sampling error portion of the estimated
returns to experience. We use a bandwidth (variance on a normal PDF) of 5 to smooth the estimates used for the
simulation. In theory, the appropriate smoothing represents a delicate balance: smoothing too little creates the
possibility of spurious gains from better fitting sampling error in estimates, while smoothing too much also removes
the signal. Indeed, complete smoothing would make the productivity of each experience cell identical, and would
therefore eliminate the possibility of any gains from better use of teacher experience stocks. In practice, however, we
have found that bandwidth choices between 2 and 10 yield very similar estimates.
34This is because we do not observe the classroom assignment histories for the vast majority of the teachers in the
first few years.
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they teach and the part stemming from longer run gains associated with the specialization of the
teacher work force.
3.7.2 Results from Counterfactual Simulations
The bar charts in Figure 3.4 present the student-weighted average expected test score gain from
optimal reallocation among all school-year combinations for both the single-year “static” simulation
(Panels C and D) and the “dynamic” simulation in which static re-assignments affect the following
year’s experience stocks (Panels A and B). The numerical values that correspond to the bars in
Figure 3.4 are presented in Table 3.8.
The results in Figure 3.4 are reported separately by whether the baseline is the actual allocation
observed in the sample (Panels A and C) or an allocation in which teachers are randomly assigned
to classrooms within field (Panels B and D). In addition, because the scope for efficiency gains
from matching and specialization increases in the size of the teaching force, achievement gains are
also presented separately by number of teachers in the school-field-year combination eligible to be
reallocated (i.e. the number who taught at least one classroom in that school-field-year combination
in the actual data for whom the full teaching history is observed).35
While optimal reallocations were implemented separately by field, the results displayed in Figure
3.4 pool the classroom-level gains across the three fields (math, science, social studies). We pool
the results because there was surprisingly little heterogeneity in simulated gains from reallocation
across fields (See Appendix Table F.21 for the disaggregated results). In each panel of Figure
3.4, the height of the rightmost bar in each set of three bars represents the total simulated per-
student standardized test score gain from optimally allocating teachers to classrooms, while the
heights of the leftmost and middle bars decompose this total per-student gain into the components
stemming from better (or worse) use of teachers’ context-specific experience and context-specific
talent, respectively.
35In the case where only one teacher is observed teaching all of the courses in the field, there can be no gains from
teacher reallocation. Thus, school-field-years featuring only one teacher are omitted from the simulations presented
in Figure 3.4.
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We focus first on Panel A, which displays results from our “dynamic” simulations in which the
actual allocation observed in North Carolina is used as a baseline. These results indicate that
better use of context-specific talent in particular has the potential to reap non-trivial efficiency
gains. Specifically, the total gains relative to the actual allocation from better use of context-
specific teacher productivity grow from .017 test score standard deviations for school-year-fields
in which only two teachers are eligible to be reallocated to .033 for four-teacher fields and .044
standard deviations for school-year-fields featuring eleven or more eligible teachers.36 Moreover,
these total gains derive almost entirely from more efficient use of teachers’ task-specific talent,
while gains from better use of teacher-specific experience are negligible and in some cases slightly
negative.
If instead the random allocation is used as a baseline (Panel B), two-teacher fields reap efficiency
gains of .025 standard deviations, while four-teacher fields produce gains of .044 standard devia-
tions and fields with eleven or more teachers produce gains .054 standard deviations. Generally
speaking, about 20% of the gains relative to the random allocation comes from effective use of
context-specific experience rather than talent; .05, .010 and .015 of the total per-student test score
gain can be attributed to better exploiting teacher subject-specific and level-specific experience for
school-year-fields with two teachers, four teachers, and eleven or more teachers eligible for real-
location, respectively. The combined results in Panels A and B suggest that while effective use
of teachers’ stocks of context-specific experience could be an important source of efficiency gains
in some contexts, North Carolina principals already seem to be effectively exploiting the context-
specific experience of their staffs, possibly even at the expense of subject-specific and level-specific
teacher talent.
Panels C and D display the corresponding results for the “static” simulations, in which teacher
assignments up until time t− 1 are held fixed when choosing simulated classroom allocations at t.
They reveal that nearly all of the long-run gains from optimal reallocation of teachers are reaped in
the first period of reallocation. This is not surprising given the small fraction of the total efficiency
36This pattern is mirrored in the fraction of classrooms whose assigned teacher in the simulation differs from the
one observed in the data. 30.3, 44.9, and 51.9 percent of classrooms in the math field with two, four, and 11+ teachers
have their original teachers reassigned in the dynamic simulation. The corresponding percentages are 25.3, 40.4, and
45.6 for the static simulation. Appendix Table F.22 presents the full set of reallocation rates from our simulations.
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gains in the dynamic simulations attributable to better use of task-specific experience.
Note that if principals have very precise information about task-specific talent at the time of hire,
then there is no tension between maximizing the contributions of task-specific experience versus
task-specific talent: teachers can be assigned when hired to the courses in which they have the
strongest comparative advantages, and then can continue to teach these courses, building up the
relevant task-specific experience. However, for principals that have minimal information about
teachers’ context-specific talent at the time of hire, our estimates suggest that the degree to which
teachers should be rotated among courses is likely to depend strongly on a school’s teacher turnover
rate. For schools with very low turnover rates, the variance in context-specific talent is sufficiently
large that principals might find it worthwhile to rotate teachers for several years in order to learn
the set of course assignments that best utilize task-specific talent. However, for schools with high
turnover rates, the signal about task-specific talent received from a small number of classrooms is
sufficiently coarse that the knowledge necessary to benefit from superior allocation of task-specific
talent cannot be gathered in time for it to be valuable; by contrast, the productivity gains from
the first two years of subject-specific experience are reasonably large, and can be reaped even
among teachers who are only likely to stay for three or four years. This logic suggests that high
turnover schools are likely to be better off minimizing the degree to which teachers are rotated
among courses.
In the absence of an analytical solution to the full dynamic problem, a more precise characteriza-
tion of the optimal amount of teacher rotation requires simulating test score contributions from
alternative rotation strategies for a variety of parameter combinations governing, for example,
turnover rates, principal information, teaching loads, and the number of distinct subjects, levels,
and courses. We leave such an extensive simulation exercise for future work. However, we wish to
emphasize that each individual school likely faces fixed and known values of many of these remain-
ing parameters, so that the estimated task-specific experience profiles and underlying variances in
subject-specific and level-specific talent presented in this paper provide the information necessary
for school administrators to perform their own customized simulations to guide their classroom
assignment decisions.
In Appendix Table F.23, we also display results from simulations in which all observed teachers who
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taught the tested courses are eligible for reallocation. We impute context-specific experience stocks
for those teachers whose full teaching history is not observed based on the distribution of context-
specific experience among the most experienced teachers whose full histories are observed. Adding
in the full roster of teachers reduces dynamic gains relative to the actual allocation to .005 standard
deviations for two-teacher fields, .014 standard deviations for four-teacher fields, and .025 for fields
with eleven or more teachers (though note that 29% of the school-year fields in the full sample
feature 11+ teachers, relative to 2% for the complete history subsample). These smaller simulated
gains indicate that principals might make better use of their experienced teachers’ context-specific
talent, suggesting that they may learn teachers’ comparative advantages slowly. When the random
baseline is used instead, the corresponding gains are .011 for two-teacher fields, .027 standard
deviations for four-teacher fields and .042 for fields with eleven or more teachers.
On one hand, these magnitudes are clearly not large enough to dramatically shift the distribution
of student achievement; a .025 standard deviation test score gain is only enough to move an average
student from the 50th to the 51st percentile of the state test score distribution. However, a number
of other considerations suggest a more optimistic interpretation of these efficiency gains.
First, note that these gains are virtually costless: no change in existing staff is required, and all
teaching loads are held fixed. It is rare to find the potential for across-the-board gains from policy
changes that require so little upheaval.
Second, given that the vast majority of the test-score variation is within classes, most other school-
level policies are likely to have a similarly-sized impact. For example, consider a policy that aims
to identify and replace the worst 10 percent of teachers with new hires. Using the estimates from
Table 3.4, the expected contribution of a randomly chosen teacher below the 10th percentile of
general skill is -.22 test score standard deviations, so that if such teachers teach only 10 percent of
students, average test scores would increase by 0.022 standard deviations even under the optimistic
assumption that replacement teachers were of average quality.
Third, note that the vast majority of students are taught in high schools that feature seven or more
teachers in a field. Furthermore, classrooms were only reallocated in tested courses, so that, for
example, teachers who only taught calculus were not available for reallocation. Thus, the largest
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efficiency gains from our simulations are probably the relevant gains in most situations, and in fact
may still be underestimates for most large schools.
Finally, these average gains conceal considerable heterogeneity in potential gains among schools.
Consider the specification that incorporates task-specific talent, reallocates only teachers with fully
observed teaching histories, and uses the observed allocation as the baseline. Focusing on schools
with fields that generally feature seven or more teachers and averaging across fields and years, the
mean dynamic gain from optimal reallocation among the 10 percent of schools featuring the smallest
gains is only .004 standard deviations, while schools among the top decile of the distribution of
dynamic gains are predicted to enjoy test score increases of .047 standard deviations on average.
Thus, there seem to be a non-trivial subset of schools that might be able to reap substantial gains
simply from changing their teacher assignment mechanism.
On the other hand, several additional caveats and limitations of our simulations should be noted.
First, recall that the projected gains relative to the actual allocation rely on the questionable
assumption that the principal does not have alternative sources of information beyond what is
reflected in the full sample of test scores. Second, we are unable to evaluate the extent to which
any achievement gains from an alternative teacher assignment mechanism would also contribute to
or detract from other important non-test score student or school outcomes. Furthermore, because
we do not allow our simulated classroom assignments to affect teacher turnover, the simulated
efficiency gains could overstate even the true achievement gains if, for example, good teachers have
a taste for variety, and quit more frequently if they are forced to teach the same subject-level
combination repeatedly.37 Similarly, our data do not permit us to estimate gains (or losses) to
high levels of general and context-specific experience. It may be that some of the excess rotation of
teachers away from their comparative advantages is necessary to prevent burnout or human capital
depreciation among the most senior teachers. This might also lead us to overstate potential gains
from optimal reallocation.38
37However, Ost and Schiman (2015) suggests that the opposite is true in the elementary school context: teachers
who rotate more frequently among grades exit schools at a higher rate.
38Note, though, that this scenario could also cause us to understate the gains to reallocation, since we have
essentially assumed away any experience-based gains from reallocation among very experienced teachers by assigning
the same experience productivity values to all levels of experience beyond 10 years.
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3.8 Conclusions
This paper introduces and implements a method for decomposing worker productivity into task-
specific and general components of both experience and persistent talent. For high school teachers,
about a third of the productivity gains from experience are specific to the subjects to which a teacher
has been assigned, while about 74% of the variance in experience-invariant talent is portable across
all courses. Nonetheless, our simulations provide suggestive evidence that existing allocations of
teachers to classrooms in public high schools might be failing to exploit the variation in subject-
specific and level-specific human capital that does exist, suggesting the potential for efficiency
gains of around .02-.03 student test score standard deviations on average, with larger gains for
some schools.
Note, however, that the results of the decomposition we estimate may not generalize to other occu-
pations or even to alternative definitions of teachers’ tasks. In particular, the tasks we consider are
still fairly similar in scope. For example, we might observe greater variation in task-specific talent
among teachers if we included serving as a high school athletic coach as one of a teacher’s tasks.
Similarly, developing students’ cognitive and non-cognitive skills might represent two different tasks
facing a teacher even within a given classroom context.39
The methodology, however, does generalize: a similar decomposition may be estimated in any
context in which worker productivity may be measured at the task level and where the blend of
tasks changes over time. Indeed, there are many other organizational contexts in which we might
also expect productivity to reflect a mix of general and task-specific talent as well as general and
task-specific experience, and in which the nature of this production function may not be easily
observable by employers or managers. A company employing a sales team to sell different products
to different types of clientele, for example, might have both the wherewithal and the need to
implement our decomposition.
39For instance, teachers who are effective at teaching abstract concepts may not be effective at handling student
emotional crises.
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3.9 Tables and Figures








# Teachers 23.1 23.3
(8.9) (8.7)
Teacher-Year Averages
General Experience 4.96 3.28
(3.65) (3.01)
Subject Experience 3.78 2.37
(3.30) (2.48)
Level Experience 4.70 3.11
(3.55) (2.91)
Subject-Level Experience 3.42 2.17
(3.11) (2.35)
Classes Taught Per Year 3.44 3.34
(1.52) (1.50)
Unique Subj./Lvl. Taught Per Year 1.67 1.63
(0.70) (0.67)
Student-Year Averages
Standardized Subject Test 0.041 -0.024
(0.662) (0.636)
Fraction of White Students 0.667 0.641
(0.270) (0.276)
Fraction of Black Students 0.259 0.278
(0.252) (0.258)
Fraction of Other Students 0.074 0.081
(0.100) (0.104)
8th Grade Standardized Reading Scores 0.095 -0.024
(0.975) (0.614)
8th Grade Standardized Math Scores 0.075 -0.030
(0.976) (0.651)
N (Aggregated Classroom Observations) 207,951 61,993
Notes: Student-test-weighted means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of classroom observations are
reported for each sample. Full Sample includes all classroom observations with valid values for the variables in
this table (i.e. current and 8th grade test scores, subject and level designation, race variables, teacher experience,
class size, and grade). Regression Sample includes only classroom observations that satisfy the more extensive set
of sample restrictions described in Section 3.4. The most important restriction is that the full history of course
assignments must be observed for the teacher of the classroom. The School-Year Averages for the Regression
Sample in Column (2) present the school-average student enrollment and teaching staff size from the Full Sample,
but for the classrooms represented in the Regression Sample (now weighted by the number of student-tests in the
regression sample). If we only count the subset of students and teachers that actually contribute an observation to
our Regression Sample, student-test-weighted school means of enrollment and number of teachers are 504.9 and
8.4, respectively.
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Table 3.2: Teacher Mobility Across Subjects: Regression Sample
Math Science Social Studies English








Algebra 1 1,860 749 742 26 18 16 37 11 12 13 33
1.000 0.403 0.399 0.014 0.010 0.009 0.020 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.018
Algebra 2 749 1,078 533 4 9 14 14 1 3 3 0
0.695 1.000 0.494 0.004 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.000
Geometry 742 533 1,142 8 3 10 6 1 3 3 4
0.650 0.467 1.000 0.007 0.003 0.009 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004
Science
Biology 26 4 8 1,472 185 69 525 7 24 20 26
0.018 0.003 0.005 1.000 0.126 0.047 0.357 0.005 0.016 0.014 0.018
Chemistry 18 9 3 185 554 112 307 0 0 1 1
0.032 0.016 0.005 0.334 1.000 0.202 0.554 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
Physics 16 14 10 69 112 243 165 0 0 2 0
0.066 0.058 0.041 0.284 0.461 1.000 0.679 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000
Physcial
Sciences
37 14 6 525 307 165 1,151 6 24 15 21
0.032 0.012 0.005 0.456 0.267 0.143 1.000 0.005 0.021 0.013 0.018
Soc. Stu.
Civics 11 1 1 7 0 0 6 904 279 412 12
0.012 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.007 1.000 0.309 0.456 0.013
E/L/P 12 3 3 24 0 0 24 279 952 414 52
0.013 0.003 0.003 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.293 1.000 0.435 0.055
U.S. History 13 3 3 20 1 2 15 412 414 1,235 36
0.011 0.002 0.002 0.016 0.001 0.002 0.012 0.334 0.335 1.000 0.029
English
English 33 0 4 26 1 0 21 12 52 36 2,162
0.015 0.000 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.006 0.024 0.017 1.000
Notes: E/L/P denotes Econ/Law/Politics. The top entry in the (i,j)-th cell is the number of teachers who are
observed teaching in both the i-th and the j-th subject (not necessarily in the same year). The bottom entry of
the (i,j)-th cell is the fraction of teachers ever observed teaching the i-th subject who are also observed teaching
the j-th subject at some point during the sample.
Table 3.3: Teacher Mobility Across Math Subject-Level Combinations: Regression Sample
Algebra 1 Algebra 2 Geometry
Low High Low High Low High
Algebra 1
Low Level
1,855 27 676 331 678 315
1.000 0.015 0.364 0.178 0.365 0.170
High Level
27 32 18 10 14 7
0.844 1.000 0.563 0.313 0.438 0.219
Algebra 2
Low Level
676 18 966 341 451 194
0.700 0.019 1.000 0.353 0.467 0.201
High Level
331 10 341 453 202 118
0.731 0.022 0.753 1.000 0.446 0.260
Geometry
Low Level
678 14 451 202 1,053 368
0.644 0.013 0.428 0.192 1.000 0.349
High Level
315 7 194 118 368 457
0.689 0.015 0.425 0.258 0.805 1.000
Notes: The top entry in the (i,j)-th cell is the number of teachers who are observed teaching in both the i-th and
the j-th subject- level (not necessarily in the same year). The bottom entry of the (i,j)-th cell is the fraction of
teachers ever observed teaching the i-th subject-level who are also observed teaching the j-th subject-level at some
point during the sample.
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Table 3.4: True Variances in Fixed Effects (Using Year-Based Measure of Teacher Experience with the
Baseline Specification )
Lower Bound Intermediate Upper Bound
Var. SD Var. SD Var. SD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sch-Subj-Lvl-Tch Combos 0.0236 0.154 0.0467 0.216 0.0605 0.246
General Talent 0.0175 0.132 0.0368 0.192 0.0506 0.225
Subj-Lvl Combos 0.0061 0.078 0.0099 0.099 0.0099 0.099
Sch-Lvl-Tch Combos 0.0197 0.140 0.0407 0.202 0.0545 0.234
Subject Talent 0.0039 0.063 0.0060 0.077 0.0060 0.077
Sch-Subj-Tch Combos 0.0215 0.147 0.0433 0.208 0.0571 0.239
Level Talent 0.0021 0.045 0.0034 0.058 0.0034 0.058
Subject-Level Talent 0.0001 0.011 0.0005 0.023 0.0005 0.023
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the teacher level. Lower Bound estimates
allocate all of the between school-subject-level variance in residual test scores to
school and student inputs (Assumption 2A). This is implemented by including school-
subject-level fixed effects and normalizing the mean among school-teacher-subject-
level fixed effects to be 0 in each school-subject-level. Intermediate estimates allocate
the between school variance in residual test scores to school and student inputs, and
the within-school/between subject-level variance to teachers (Assumption 2B). This
is implemented by replacing the school-subject-level fixed effects with school fixed
effects only. Upper Bound estimates allocate all of the between school-subject-level
variance in residual test scores to teachers (Assumption 2C). This is implemented by
removing all school-level controls. See Section 3.3.2 for details.
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Table 3.5: Effect of Years of General, Subject-Specific, Level-Specific, and Subject-Level-Specific Experi-
ence on Student Test Scores (Baseline Specification)
Years
Experience
General Subject Level Subj.-Level Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 yr 0.066*** 0.014 -0.006 0.000 0.074***
[0.017] [0.015] [0.015] [0.013] [0.006]
2 yrs 0.085*** 0.033* -0.006 -0.013 0.099***
[0.025] [0.023] [0.022] [0.020] [0.010]
3 yrs 0.090*** 0.049** -0.001 -0.027 0.110***
[0.030] [0.029] [0.028] [0.026] [0.014]
4 yrs 0.097*** 0.053* -0.004 -0.033 0.113***
[0.035] [0.033] [0.033] [0.031] [0.018]
5-6 yrs 0.097*** 0.056* 0.008 -0.044 0.116***
[0.040] [0.039] [0.037] [0.036] [0.023]
7-10 yrs 0.113*** 0.046 -0.006 -0.054 0.098***
[0.046] [0.046] [0.044] [0.043] [0.031]
11-14 yrs 0.093** 0.067 0.024 -0.099** 0.085**
[0.054] [0.059] [0.055] [0.060] [0.046]
Notes: N = 61, 993 test-score-weighted classroom observations. The outcome is the class average
of student standardized test scores in the subject. The regression includes school-teacher-subject-
level fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, and a vector of classroom observable characteristics
with subject-level-specific coefficients. The regression also includes controls for teacher workload
(number of current class periods and number of distinct subject-levels taught) and depreciation of
experience capital (indicators for whether the teacher taught a class in the current subject, level,
subject-level, or taught at all last year, as well as analogous indicators for teaching in each context
two years ago). Finally, the regression also includes controls for decreasing effort/productivity
shocks in the year prior to an assignment change (indicators for whether the current year is the
final time the teacher taught the subject, level, subject-level associated with the observation, as well
as whether the current year is the teacher’s final year of teaching high school in North Carolina.
Experience is measured as the total number of prior years in which the classroom’s teacher taught
at least one class at all (Col. 1) or in the subject (Col. 2), level (Col. 3), or subject-level (Col.
4) associated with the current classroom observation. Column 5, entitled Combined, captures the
combined predicted contribution of all four dimensions of experience capital for the case in which
the teacher has taught the course associated with the classroom observation in every year of a career
length defined by the row label. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the teacher level.
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. See
Section 3.2 for methodological details.
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Table 3.6: Effect of Years of General, Subject-Specific, Level-Specific, and Subject-Level-Specific Experi-
ence on Student Test Scores (Restricted Specification)
Years
Experience
General Subject Level Subj.-Level Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 yr 0.065*** 0.014* -0.003 0.013* 0.089***
[0.011] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [0.004]
2 yrs 0.085*** 0.023** -0.004 0.014* 0.118***
[0.014] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.006]
3 yrs 0.093*** 0.036*** -0.007 0.008 0.131***
[0.016] [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.007]
4 yrs 0.101*** 0.041*** -0.011 0.007 0.138***
[0.018] [0.015] [0.016] [0.014] [0.008]
5-6 yrs 0.103*** 0.041*** -0.002 0.009 0.152***
[0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.015] [0.009]
7-10 yrs 0.114*** 0.025 -0.008 0.006 0.138***
[0.022] [0.021] [0.020] [0.019] [0.012]
11-14 yrs 0.107*** 0.027 0.027 -0.019 0.141***
[0.028] [0.038] [0.028] [0.041] [0.026]
Notes: N = 61, 993 test-score-weighted classroom observations. The outcome is the class average of student
standardized test scores in the subject. Restricted Specification refers to the specification in equation
(3.3) in which the school-teacher-subject-level fixed effects µˆsrjl from Equation (3.2) are restricted to be
common across subject-levels (i.e. replaced by school-teacher effects). Refer to notes below Table 3.5 for
a full description of the control variables. Experience is measured as the total number of prior years in
which the classroom’s teacher taught at least one class at all (Col. 1) or in the subject (Col. 2), level
(Col. 3), or subject-level (Col. 4) associated with the current classroom observation. Column 5, entitled
Combined, captures the combined predicted contribution of all four dimensions of experience capital for
the case in which the teacher has taught the course associated with the classroom observation in every year
of a career length defined by the row label. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the teacher level.
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. See Section 3.2
for methodological details.
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Table 3.7: Effect of Years of General and Subject-Specific Experience on Student Test Scores (Restricted
Specification with Level and Subject-Level Experience Additionally Constrained to 0)
Restricted Specification w/




General Subject Combined “General”
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 yr 0.063*** 0.025*** 0.088*** 0.084***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004]
2 yrs 0.081*** 0.036*** 0.118*** 0.113***
[0.009] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005]
3 yrs 0.087*** 0.045*** 0.133*** 0.127***
[0.010] [0.009] [0.007] [0.006]
4 yrs 0.092*** 0.048*** 0.140*** 0.136***
[0.011] [0.010] [0.007] [0.007]
5-6 yrs 0.100*** 0.050*** 0.151*** 0.148***
[0.012] [0.011] [0.009] [0.008]
7-10 yrs 0.107*** 0.032** 0.139*** 0.148***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.011] [0.010]
11-14 yrs 0.124*** 0.020 0.143*** 0.157***
[0.020] [0.025] [0.023] [0.016]
Notes: N = 61, 993 test-score-weighted classroom observations. The outcome is
the class average of student standardized test scores in the subject. Restricted
Specification refers to the specification in equation (3.3). Columns (1-3) re-
port results from imposing on the Restricted Specification the additional re-
strictions that gains from level-specific and subject-level-specific experience are
constrained to be 0: dl(exp) = 0 and djl(exp) = 0 ∀ exp. Column 4 reports
results from imposing the further restriction that dj(exp) = 0 ∀ exp, for ease of
comparison with with standard experience profiles estimated in the literature.
Refer to notes below Table 3.5 for a full description of the control variables.
Experience is measured as the total number of prior years in which the class-
room’s teacher taught at least one class at all (Col. 1 & 4) or in the subject
(Col. 2) associated with the current classroom observation. Column 3, entitled
Combined, captures the combined predicted contribution of both dimensions of
experience capital for the case in which the teacher has taught the course asso-
ciated with the classroom observation in every year of a career length defined by
the row label. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the teacher level.
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and *
respectively. See Section 3.2 for methodological details.
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Table 3.8: Counterfactual Simulations: Achievement Gains from Optimal Allocation Relative to Actual




Actual Random Actual Random
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2
Total .017 .025 .017 .025
Talent .018 .021 .018 .020
Exper. -.001 .004 -.001 .005
3
Total .026 .035 .027 .039
Talent .027 .030 .028 .031
Exper. -.001 .005 -.000 .008
4
Total .031 .041 .033 .044
Talent .032 .035 .033 .035
Exper. -.001 .006 .001 .010
5-6
Total .038 .048 .040 .053
Talent .039 .041 .039 .042
Exper. -.001 .007 .001 .011
7-10
Total .039 .050 .041 .052
Talent .039 .042 .039 .041
Exper. .000 .008 .002 .012
11+
Total .042 .053 .044 .054
Talent .039 .044 .039 .039
Exper. .003 .009 .005 .015
Notes: Each cell presents simulated achievement gains from the optimal allocation of teachers to classrooms
relative to either the observed allocation (in columns labeled “Actual”) or a randomly selected feasible allocation
(columns labeled “Random”) among all school-year-field combinations with the number of eligible teachers spec-
ified by the row label. Classroom-level gains are pooled across the three fields (math, science, and social studies).
The top entry in each cell displays the total achievement gains, while the middle and bottom entries display the
components of the gains attributable to task-specific experience and task-specific talent, respectively. Static refers
to simulations in which teacher experience stocks are held fixed as they were in the actual sample through year
t− 1 prior to simulated reassignment in year t. Dynamic refers to simulations in which teacher experience stocks
used as the basis for simulated reassignment in year t are based on simulated assignments from 1995 through year
t−1. See Section 3.7.1 and Appendix Section F for further detail about simulation methodology. A teacher is el-
igible for reassignment if their full teaching history is observed in the data. Estimates of gains from task-specific
experience and of teachers’ task-specific talent are derived from the Full Specification (equation (3.13)). The
principal incorporates information from empirical Bayes posterior beliefs about each teacher’s task-specific talent
based on our school-teacher-subject-level fixed effect estimates for any school-teacher-subject-level combination
that is observed in our sample. We assign task-specific productivities of 0 for any school-teacher-subject-level
combination that we do not observe.
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Figure 3.1: Fraction of Teachers Starting New or Discontinuing Existing Courses by Year of General
Experience





















(a) First Time Teaching Course























(b) Last Time Teaching Course
Notes: Panel A plots the fraction of teachers with the given number of years of general
experience that teach a new subject, level, and subject-level combination, respectively,
in that year that they have not previously taught. Panel B plots the fraction of teachers
with the given number of years of general experience that discontinue teaching at least one
subject, level, and subject-level combination, respectively, after the chosen year. Counts
for the number of school-teacher-year observations associated with each general experience
level are: 0 (5,294), 1 (4,249), 2 (3,545), 3 (2,901), 4 (2,322), 5 (1,792), 6 (1,385), 7 (1,106).
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0 Years Exp. 1 Year Exp. 2 Years Exp.
(b) Third-Year Teachers
Notes: The figure displays the classroom-weighted distribution of four-dimensional experi-
ence stocks among second- and third-year teachers in our final sample. The sample includes
10,270 and 8,665 total classes taught by a second-year and third-year teacher respectively.
Panel A displays the fractions of classrooms taught by second-year teachers in which the
teacher has 0 versus 1 prior years of the relevant subject-, level-, and subject-level-specific
experience, respectively. Panel B displays the fractions of classrooms taught by third-year
teachers in which the teacher has 0, 1, and 2 prior years of the relevant subject-, level-,
and subject-level-specific experience, respectively. Note that multiple subject-level combi-
nations can be taught in a year. The full joint distribution of four dimensional experience
profiles for second- and third-year teachers can be found in Appendix table F.2.
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Figure 3.3: Effect of Years of General, Subject-Specific, Level-Specific, and Subject-Level-Specific Expe-
rience on Student Test Scores (Various Specifications)























































Notes: Figures 3.3a, 3.3b, and 3.3c plot the entries from Tables 3.5, 3.6, and F.20, respec-
tively. Refer to the notes from these tables for further detail concerning these specifications.
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Figure 3.4: Counterfactual Simulations: Achievement Gains from Optimal Allocation Relative to Actual
and Random Allocations (Year-Based Measure of Experience, Excluding Teachers Without Full Histories)























































(c) Static Simulations with
Actual Baseline

















(d) Static Simulations with
Random Baseline
Experience Talent Total
Notes: Each cell presents simulated achievement gains from the optimal allocation of teachers to classrooms relative to
either the observed allocation (in sub-figures labeled “Actual”) or a randomly selected feasible allocation (sub-figures labeled
“Random”) among all school-year-field combinations with the number of eligible teachers specified on the x-axis. The gains
reported are averages of classroom-level gains across all classrooms in math, science, and social studies from the final 5 years of
simulated allocations (2005-2009). The white cells display the total achievement gains, while the grey and black cells display
the components of the gains attributable to more efficient use of task-specific talent and task-specific experience, respectively.
Subfigures labeled Static refer to simulations in which teacher experience stocks are held fixed as they were in the actual
sample through year t − 1 prior to simulated reassignment in year t. Subfigures labeled Dynamic refer to simulations in
which simulated classroom assignments from 1995 through year t − 1 are used construct the teacher experience stocks that
determine the simulated reassignment in year t . See Section 3.7.1 and Appendix Section F for further detail about simulation
methodology. A teacher is eligible for reassignment if their full teaching history is observed in the data. Estimates of gains
from task-specific experience and of teachers’ task-specific talent are derived from the Full Specification (equation (3.13)). The
principal incorporates information from empirical Bayes posterior beliefs about each teacher’s task-specific talent based on
our school-teacher-subject-level fixed effect estimates for any school-teacher-subject-level combination that is observed in our
sample. We assign task-specific productivities of 0 for any school-teacher-subject-level combination that we do not observe.
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A Differential Trends Test: Main Outcomes
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(f) Math Achievement
School Year
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
Notes: Each figure presents the effect of receiving an initial seat offer to a magnet school through a lottery
with a 1 percentage point larger disparity between the percentage of black students in the lottery pool
and the percentage of black student receiving offers in 2002 (DPB
′02) on the given current outcome.
Regressions are estimated using (1.5) as explained in Section 1.6.1. Each regression is respectively run
using the sample restrictions for the given outcome in the footnotes of Table 1.8. The reference line in
2003 denotes the first year the LUSD implemented the consolidated lottery system.
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(d) 4-Year School (18 Months)
School Year
Estimate 95% Confidence Interval
Notes: Each figure presents the effect of receiving an initial seat offer to a magnet school through a lottery
with a 1 percentage point larger disparity between the percentage of black students in the lottery pool
and the percentage of black student receiving offers in 2002 (DPB
′02) on the given current outcome.
Regressions are estimated using (1.5) as explained in Section 1.6.1. Each regression is respectively run
using the sample restrictions for the given outcome in the footnotes of Table 1.9. The reference line in
2003 denotes the first year the LUSD implemented the consolidated lottery system.
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B Disaggregated Magnet Effects
B.1 Effects of Magnet Enrollment on Academic Achievement
Table B.1 presents the effect of magnet enrollment on subject-specific statewide achievement.1 Panel A
provides estimates for the effect of magnet enrollment on subsequent achievement among the pooled
regression sample.2 I am unable to detect statistically significant differences between magnet and
traditional enrollees.
Panel B disaggregates these estimates among sub-groups by student race, gender, and baseline aptitude.
Specifically, I calculate whether each student’s baseline math achievement is above or below the
district’s median for the given year. Gains to middle school science achievement are local to non-black
and female students. One possible explanation for why subject-specific effects can differ so drastically by
student subgroups is that magnet schools across the district vary considerably in their teaching
strategies and specialties. Particularly effective schools could be driving estimates for certain student
subgroups. However, because the focus of this paper is estimating segregation effects, I leave this
particular exploration to future work.
These estimates show that the gains to magnet enrollment over traditional school enrollment are
generally small and statistically insignificant. Because these schools are trying to attract non-black
enrollment, it is sensible that the largest magnet school gains are concentrated among non-black
students. Due to the localized nature of the returns to magnet enrollment, I conclude that enrolling in a
magnet or traditional school in this LUSD yields similar achievement returns.
1The grades that achievement tests were administered slightly changed over time. Middle school tests were administered
during 8th grade in 1995, 2003, and 2004 and in 6th grade all other years.
2First-stage estimates, observation counts, weak F tests, and outcome means are presented in tables B.2, B.3, B.4, and
B.5 respectively.
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Table B.1: Effect of Magnet Enrollment on Achievement – Application Level
Reading Math Science Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Pooled Sample
Enrolled in Magnet 0.038 0.161 0.171 -0.032
(0.078) (0.145) (0.123) (0.123)
First Stage: Initial Offer 0.193∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.073)
Observations 12,198 12,170 10,587 9,463
Panel B: Effects by Subgroup
Non-Black 0.076 0.082 0.422∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.109) (0.106) (0.152) (0.124)
Black 0.006 0.178 0.082 -0.046
(0.084) (0.180) (0.136) (0.142)
Male -0.037 0.155 0.162 0.123
(0.132) (0.233) (0.198) (0.146)
Female 0.095 0.167 0.207∗∗ -0.163
(0.068) (0.113) (0.097) (0.157)
Above Median Baseline Math Score 0.025 0.169 0.366 -0.033
(0.091) (0.196) (0.231) (0.160)
Below Median Baseline Math Score -0.058 0.089 -0.004 -0.128
(0.144) (0.187) (0.195) (0.220)
Black, Female 0.050 0.211 0.094 -0.158
(0.086) (0.164) (0.124) (0.218)
Black, Male -0.040 0.152 0.109 0.087
(0.142) (0.241) (0.225) (0.157)
Black, Above Median -0.001 0.300 0.303 0.007
(0.116) (0.278) (0.308) (0.190)
Black, Below Median -0.093 0.090 -0.056 -0.182
(0.166) (0.213) (0.212) (0.267)
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Regressions follow
equation (1.1) where each outcome is regressed on a indicator equal to one if the student attended a magnet school during
the year following the lottery as well as indicators for student gender, race, year-of-test and risk-sets. I instrument for
endogenous magnet attendance variable with whether the student received an initial lottery offer. Standard errors are
two-way clustered by student and the enrolled school after the lottery. Each regression sample is limited to baseline sample
restrictions i.e., the student must have applied to a magnet school lottery in 6th grade between 1998 and 2007, must be
in their first year attending the grade of the lottery application (no grade retention), and must not be eligible for special
education. The regressions in this table further condition on having non-missing outcome information. Regressions are
weighted by one over the number of lotteries applied to by the student in the given year. The regressions in this table
further condition on having non-missing outcome information. First-stage estimates, observation counts, weak IV tests,
and outcome means are provided in tables B.2, B.3, B.4, and B.5, respectively.
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Table B.2: First-Stage for Table B.1
Reading Math Science Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Pooled Sample
First Stage: Initial Offer 0.193∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.073)
Panel B: Effects by Subgroup
Non-Black 0.318∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.089) (0.093) (0.097)
Black 0.171∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.070)
Male 0.183∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.070)
Female 0.201∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.195∗∗
(0.073) (0.074) (0.077) (0.077)
Above Median Baseline Math Score 0.188∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗ 0.196∗∗
(0.071) (0.071) (0.076) (0.083)
Below Median Baseline Math Score 0.174∗∗ 0.174∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.174∗∗
(0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.079)
Black, Female 0.173∗∗ 0.175∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.167∗∗
(0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.071)
Black, Male 0.168∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.070)
Black, Above Median 0.159∗∗ 0.163∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.164∗∗
(0.067) (0.068) (0.069) (0.075)
Black, Below Median 0.154∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.153∗∗
(0.072) (0.071) (0.073) (0.078)
Notes: This Table provides first-stage estimates for Table B.1. See notes in Table B.1 for
specification details.
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Table B.3: Observation Counts for Table B.1
Reading Math Science Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Pooled Sample
Enrolled in Magnet 12,198 12,170 10,587 9,463
Panel B: Effects by Subgroup
Non-Black 1,891 1,864 1,625 1,494
Black 10,307 10,306 8,962 7,969
Male 5,369 5,349 4,757 4,136
Female 6,829 6,821 5,830 5,327
Above Median Baseline Math Score 5,723 5,689 4,922 4,313
Below Median Baseline Math Score 4,671 4,682 4,147 3,532
Black, Female 5,785 5,784 4,950 4,487
Black, Male 4,522 4,522 4,012 3,482
Black, Above Median 4,446 4,439 3,831 3,328
Black, Below Median 4,313 4,321 3,816 3,248
Notes: This Table provides observation counts for Table B.1. See notes in Table B.1 for speci-
fication details.
Table B.4: Weak Instruments F Statistics for Table B.1
Reading Math Science Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Pooled Sample
Enrolled in Magnet 7.945 7.893 7.906 7.436
Panel B: Effects by Subgroup
Non-Black 12.472 12.167 14.131 11.884
Black 6.764 6.771 6.676 6.436
Male 8.310 8.199 9.196 8.192
Female 7.491 7.492 6.635 6.390
Above Median Baseline Math Score 6.995 6.976 6.139 5.532
Below Median Baseline Math Score 5.513 5.536 5.665 4.834
Black, Female 6.356 6.388 5.521 5.585
Black, Male 7.213 7.211 7.918 6.998
Black, Above Median 5.667 5.781 5.009 4.733
Black, Below Median 4.621 4.642 4.541 3.884
Notes: Table reports weak instrument tests using the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic for
Table B.1. See notes in Table B.1 for specification details.
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Table B.5: Control Group Outcome Means for Table B.1
Reading Math Science Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Pooled Sample
Enrolled in Magnet 0.326 0.169 0.082 0.337
Panel B: Effects by Subgroup
Non-Black 0.729 0.731 0.585 0.622
Black 0.270 0.092 0.018 0.301
Male 0.230 0.131 0.104 0.133
Female 0.399 0.199 0.064 0.490
Above Median Baseline Math Score 0.617 0.571 0.372 0.616
Below Median Baseline Math Score -0.063 -0.370 -0.290 0.059
Black, Female 0.349 0.122 0.009 0.454
Black, Male 0.166 0.053 0.029 0.102
Black, Above Median 0.564 0.489 0.306 0.584
Black, Below Median -0.075 -0.387 -0.306 0.061
Notes: This Table provides outcome means among students not offered a magnet seat for Table
B.1. See notes in Table B.1 for specification details.
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B.2 Effects of Magnet Enrollment on ACT Testing
Estimates of the effect of magnet enrollment on ACT test taking behavior and composite scores are
provided in Panel A of Table B.6 for the pooled sample and Panel B for subgroup analyses.3 In column
1, I estimate that enrollment in a magnet middle school has no effect on ACT test taking. Columns 2
presents effects on composite ACT scores. Magnet middle schools appear to decrease composite scores
by about half of a point, though I cannot rule out change findings. Subgroup estimates are again
imprecise, but the possibility of heterogeneous impacts. Magnet schools increase ACT test taking for
non-black, low-aptitude, and male students, while they decrease test taking for females.4 If magnet
middle schools increase the proportion of students taking the ACT it is likely that students at the lower
end of the achievement distribution are the ones induced to take the test.
In Appendix B.2, I show how the simulation procedure used by Garlick and Hyman (2015) can be
adapted to correct for selection in settings where the treatment directly affects whether the outcome of
interest is observed. This method is similar to that used by Meyer and Sullivan (2008) to impute
missing housing and vehicle prices. As an overview, I regress ACT scores on student demographics,
prior test scores and current-school-by-year fixed effects among ACT test takers and generate a vector of
residuals. Then for non-ACT takers, I predict their ACT score based on student demographics, prior
math and reading test scores, and current-school-by-year fixed effects and fill in with randomly chosen
errors from the first step.5 I then run equation (1.1) on this new outcome, repeat the procedure 50 times
and report the mean of both the estimates and the standard errors.
Column 3 presents these selection-corrected estimates. As expected, magnet middle school effects are
generally larger in magnitude after accounting for the change in the composition of the pool of students
taking the ACT. Table B.11 presents estimates for subject-specific, selection-corrected ACT scores.
Black male students improve their ACT English scores, however, non-black students perform worse on
the ACT Math section.
Selection Correction
The selection-correction method is as follows:
1. Estimate the relationship between covariates and ACT scores among test takers using prior test
scores and current-school-by-year fixed effects
2. Predict residuals
3. For all missing values fill in with the predicted ACT score plus a randomly drawn error term
4. Repeat K times
5. Report mean of beta vector and standard error vector
This is done so that the distribution of predicted ACT scores of is comparable to the latent distribution.
Not incorporating errors would understate the variance of predicted ACT scores (Garlick and Hyman,
2015). This procedure introduces measurement error for non-test takers, but because this is
measurement error in the outcome, it will increase noise, but will not necessarily induce a estimation
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bias.
3For the small share of students taking the SAT instead of the ACT, I convert scores to their ACT counterparts.
4While each of these suggestive estimates are not significantly different than zero, many are larger than their standard
errors.
5I also predict scores for student for whom I have no ACT test taking information. Thus, sample sizes for selection-
corrected outcomes are larger than the original ACT test taking outcome.
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Panel A: Pooled Sample
-0.000 -0.453 0.172
(0.069) (1.042) (0.479)
Panel B: Effects by Subgroup
Non-Black 0.112 -1.108 0.321
(0.071) (2.180) (1.096)
Black -0.031 -0.513 0.081
(0.089) (1.223) (0.535)
Male 0.210 -1.982 -0.517
(0.133) (1.998) (0.588)
Female -0.146 -0.006 0.239
(0.113) (0.900) (0.558)
Above Median Baseline Math Score -0.045 -0.567 0.451
(0.082) (1.273) (0.836)
Below Median Baseline Math Score 0.197 0.665 1.362
(0.212) (1.072) (1.010)
Black, Male 0.249 -1.417 0.476
(0.167) (2.494) (0.791)
Black, Female -0.220 -0.239 1.057
(0.161) (0.939) (0.908)
Black, Above Median -0.085 -0.574 0.137
(0.126) (1.460) (1.013)
Black, Below Median 0.200 0.370 1.292
(0.252) (1.307) (1.066)
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Regressions follow equation (1.1) where each outcome is regressed on a indicator equal to one if
the student attended a magnet school during the year following the lottery as well as indicators
for student gender, race, and risk-sets. I instrument for endogenous magnet attendance variable
with whether the student receiving an initial lottery offer. Standard errors are two-way clustered by
student and the enrolled school after the lottery. Each regression sample is limited to baseline sample
restrictions specified in the notes for Table B.1. Estimates from Panel A are only run among the
sample of students with valid test scores. Estimates from Panel B correct for selection by imputing
scores for non-test-takers as is explained in Appendix B.2. Analysis is run on application-level data
meaning that a student with multiple applications in a given year will appear multiple times in the
data. Regressions are weighted by one over the number of lotteries applied to by the student in
the given year. First-stage estimates, observation counts, weak IV tests, and outcome means are
provided in Tables B.7, B.8, B.10, and B.9, respectively.
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Panel A: Pooled Sample
0.170∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.068) (0.074)
Panel B: Effects by Subgroup
Non-Black 0.327∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.113) (0.089)
Black 0.148∗∗ 0.167∗∗ 0.184∗∗
(0.062) (0.067) (0.073)
Male 0.159∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.058) (0.066)
Female 0.179∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.080) (0.080)
Above Median Baseline Math Score 0.184∗∗ 0.181∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.075) (0.070)
Below Median Baseline Math Score 0.129∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.175∗∗
(0.065) (0.071) (0.069)
Black, Male 0.138∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.058) (0.060)
Black, Female 0.157∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.171∗∗
(0.071) (0.076) (0.067)
Black, Above Median 0.158∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.152∗∗
(0.068) (0.077) (0.065)
Black, Below Median 0.110∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.156∗∗
(0.063) (0.070) (0.068)
Notes: Table provides first-stage estimates for Table B.6. See notes of Table B.6 for regression
details.
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Panel A: Pooled Sample
7,993 4,371 14,601
Panel B: Effects by Subgroup
Non-Black 1,049 581 2,449
Black 6,944 3,790 12,152
Male 3,292 1,661 6,651
Female 4,701 2,710 7,950
Above Median Baseline Math Score 4,001 2,262 6,282
Below Median Baseline Math Score 2,816 1,322 5,128
Black, Male 2,852 1,420 4,989
Black, Female 4,092 2,370 6,231
Black, Above Median 3,244 1,825 4,800
Black, Below Median 2,677 1,272 4,706
Notes: Table provides observation counts for Table B.6. See notes of Table B.6 for regression
details.







Panel A: Pooled Sample
0.686 17.695





Above Median Baseline Math Score 0.741 18.913
Below Median Baseline Math Score 0.597 15.599
Black, Male 0.623 17.095
Black, Female 0.738 17.271
Black, Above Median 0.749 18.321
Black, Below Median 0.604 15.550
Notes: Table provides outcome means among students not offered a magnet lottery
seat for Table B.6. See notes of Table B.6 for regression details.
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Panel A: Pooled Sample
6.654 7.116





Above Median Baseline Math Score 6.558 5.854
Below Median Baseline Math Score 3.881 5.343
Black, Male 6.453 4.555
Black, Female 4.839 6.481
Black, Above Median 5.453 4.998
Black, Below Median 2.997 4.452
Notes: Table reports weak instrument tests using the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statis-
tic for Table B.6. See notes of Table B.6 for regression details.
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Table B.11: Effect of Magnet Enrollment on ACT Selection-Corrected Subject Scores – Application Level
Middle School
Reading Math Science English
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Pooled Sample
Enrolled in Magnet 0.491 0.361 0.759 1.343
(0.849) (0.607) (0.764) (0.891)
First Stage: Initial Offer 0.193∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
Observations 13,426 13,426 13,426 13,426
Panel B: Effects by Subgroup
Non-Black 3.075 -1.635∗ -0.331 1.293
(2.376) (0.989) (1.352) (1.484)
Black 0.176 0.332 0.898 1.565
(0.994) (0.727) (0.865) (1.161)
Male -0.078 -0.458 0.622 1.667∗
(0.866) (0.685) (0.789) (1.003)
Female 0.711 0.510 1.216 1.347
(0.991) (0.517) (1.164) (0.958)
Above Median Baseline Math Score 0.331 -0.103 0.741 0.867
(1.321) (0.684) (0.949) (1.168)
Below Median Baseline Math Score 1.398 1.120 1.746 1.364
(0.990) (0.986) (1.456) (1.332)
Black, Male 0.693 0.314 0.837 2.461∗
(0.992) (0.893) (0.992) (1.329)
Black, Female 0.441 0.712 1.235 1.390
(1.007) (1.002) (1.414) (1.108)
Black, Above Median -0.708 0.214 0.438 0.977
(1.821) (1.095) (1.130) (1.501)
Black, Below Median 1.172 1.491 2.121 1.808
(1.019) (1.118) (1.570) (1.390)
Notes: Regressions follow equation (1.1) where each outcome is regressed on a indicator equal to one if the student
attended a magnet school during the year following the lottery as well as indicators for student gender, race, and risk-
sets. I instrument for endogenous magnet attendance variable with whether the student receiving an initial lottery offer.
Standard errors are two-way clustered by student and the enrolled school after the lottery. Each regression sample
is limited to baseline sample restrictions specified in the notes for Table B.1. Estimates from Panel A are only run
among the sample of students with valid test scores. Estimates from Panel B correct for selection by imputing scores for
non-test-takers as is explained in Appendix B.2. Analysis is run on application-level data meaning that a student with
multiple applications in a given year will appear multiple times in the data. Regressions are weighted by one over the
number of lotteries applied to by the student in the given year.
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B.3 Effects of Magnet Enrollment on Postsecondary Attainment
In Table B.12, I present the effect of magnet enrollment on various college outcomes. Specifically, I test
whether attending a magnet school affects the probability of attending any postsecondary institution, or
a two-year or four-year, or a “Top 50” ranked institution within 18 months after high school
graduation.6 Again, I find imprecisely estimated magnet effects for the pooled sample and
heterogeneous effects by students subgroups. In the pooled sample, I find suggestive evidence that
magnet schools induce a shift in postsecondary enrollment from 4-year to 2-year institutions. This shift
is driven by an increase in 2-year attendance among black male students and a decrease in 4-year
attendance among black female students. Lastly, magnet enrollment has a negligible impact on the
probability of enrolling in a “Top 50” ranked institution.
Finally, I descriptively investigate how magnet attendance affects college major choices. Appendix Table
B.13 presents these effects for the subset of students attending college. The small sample sizes make me
hesitant to assign a causal interpretation to these estimates. I find evidence that magnet school
enrollment is negatively associated with students choosing to major in Fine Arts fields.
6“Top 50” ranked as measured by the 2006 US & News World Report.
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Table B.12: Effect of Middle School Magnet Attendance on College Enrollment – Application Level




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Pooled Estimates
Enrolled in Magnet School -0.049 0.159 -0.104 -0.014
(0.106) (0.150) (0.079) (0.013)
Panel B: Sub-group Estimates
Non-Black -0.012 0.014 -0.037 -0.004
(0.165) (0.088) (0.180) (0.023)
Black -0.078 0.203 -0.137 -0.018
(0.110) (0.200) (0.089) (0.013)
Male 0.137 0.254∗ 0.105 -0.046
(0.107) (0.154) (0.085) (0.038)
Female -0.153 0.112 -0.241∗∗ 0.006
(0.124) (0.172) (0.119) (0.009)
Above Median Baseline Math Score -0.077 0.250 -0.164 -0.024
(0.128) (0.220) (0.109) (0.017)
Below Median Baseline Math Score 0.062 0.221 -0.066 0.005
(0.145) (0.203) (0.199) (0.015)
Black, Male 0.153 0.254 0.142 -0.029
(0.123) (0.203) (0.103) (0.028)
Black, Female -0.210 0.174 -0.314∗∗ -0.009
(0.137) (0.229) (0.148) (0.008)
Black, Above Median -0.116 0.337 -0.246 -0.040
(0.125) (0.312) (0.150) (0.026)
Black, Below Median 0.053 0.222 -0.050 0.006
(0.185) (0.251) (0.142) (0.019)
Notes: Regressions follow equation (1.1) where each outcome is regressed on a indicator equal to one if the student
attended a magnet school during the year following the lottery as well as indicators for student gender, race, and risk-
sets. I instrument for endogenous magnet attendance variable with whether the student receiving an initial lottery
offer. Standard errors are two-way clustered by student and the enrolled school after the lottery. Each regression
sample is limited to baseline sample restrictions specified in the notes for Table B.1. Top 50 ranking is from the
US News and World Report 2006 ranking. Analysis is run on application-level data meaning that a student with
multiple applications in a given year will appear multiple times in the data. Regressions are weighted by one over


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C First-Stage Estimates, Observation Counts, and Outcome
Averages







Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
First Stage: Initial Offer 0.192∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.065) (0.067)
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Non-Black 0.318∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.101) (0.087)
Black 0.169∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.060) (0.064)
Male 0.180∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.054) (0.061)
Female 0.201∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.075) (0.073)
Above Median Baseline Math Score 0.186∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.072) (0.069)
Below Median Baseline Math Score 0.171∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.175∗∗
(0.072) (0.064) (0.071)
Black, Male 0.163∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.050) (0.059)
Black, Female 0.175∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.177∗∗
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Black, Above Median 0.159∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.155∗∗
(0.066) (0.065) (0.065)
Black, Below Median 0.149∗∗ 0.109∗ 0.154∗∗
(0.069) (0.061) (0.069)
Notes: Table provides first-stage estimates for Table 1.6. See notes of Table 1.6 for regression details.
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Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
Observations 12,392 7,715 12,635
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Non-Black 1,946 1,037 1,970
Black 10,446 6,678 10,665
Male 5,473 3,200 5,576
Female 6,919 4,515 7,059
Above Median Baseline Math Score 5,790 3,949 5,904
Below Median Baseline Math Score 4,762 2,652 4,877
Black, Male 4,607 2,752 4,690
Black, Female 5,839 3,926 5,975
Black, Above Median 4,484 3,192 4,581
Black, Below Median 4,386 2,520 4,495
Notes: Table provides observation counts for Table 1.6. See notes of Table 1.6 for regression details.







Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
F Statistics 8.116 6.543 8.286
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Non-Black 12.769 9.070 13.733
Black 6.868 5.858 7.006
Male 8.535 8.892 8.702
Female 7.591 5.309 7.718
Above Median Baseline Math Score 6.976 5.681 7.118
Below Median Baseline Math Score 5.698 3.966 6.055
Black, Male 7.287 7.902 7.402
Black, Female 6.474 4.719 6.567
Black, Above Median 5.701 4.969 5.668
Black, Below Median 4.629 3.154 5.000
Notes: Table reports weak instrument tests using the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic for Table 1.6. See notes
of Table 1.6 for regression details.
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Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
Outcome Mean 0.225 0.014 0.108
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Non-Black 0.672 -0.027 0.408
Black 0.163 0.019 0.067
Male 0.152 -0.047 0.044
Female 0.282 0.056 0.158
Above Median Baseline Math Score 0.549 0.071 0.338
Below Median Baseline Math Score -0.184 -0.075 -0.192
Black, Male 0.084 -0.045 -0.003
Black, Female 0.223 0.063 0.120
Black, Above Median 0.483 0.077 0.295
Black, Below Median -0.195 -0.068 -0.199
Notes: Table provides outcome means among students not offered a magnet lottery seat for Table 1.6. See notes
of Table 1.6 for regression details.
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Table C.5: First-Stage Estimates for Table 1.8
Achievement Testing
Reading Math Science Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
DPB
′02 ∗ 1(Post′02) ∗ 1(Offer) 2.098∗∗∗ 2.105∗∗∗ 1.955∗∗∗ 2.073∗∗∗
(0.550) (0.552) (0.565) (0.599)
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Black 2.018∗∗∗ 1.999∗∗∗ 1.901∗∗∗ 1.933∗∗∗
(0.593) (0.591) (0.591) (0.618)
Male 2.653∗∗∗ 2.616∗∗∗ 2.205∗∗∗ 2.265∗∗∗
(0.550) (0.547) (0.618) (0.619)
Female 1.630∗∗∗ 1.673∗∗∗ 1.723∗∗∗ 1.890∗∗∗
(0.570) (0.572) (0.551) (0.627)
Above Median Baseline Math Score 2.170∗∗∗ 2.201∗∗∗ 1.977∗∗∗ 2.184∗∗∗
(0.577) (0.578) (0.596) (0.669)
Below Median Baseline Math Score 1.703∗∗ 1.704∗∗ 1.606∗∗ 1.533∗
(0.692) (0.684) (0.796) (0.895)
Black, Male 2.626∗∗∗ 2.548∗∗∗ 2.160∗∗∗ 2.185∗∗∗
(0.574) (0.556) (0.601) (0.608)
Black, Female 1.525∗∗ 1.551∗∗ 1.645∗∗∗ 1.706∗∗
(0.650) (0.651) (0.626) (0.675)
Black, Above Median 2.139∗∗∗ 2.135∗∗∗ 1.964∗∗∗ 2.111∗∗∗
(0.652) (0.656) (0.632) (0.715)
Black, Below Median 1.625∗∗ 1.604∗∗ 1.492∗ 1.314
(0.732) (0.725) (0.805) (0.904)
Notes: Table provides first-stage estimates for Table 1.8. See notes of Table 1.8 for regression details.
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Table C.6: Observation Counts for Table 1.8
Achievement Testing
Reading Math Science Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
Observations 12,187 12,159 10,565 9,448
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Black 10,303 10,302 8,948 7,959
Male 5,359 5,339 4,740 4,128
Female 6,823 6,815 5,821 5,319
Above Median Baseline Math Score 5,712 5,678 4,911 4,306
Below Median Baseline Math Score 4,665 4,676 4,138 3,524
Black, Male 4,515 4,515 3,999 3,476
Black, Female 5,782 5,781 4,944 4,482
Black, Above Median 4,440 4,433 3,824 3,326
Black, Below Median 4,308 4,316 3,810 3,242
Notes: Table provides observation counts for Table 1.8. See notes of Table 1.8 for regression details.
Table C.7: Weak Instruments F Statistics for Table 1.8
Achievement Testing
Reading Math Science Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
F Statistics 14.534 14.521 11.953 11.967
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Black 11.571 11.429 10.358 9.771
Male 23.290 22.912 12.747 13.390
Female 8.187 8.567 9.763 9.100
Above Median Baseline Math Score 14.148 14.499 11.004 10.649
Below Median Baseline Math Score 6.060 6.203 4.068 2.933
Black, Male 20.950 20.973 12.900 12.911
Black, Female 5.498 5.683 6.912 6.384
Black, Above Median 10.758 10.585 9.672 8.713
Black, Below Median 4.928 4.895 3.438 2.113
Notes: Table reports weak instrument tests using the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic for Table 1.8.
See notes of Table 1.8 for regression details.
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Table C.8: Outcome Means for Table 1.8
Achievement Testing
Reading Math Science Writing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
Outcome Mean 0.357 0.091 0.071 0.410
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Black 0.260 -0.026 -0.038 0.359
Male 0.249 0.045 0.093 0.228
Female 0.443 0.128 0.053 0.550
Above Median Baseline Math Score 0.732 0.554 0.415 0.679
Below Median Baseline Math Score -0.105 -0.516 -0.357 0.127
Black, Male 0.136 -0.080 -0.035 0.173
Black, Female 0.356 0.016 -0.041 0.501
Black, Above Median 0.628 0.420 0.283 0.638
Black, Below Median -0.131 -0.539 -0.383 0.119
Notes: Table provides outcome means among students not receiving magnet lottery offer for Table 1.8.
See notes of Table 1.8 for regression details.
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Table C.9: First-Stage Estimates for Table 1.9
College Attendance
(18 Months after High School
Graduation)
HS Grad. Any 2-year 4-year Top 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
DPB
′02 ∗ 1(Post′02) ∗ 1(Offer) 2.211∗∗∗ 2.239∗∗∗ 2.239∗∗∗ 2.239∗∗∗ 2.239∗∗∗
(0.544) (0.571) (0.571) (0.571) (0.571)
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Black 2.206∗∗∗ 2.138∗∗∗ 2.138∗∗∗ 2.138∗∗∗ 2.138∗∗∗
(0.611) (0.641) (0.641) (0.641) (0.641)
Male 2.526∗∗∗ 2.537∗∗∗ 2.537∗∗∗ 2.537∗∗∗ 2.537∗∗∗
(0.622) (0.637) (0.637) (0.637) (0.637)
Female 1.790∗∗∗ 1.851∗∗∗ 1.851∗∗∗ 1.851∗∗∗ 1.851∗∗∗
(0.548) (0.575) (0.575) (0.575) (0.575)
Above Median Baseline Math Score 2.611∗∗∗ 2.362∗∗∗ 2.362∗∗∗ 2.362∗∗∗ 2.362∗∗∗
(0.586) (0.587) (0.587) (0.587) (0.587)
Below Median Baseline Math Score 1.656∗∗ 1.779∗∗ 1.779∗∗ 1.779∗∗ 1.779∗∗
(0.726) (0.821) (0.821) (0.821) (0.821)
Black, Male 2.600∗∗∗ 2.409∗∗∗ 2.409∗∗∗ 2.409∗∗∗ 2.409∗∗∗
(0.674) (0.694) (0.694) (0.694) (0.694)
Black, Female 1.755∗∗∗ 1.801∗∗∗ 1.801∗∗∗ 1.801∗∗∗ 1.801∗∗∗
(0.651) (0.650) (0.650) (0.650) (0.650)
Black, Above Median 2.601∗∗∗ 2.277∗∗∗ 2.277∗∗∗ 2.277∗∗∗ 2.277∗∗∗
(0.670) (0.675) (0.675) (0.675) (0.675)
Black, Below Median 1.637∗∗ 1.575∗ 1.575∗ 1.575∗ 1.575∗
(0.748) (0.851) (0.851) (0.851) (0.851)
Notes: Table provides first-stage estimates for Table 1.9. See notes of Table 1.9 for regression details.
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Table C.10: Observation Counts for Table 1.9
College Attendance
(18 Months after High School
Graduation)
HS Grad. Any 2-year 4-year Top 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
Observations 9,023 7,696 7,696 7,696 7,696
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Black 7,809 6,663 6,663 6,663 6,663
Male 3,858 3,191 3,191 3,191 3,191
Female 5,162 4,502 4,502 4,502 4,502
Above Median Baseline Math Score 4,417 3,942 3,942 3,942 3,942
Below Median Baseline Math Score 3,286 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,641
Black, Male 3,333 2,744 2,744 2,744 2,744
Black, Female 4,473 3,916 3,916 3,916 3,916
Black, Above Median 3,565 3,188 3,188 3,188 3,188
Black, Below Median 3,102 2,511 2,511 2,511 2,511
Notes: Table provides observation counts for Table 1.9. See notes of Table 1.9 for regression details.
Table C.11: Weak Instruments F Statistics for Table 1.9
College Attendance
(18 Months after High School
Graduation)
HS Grad. Any 2-year 4-year Top 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
F Statistics 16.529 15.399 15.399 15.399 15.399
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Black 13.053 11.120 11.120 11.120 11.120
Male 16.476 15.874 15.874 15.874 15.874
Female 10.677 10.346 10.346 10.346 10.346
Above Median Baseline Math Score 19.872 16.199 16.199 16.199 16.199
Below Median Baseline Math Score 5.196 4.688 4.688 4.688 4.688
Black, Male 14.878 12.033 12.033 12.033 12.033
Black, Female 7.276 7.664 7.664 7.664 7.664
Black, Above Median 15.075 11.395 11.395 11.395 11.395
Black, Below Median 4.792 3.426 3.426 3.426 3.426
Notes: Table reports weak instrument tests using the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic for Table 1.9. See notes of Table 1.9
for regression details.
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Table C.12: Outcome Means for Table 1.9
College Attendance
(18 Months after High School
Graduation)
HS Grad. Any 2-year 4-year Top 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: 2SLS Estimates for Pooled Sample
Outcome Mean 0.639 0.652 0.274 0.462 0.005
Panel B: 2SLS Estimates by Subgroup
Black 0.636 0.653 0.278 0.463 0.004
Male 0.591 0.609 0.262 0.423 0.006
Female 0.676 0.683 0.283 0.490 0.004
Above Median Baseline Math Score 0.787 0.710 0.254 0.543 0.007
Below Median Baseline Math Score 0.632 0.570 0.296 0.351 0.001
Black, Male 0.582 0.611 0.266 0.426 0.004
Black, Female 0.676 0.683 0.287 0.489 0.003
Black, Above Median 0.786 0.714 0.258 0.552 0.006
Black, Below Median 0.639 0.575 0.298 0.355 0.001






In this section, I cover details of the subjective data cleaning considerations underling my
analyses. Table A.1 displays a summary of the source, important variables, year available and any
miscellaneous notes for the data used in this paper.
A.1 ODE Restricted-Access Staff Data
In the staffing data, a teacher’s education category can only take the following values:
Non-Degree, Associate, BA, MA, Education Specialist, PhD, Other, less than HS Diploma, HS
Diploma, and GED.
I only keep staff classified as “regular teachers” receiving annual salaries, with previous education
categories: non-degree, BA, and MA. I truncate the sample and drop teacher-year observations
with real ($2010) annual salaries less than $15,000 or greater than $85,000 as well as teachers
reporting a null value for full-time equivalency units.
The next issue with these data is that teacher experience doesn’t always increment properly. To
fix this, I use the experience from the first year a teacher is observed in the dataset and then
increment for all subsequent years that the teacher is observed in the data. For some teachers,
they have valid experience for years later in their career. This information is utilized by
decrementing to fill previous missing years. In the case where the incremented and decremented
imputed experience disagree, I take the values of the decremented experience because they appear
more accurate. Also, because 2012 is missing, but 2013 and 2014 are available, for teachers
observed teaching after 2012, experience is incremented assuming they also taught in 2012.
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A.2 SERB Collectively Bargained Contract Data
First, I only keep contracts from full-time, regular teachers. In Ohio, the school year typically
runs from the end of August to the beginning of June, so for mid-year negotiations, I consider all
contracts that begin being enforced from January through May as belonging to the current school
year. For example, a contract with an enforcement date in February 2010 would be considered to
be effective during the 2009-10 school year. Outliers in nominal entry- and top-level salaries are
dropped. Specifically, I code as missing contract-education observations with starting salaries less
than $10,000 and top salaries greater than $200,000. I also recode as missing the number of salary
steps to reach the top of a pay scale for contracts with 40 or more steps. Finally, if the total
number of years required to ascend the pay scale was greater than 50, I set the variable capturing
the number of years between each step to missing.1 It is also worth noting that all monetary
variables are brought into real 2010$ by using the BEA Personal consumption expenditures from
Table 1.1.4. “Price Indexes for Gross Domestic Product”.
A.3 Other Sample Restrictions
For my final analysis sample, I exclude any districts that are entirely made up of charter schools.
In Ohio, charters are recorded as being in their own local area agency so this effectively limits the
analysis to all non-chartered districts. I also drop special needs and other non-traditional regional
education service agencies (including joint vocational districts) so that the analysis is only
performed on traditional K-12 school districts. Lastly, the sample is limited to districts that
report having more than 50 students enrolled and more than 5 teachers employed within the
district.
1The total number of years required to ascend the pay scale is defined as the number of pay scale steps × number
of years between each pay scale step.
192
Table A.1: Data Summary
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Table A.2: Example of Teacher Salary Contract
Non-
Experience Degree BA BA+150 MA MA+30
0 22,013 25,898 26,934 28,488 29,524
1 22,790 26,934 28,099 29,783 30,948







7 28,229 33,149 35,092 37,552 39,494
8 29,265 34,185 36,257 38,847 40,919
9 29,265 35,221 37,423 40,142 42,343







13 29,265 39,365 42,084 45,322 48,041
14 30,042 40,401 43,250 46,616 49,485







28 30,042 45,348 49,014 52,067 54,578
Notes: This table presents a fictitious collectively bargained teacher’s
salary matrix. A teacher’s pay can be determined simply by referring to the
number of years they have taught in the district and the level of education
they possess. Education categories are respectively no degree, Bachelor’s
degree, Bachelor’s degree with 150 additional credit hours, Master’s degree,
and Master’s degree with 30 additional credit hours. SERB data contain
starting-level salary information for all education levels (i.e., all entries cor-
responding to the null experience level). While data sometimes exist for
top-level salaries (i.e., all entries for 28 years of experience), SERB data
custodians often instead code top-level salaries as the first experience step
in which subsequent experience gains incurs no additional salary premium.
The bold values represent these incorrectly-coded top-level salaries for the
example contract.
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B Full Salary Distribution Imputation
By making use of both my teacher-level micro data as well as information about contract
negotiation years, I am able to approximate negotiated salaries for each step of the pay scale.
This allows me to estimate the effect of charter competition along the entire negotiated pay scale
distribution. Most importantly, these teacher-level data include the college degree, number of
years in the district, and annual compensation. This is enough to identify which step on the pay
scale that each teacher should in theory be compensated.
Next, I collapse the teacher data so that the unit of observation is the district, year, college
degree, experience level and calculate the median payments within each cell.2 I then merge in
contract negotiation dates from my SERB data so that observations are limited to the years in
which a new contract is being enforced. In the end I want a dataset that has approximated salary
steps for each district, year, education, and experience combination, but teachers are not observed
teaching in each of these combinations. To solve this problem, I impute district-specific annual
payments for any missing pay scale steps by using predicted values from the regression
Median Real Paymentidet = α+ γit ∗ Experienceidet + δit ∗ Experience2idet (B.1)
+ φit + θd + iset ,
where Median Real Paymentidet is the 2010-inflation-adjusted median annual payment to teachers
in district i, with degree d, years of experience e, during the school year in which the contract for
the district is enforced t. I also include a district-year-specific quadratic for a continuous measure
of experience (Experienceidet) and include the main effects φit. θd are degree fixed effects.
Equation (B.1) is simply fitting a district-year-specific quadratic experience term (the γit’s and
δit’s) to the median payments within each district, during the contract’s enforcement year, and
allows for level shifts in the pay scale for each education category.
I then create a balanced panel of all possible district-year-education-experience cells and for cells
without actual payment information I impute using predicted values from (B.1). This dataset is
used for the analysis explained in Section 2.6 that generates Figure 2.5.
C Alternative Measures of Charter Competition
In this section, I provide estimates for the main revenue and expenditure outcomes of this study
using four alternate measures of charter competition. The first two measures are respectively the
number of charter buildings in operation during the given school year that are within 5 and 10
2This helps exclude outlier salaries due to some teachers receiving bonus payments for additional responsibilities
such as coaching an athletic team.
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miles of the TPSD’s geographic center.3 It is likely that parents in more rural areas of the state
would be willing to have their child travel further distances to attend a school. As a result, I also
create a measure of charter competition based on the overall district size. Specifically, for each
TPSD, I have shape files containing coordinates that trace out each enrollment boundary. I
identify 20 equidistant coordinates along with the coordinates corresponding to points on the
opposite side of the district. I calculate the distance between these 20 points and their
accompanying opposite points and take half of this average to calculate my measure of average
TPSD radius. Finally, I count the number of charter schools open within 150 percent of this
metric. The final measure of charter competition is simply the number of operating charters that
are located within district boundaries.
I present the robustness of my main results across these measures of charter competition in Table
C.1. For comparison, Column 1 provides estimates using my main competition metric. Overall,
my results are extremely robust across competition measures showing that the effects I find are
not simply an artifact of my particular competition metric. Estimates measuring competition as
the number of operating chartering within 5 miles of the TPSD district center (column 2) most
closely mirror my main results. As the radius is extended (columns 3 and 4) estimates attenuate
slightly. One possible explanation is that as the boundaries increase, charters are counted that
may not actually be viable options for parents in the district. Measuring charter competition as
the number of charters operating within TPSD boundaries (column 5) attenuates estimates the
most. This could happen if charter competition outside of TPSD boundaries present particularly
strong competitive pressures. However, even using this measure, all of the effect signs remain the
same making the overall story unchanged. Finally, it is worth noting that each of these alternative
measures miss the digital charter competition that is captured by my preferred measure.
3TPSD center coordinates are provided in the NCES Common Core of Data.
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Table C.1: Effect of Various Charter Competition Measures on Key IV Estimates






within 5 miles of
TPSD center
# Charters









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: TPSD Revenues
IHS of Total -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
IHS of Federal -0.041∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
IHS of Local -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
IHS of Residential Values -0.026∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Panel B: Union Salary
Log of Entry -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Log of Imputed Top -0.010∗∗ -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Panel C: TPSD Expenditures
IHS of Total (Excl. Charter -0.017∗∗∗ -0.020 -0.013 -0.014 -0.005
Transfers) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003)
IHS of Instructional -0.023∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.003
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
IHS of Capital Outlays 0.073∗∗ 0.103 0.066 0.069 0.022
(0.034) (0.080) (0.052) (0.056) (0.022)
IHS of New Construction 0.113 0.142 0.090 0.091 0.027
Capital Outlays (0.114) (0.272) (0.181) (0.195) (0.079)
Notes: Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered by district. See footnote 28 on page 68 for details on the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (IHS).
Refer to Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 for specification details for panels A, B, and C respectively. This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effect of various
measures of charter competition on key outcomes. In Column 1, competition is measured as the fraction of the district’s membership attending charter
schools times 100. Columns 2 and 3 present estimates of competition as measured by the number of charters open within 5 and 10 miles of the TPSD
geographic center. In Column 4, competition is measured as the number of charters open within 1.5 times the district’s average radius. In Column 5,
competition is measured as the number of charters open within the TPSD’s boundaries.
∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
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D Ohio School Rating Designation System
Ohio uses four measures to evaluate the performance of schools and districts: (1) State Indicators,
(2) Performance Index, (3) Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP), and (4) Value-Added data.
D.1 State Indicators
Schools and districts are evaluated based on 26 measures against state determined goals, as seen
in Table D.1.
D.2 Performance Index Scores
The Performance Index score is a continuous measure that summarizes student achievement (for
all students, not just those testing proficient or higher) at the school or district level into a single
index. These scores are calculated using a weighted average of individual student performance
levels on proficiency and achievement tests. The weights for different score levels can be found in
Table D.2. You can see that there are large penalties to testing below proficiency, but only small
bonuses for testing above the “Proficient level”. Thus, it takes several high scores to balance a
single low score.
Each weighted score is multiplied by the percentage of students scoring at that level. In order to
generate these percentages, schools count the number of students present during the October
count and 120 consecutive school days of enrollment, including the March testing period. Other
rules apply to counting students that have a small impact on student enrollment counts.4
Specifically, the Performance Index rating is calculated for school/district i in academic year t
using the previous year’s (t− 1) academic scores as follows:
PIit = 1.2 (% Advancedi,t−1) + 1.1 (% Acceleratedi,t−1) (D.1)
+ 1.0 (% Proficienti,t−1) + 0.6 (% Basicit) + 0.3 (% Limitedi,t−1).
D.3 School and District Rating Calculations
Once Performance index scores are calculated, school and districts are then categorized into five
levels as seen in Table D.3.
In addition to these raw PI scores, schools and districts can also experience a boost in their rating
based on certain growth calculations. Specifically a school/district can move from “Emergency”
4e.g., 1 percent limitation on counting alternately assessed students as proficient. The total count of all student
scores includes up to five tests per student.
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to “Watch” or from “Watch” to “Improvement” if: (1) the PI score improved in each of the last
two years and (2) the total two-year gain was at least 10 points and (3) a gain of a least 3 points
took place in the current year.
D.4 Value Added
Value-Added (VA) measures try to account for how much progress and growth has been made
since the previous year. These VA measures are calculated for grades 4-8 in reading and math. A
composite is made of these scores and schools are delineated as performing above, at, or below
expectations. Schools performing above expectation may increase its designation by one rating.
D.5 Ratings Determined by Number of AYP Indicators met
The building/district designation will always be the higher category determined by the PI score
or the number of AYP indicators met. Ohio schools that meet AYP must be designated as
Continuous Improvement or higher. Conversely, schools not meeting AYP for three years in a row
and not meeting it for more than one student group in the most recent year can be rated no
higher than Continuous Improvement. AYP indicators are based on 3-8th grade reading and
math assessments as well as 10th grade Ohio graduation testing in reading and math.
Schools meet AYP when: (1) The proficiency level weighted across all tested grades is at or above
the AYP goal, (2) If the above proficiency level is met when combined with the previous year, (3)
a student group must make a 10 percent or greater reduction in its percentage of non-proficient
students from the previous year, and they must meet the AYP goal in the secondary indicator
(graduation rate and/or attendance rate), or (4) through the growth model, i.e., a non-proficient
student projected to be on a path to proficiency within two years will be treated as proficient in
the current year.5 The growth model uses data from the Ohio Achievement tests in grades 3-8 so
traditional high school buildings (those with grades 9-12) cannot use the growth model to meet
AYP (ODE, 2011). Figure D.1 provides a graphical summary of this information.
5Student groups include: All students, Black, American Indian, Asian, Hispanic, Multi-Racial, White, Economi-
cally Disadvantaged, Limited English Proficiency, and Students with Disabilities.
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Table D.1: State Indicators and 2010-11 Goals
State Indicator ’10-’11 Goal # of indicators
3rd-grade achievement tests: reading and math 75% 2
4th-grade achievement tests: reading and math 75% 2
5th-grade achievement tests: reading, math, and science 75% 3
6th-grade achievement tests: reading and math 75% 2
7th-grade achievement tests: reading and math 75% 2
8th-grade achievement tests: reading, math, and science 75% 3
Ohio Graduation Test- 10th-grade: reading, math, writing, sci-
ence, social studies
75% 5
Ohio Graduation Test- 11th-grade: reading, math, writing, sci-
ence, social studies
85% 5
Graduation Rate 90% 1
Attendance Rate 93% 1
Total 26
Source: Ohio Department of Education Report Card Guide 2010-11 – (Link)
200








Source: Ohio Department of Education
Performance Index Calculator – (Link)
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Table D.3: Performance Index Scores and Report Card Designation






Source: Ohio Department of Education
Performance Index Calculator – (Link)
Figure D.1: Summary of Rating Designation
Source: Ohio Department of Education Report Card Guide 2010-11 (ODE, 2011) –
(Link)
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E Robustness: No Child Left Behind & Great Recession
First, I attempt to account for NCLB contamination by adding additional controls to equation
(2.2). Specifically, I add indicator variables for whether the district has had an AYP failure spell
for 1-2 and 3+ consecutive years, respectively. Because AYP measures were created by the ODE
even for years prior to the NCLB introduction, I also interact these binaries with the same t− 2
post-2002 school year binaries as I do for the main instruments. This attempts to control for the
differential change in response to consecutive AYP failure that occurs at 2002, precisely the year
of the introduction of one of the policies determining charter entry. Tables E.1 to E.2 display the
main sets of results for this specification. I find that results are almost identical to the
specifications omitting these NCLB controls.
Second, many of the NCLB sanctions only could take effect once a school/district failed AYP for
two consecutive years. As a result, outcomes from 2004 and earlier are plausibly unaffected by
NCLB policies. Tables E.3 to E.4 present estimates of the main regressions from equations (2.1)
and (2.2), but limit the regression samples to school years 2004 and earlier. Because the Great
Recession occurred after this cutoff, these regressions also test whether the recession drives my
findings. Again, while the estimates are often less precise due to the loss of seven years of data,
the main story still remains in tact. The robustness of my main estimates to these tests suggests
that I am able to adequately control for any outside influence of NCLB on district resource
acquisition and allocation.
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Table E.1: Effect of Charter Transfers on District Revenues (AYP Interaction Controls)
Panel A: IHS of Total Revenues Total Federal Local
(1) (2) (3)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – OLS -0.006
∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – IV -0.017
∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006)







Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – OLS -0.035
∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.009∗
(0.012) (0.021) (0.005)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – IV -0.050
∗∗ -0.053 -0.001
(0.020) (0.084) (0.011)







Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – OLS -0.018
∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.003) (0.008) (0.007)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – IV -0.024
∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗
(0.005) (0.017) (0.017)
Panel D: Property Tax Decomposition IHS of Property Value
Total Residential Millage
(11) (12) (13)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – OLS -0.022
∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ 0.014
(0.003) (0.003) (0.085)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – IV -0.023
∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.194
(0.005) (0.005) (0.132)
Notes: N= 11,449 district-year observations. Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered by
district. First-stage estimates (and standard errors) for excluded instruments are: Post 1999τ−2 ∗
1(Acad. E.)τ−2 =2.158∗∗∗ (0.659); Post 2002τ−2 ∗ 1(Acad. W.)τ−2 =3.124∗∗∗ (0.624); and t − 1
Char. Elig. (Urban 8/21)=2.468∗∗∗ (0.906). See footnote 28 on page 68 for details on the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation (IHS). The F statistic for excluded instruments is 8.909∗∗∗. This
table reports OLS (see equation (2.1)) and 2SLS (see equation (2.2)) estimates for the effect of
charter competition on district revenues. The endogenous variable is the fraction of the district’s
membership attending charter schools times 100. Each regression also includes two binaries one
for whether during school-year t − 2, the district had missed AYP for 1-2 and 3+ consecutive
years, respectively. These binares are also interacted with an indicator equal to one if the given
t− 2 school-year was after 2002. Each cell provides the result of a separate regression. See Table
H.2 for the mean of each dependent variable and Table H.1 for tests of overidentification. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table E.3: Effect of Charter Transfers on District Revenues (Pre-2005 Sample)
Panel A: IHS of Total Revenues Total Federal Local
(1) (2) (3)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – OLS -0.002 -0.013
∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – IV -0.022
∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010)







Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – OLS -0.009 -0.024 -0.001
(0.009) (0.018) (0.004)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – IV -0.030 -0.053 -0.005
(0.023) (0.102) (0.012)







Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – OLS -0.010
∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.003) (0.005) (0.008)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – IV -0.021
∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.067∗∗
(0.007) (0.018) (0.026)
Panel D: Property Tax Decomposition IHS of Property Value
Total Residential Millage
(11) (12) (13)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – OLS -0.024
∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ 0.098
(0.004) (0.004) (0.163)
Fraction Charter Transfers ×100 – IV -0.027
∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.158
(0.006) (0.007) (0.198)
Notes: N= 7,213 district-year observations. Standard Errors in parentheses are clustered by
district. First-stage estimates (and standard errors) for excluded instruments are: Post 1999τ−2 ∗
1(Acad. E.)τ−2 =2.475∗∗∗ (0.543); Post 2002τ−2 ∗ 1(Acad. W.)τ−2 =2.207∗∗ (1.125); and t − 1
Char. Elig. (Urban 8/21)=1.626∗∗∗ (0.588). See footnote 28 on page 68 for details on the inverse
hyperbolic sine transformation (IHS). The F statistic for excluded instruments is 9.551∗∗∗. This
table reports OLS (see equation (2.1)) and 2SLS (see equation (2.2)) estimates for the effect of
charter competition on district revenues. The endogenous variable is the fraction of the district’s
membership attending charter schools times 100. The sample is additionally restricted to school-
years prior to 2005, the first year when AYP discipline could be enforced. Each cell provides the
result of a separate regression. See Table H.2 for the mean of each dependent variable and Table





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































F Mechanical Bias for Models with Partially Fixed Dependent
Variables
Consider an outcome y that can only vary intermittently. Suppose that if y was able to vary
annually, the true model would be given by
yit = β0 + β1xit + it, (F.1)
but y can only vary intermittently, so instead the econometrician only observes
y∗it =
 yi,t−g if 1(fixedit) = 1yit o.w.
where g is the number of periods since the last negotiation for district i during school year t.
1(fixedit) is an indicator variable equal to one during years in which the y value is fixed for the
given district. Thus, you can think of the measurement error term, ν as
νit =
 yit − yi,t−g if 1(fixedit) = 10 o.w.
We can now rewrite (F.1) as
y∗it + νit = β0 + β1xit + it
y∗it + 1(fixedit)(yit − yi,t−g) = β0 + β1xit + it
y∗it = β0 + β1xit + it − 1(fixedit)(yit − yi,t−g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ξit
But now we can rewrite ξit by substituting back in (F.1) to get
ξit = it − 1(fixedit) [β0 + β1xit + i,t − β0 − β1xi,t−g − i,t−g]
= it − 1(fixedit) [β1∆gxit + ∆git]
where ∆gzit ≡ zit − zi,t−g.
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Then assessing consistency we see that
















where I assume that 1(fixed)it is independent of xi,t, xi,t−g, it and i,t−g so that 1(fixed)it can
be factored out. For the final term to go to zero, we must further suppose that xi,t is independent










Thus, (F.2) can be rewritten as




1− Cov (xit, ·1(fixedit) [∆gxit])
σ2x
)
This expression can be simplified. Notice that
Cov(X,Y ) = E(XY )−E(X)E(Y )
Cov(xit,1(fixedit)xit) = E (xit · 1(fixedit)xit)
−E (xit)E (1(fixedit)xit)
= δE(x2it)− δE(xit)2 = δσ2x
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Cov(xit,1(fixedit)xi,t−g) = E (xit · 1(fixedit)xi,t−g)
−E (xit)E (1(fixedit)xi,t−g)
= δE(xit · xi,t−g)− δE(xit)E(xi,t−g)
= δ [E(xit · xi,t−g)−E(xit)E(xi,t−g)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Cov(xit,xi,t−g)≡σ∆x
= δ · σ∆x
where I denote δ ≡ E(1(fixedit)), i.e., the fraction of observations that are fixed in t.






















1− ρx(g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈[−1,1]
 ∈ [0, 2]
where ρx(g) is the autocorrelation function for g lags and is obtained by assuming stationarity in
x.6 Finally, we see that
plim β̂ = β1 [1− δ (1− ρx(g))] (F.3)
Thus, the sign of the bias is dependent on the sign of the autocorrelation function ρx(g).
F.1 Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section, I provide Monte Carlo Evidence of the bias formula in (F.3). To do this, I
generate 3 sets of data with varying levels of serial correlation. For the ρx(3) = 1 case, x is a
10,000 observation array of sequential positive integers. For ρx(3) = 0.85, x follows an AR(1)
process yielding the given serial correlation. For ρx(3) = 0, x is drawn from a uniform distribution
6The autocorrelation function provides the correlation coefficient for a given variable between two different periods
of time. Refer to Okui (2014) for estimators of autocovariance and autocorrelations for panel data with individual
and time effects.
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with values from 0 to 100. For each of these x variables, I allow y only to vary every third
observation (i.e., δ = 0.667¯). For the observations when y can vary, I set y using
yt = 10 + 1 · xt + t (F.4)
where t ∼ N(0, 1). In this data generating process βtrue = 1 is the benchmark for each bias test.
For all values of y that are fixed, y is set to equal the most recent y value that could vary.
I then calculate the theoretical bias predicted by (F.3) for these three scenarios as well as
estimate the empirical bias by regressing y on x regardless of y’s fixed status and subtracting the
true β from my estimate. Finally, I also estimate the same regression, but omit observations with
fixed y values. I repeat this exercise 1,000 times and calculate the mean and standard deviation of
each statistic.
Table F.1 displays the results from these simulations. Each rows presents the results for the
varying levels of serial correlation in x. In columns 1 and 2, I present the mean and standard
deviation of 1,000 simulations of the calculated theoretical and estimated bias respectively.
column 3, presents the absolute value of the difference between each predicted and estimated bias.
Column 4, presents the estimated bias for the regression that omits observations with fixed y
values.
As expected, when the x values are perfectly serially correlated, there is no bias from estimating
on the full or restricted samples. However, with strong, yet imperfect positive serial correlation, I
predict about a 10 percent attenuation that is confirmed in the actual estimation. When x values
have no serial correlation, the bias matches the extent to which y values are fixed, a 66.7¯ percent
attenuation in this case. Across each specification, the bias is completely mitigated by regressing
only on years for which outcomes can vary. In my setting, ρx(g) ≈ 0.9 and δ ≈ 0.667¯ meaning that
naive estimates on annual data are theoretically predicted to be attenuated by about 7 percent.
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Table F.1: Simulations to test Mechanical Bias
District-Year Observations Negotiaion Years Only
Theoretical Bias Estimated Bias Abs(Difference) Estimated Bias
ρx(3) (1) (2) (3) (4)
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.85 -0.097 -0.097 0.006 -0.000
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
0 -0.667 -0.667 0.003 0.000
(0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.001)
Notes: N= 10,000 simulated observations. δ = 0.667¯. The theoretical bias, estimated bias, and
absolute value difference in biases are calculated 1,000 times for the given autocorrelation values
and the mean and standard deviations of these simulations are reported in columns 1-3. In all
regressions, the true parameter value was unity. For ρx(3) = 1, x is simply an array of sequential
positive integers. For ρx(3) = .85, x follows an AR(1) process that yields the given serial correlation.
For ρx(3) = 0, x ∼ U [0, 100]. For all regressions, y values are calculated as y = 10 + 1 · x+ , where
 ∼ N(0, 1). Column 4 presents the estimated bias for regressions run only on observations for
which the outcome can vary (i.e., contract negotiation years).
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G Unobservable Trend IV Check: All Outcomes
Figure G.1























































































Estimate for Given Outcome
95% Confidence Interval
Notes: Each figure presents the effect of receiving an “Academic Watch” rating two
years earlier on the given current outcome, estimated from (2.8) as explained in
Section 2.3.4. Each regression is respectively run on the sample restrictions for the
given outcome in Sections 2.5 through 2.7.
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Figure G.2










































































































(d) IHS of # of Teachers Exiting to








































Estimate for Given Outcome
95% Confidence Interval
Notes: Each figure presents the effect of receiving an “Academic Watch” rating two
years earlier on the given current outcome, estimated from (2.8) as explained in
Section 2.3.4. Each regression is respectively run on the sample restrictions for the
given outcome in Sections 2.5 through 2.7.
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Figure G.3













































































































Estimate for Given Outcome
95% Confidence Interval
Notes: Each figure presents the effect of receiving an “Academic Watch” rating two
years earlier on the given current outcome, estimated from (2.8) as explained in
Section 2.3.4. Each regression is respectively run on the sample restrictions for the
given outcome in Sections 2.5 through 2.7.
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Figure G.4






































































































Estimate for Given Outcome
95% Confidence Interval
Notes: Each figure presents the effect of receiving an “Academic Watch” rating two
years earlier on the given current outcome, estimated from (2.8) as explained in
Section 2.3.4. Each regression is respectively run on the sample restrictions for the
given outcome in Sections 2.5 through 2.7.
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Figure G.5



















































































































































































Estimate for Given Outcome
95% Confidence Interval
Notes: Each figure presents the effect of receiving an “Academic Watch” rating two
years earlier on the given current outcome, estimated from (2.8) as explained in
Section 2.3.4. Each regression is respectively run on the sample restrictions for the
given outcome in Sections 2.5 through 2.7.
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Figure G.6


























































































































































Estimate for Given Outcome
95% Confidence Interval
Notes: Each figure presents the effect of receiving an “Academic Watch” rating three
years earlier on the given current outcome, estimated from (2.8) as explained in
Section 2.3.4. Each regression is respectively run on the sample restrictions for the
given outcome in Sections 2.5 through 2.7.
218
Figure G.7














































































































































































Estimate for Given Outcome
95% Confidence Interval
Notes: Each figure presents the effect of receiving an “Academic Watch” rating two
years earlier on the given current outcome, estimated from (2.8) as explained in
Section 2.3.4. Each regression is respectively run on the sample restrictions for the
given outcome in Sections 2.5 through 2.7.
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H Regression Overidentification Tests and Outcome Means
Table H.1: Overidentification Tests: Hansen J Statistic








Stu/Tch Ratio Total Teachers






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
8.995∗∗ 0.373 0.914 0.185 0.543 5.504∗ 0.986 4.728∗





(1) (2) (3) (4)
3.479 0.861 0.105 1.997
Panel C: Local District Revenues







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2.173 3.613 1.268 0.240 0.233 0.360 3.480
Panel D: Collectively Bargained Outcomes
Entry Salary Top Salary
Imputed Top
Salary
Slope # Payscale Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
3.923 9.925∗∗∗ 1.932 1.625 6.163∗∗










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
9.974∗∗∗ 0.545 7.566∗∗ 0.522 4.869∗ 0.438 2.151
Notes: Each Panel and column provides the Hansen J overidentification test statistic for the respective regression samples found in Tables 2.3 through 2.6. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table H.2: Table of Means: Dependent Variables








Stu/Tch Ratio Total Teachers






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2,897 763 396 17 176 13 0.136 0.100





(1) (2) (3) (4)
2,152,932 417,772 446,004 1,289,156
Panel C: Local District Revenues







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
16,142,809 13,161,744 518,759 2,462,307 407,999,512 250,736,793 29
Panel D: Collectively Bargained Outcomes
Entry Salary Top Salary
Imputed Top
Salary
Slope # Payscale Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
35,144 58,306 59,910 1,530 15










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.462 31,027,948 15,649,987 3,289,005 12,088,956 2,499,978 789,028








Notes: Each Panel and column provides the untransformed mean of the dependent variable for the respective regression samples found in Tables 2.3 through 2.6.




A Identification of Experience Profiles
To see how identification of the returns to both general and three dimensions of context-specific
experience might be secured, consider a simple case in which there are only two subjects,
chemistry (C) and physics (P), and only two difficulty levels, basic (B) and honors (H). Suppose
that four different teachers (not necessarily at the same school) each teach different subject-level
combinations in their first years: Teacher 1 teaches basic physics (BP) in her first year, while
teacher 2 teaches honors physics (HP), teacher 3 teaches basic chemistry (BC) and teacher 4
teaches honors chemistry (HC). Suppose then that all four teach honors chemistry (HC) every
year thereafter. To keep the example simple, suppose further that the gains from each of the
components of experience are fully persistent (no depreciation), and that each teacher only
teaches classes in one subject-level per year. Panel A of Table F.1 displays the course assignment
paths taken by each teacher, along with the observed stocks of general, subject-specific,
level-specific, and subject-level specific experience that teachers will possess at the beginning of
each of their school years.
Consider a difference-in-difference estimator that compares the change in teacher 1’s average
student test scores between years 2 and 3 with the corresponding change for teacher 2. Since each
teacher teaches the same subject-level (HC) in both year 2 and year 3, focusing on changes over
time differences out the permanent general and context-specific skills of the two teachers (as well
as any differences in time-invariant school quality). Furthermore, comparing across teachers
removes the common gains from the second year of (previous) general experience and the first
year of subject-specific and subject-level specific experience. Because teacher 2 taught at the
honors level in her first year, the extent to which teacher 1’s performance converges to or diverges
from teacher 2’s performance between years 2 and 3 will reflect the relative value of the 2nd year
of level-specific experience compared to the 1st year: (dl(2)− dl(1))− (dl(1)− 0).1 If instead we
1Note that since returns to experience can only be identified relative to other levels of experience, we must
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compare the change in student performance between years 3 and 4 for the same two teachers (1
and 2), we recover the relative value of the 3rd year of level-specific experience compared to the
2nd year: (dl(3)− dl(2))− (dl(2)− dl(1)). Indeed, conditional on knowing the value of the first
year of level-specific experience, dl(1), we can trace out the entire path of returns to level-specific
experience by comparing the divergence/convergence in the performance of teachers 1 and 2 as
they progress through their careers. If we replace teacher 2 with teacher 3 in the comparisons
above, we instead trace out the path of returns to subject-specific experience. Now that the
returns to subject-specific and level-specific experience have been identified, replacing teacher 3
with teacher 4 identifies the path of returns to subject-level-specific experience. Finally, the
growth path of teacher 4, who never switched subjects or levels, identifies the path of returns to
general experience.
To see how the value of the first year of experience might be identified for each component of
experience, consider a second scenario in which teacher 1 teaches the following sequence of courses
in her first four years: BC → HC → BP → HC. Teacher 2 teaches the same set of courses, but
in a different sequence: BP → HC → BC → HC. Panel B of Table F.1 illustrates the stocks of
general and context-specific experience each teacher possesses at the beginning of each year of
teaching. Since both teachers teach honors chemistry with the same accumulated experience
profile in year 4, comparing the performance of the two teachers identifies the difference in
permanent teaching skill between the two teachers (part of which may be honors-chemistry
specific): µ2CH − µ1CH . Once relative permanent skill has been identified, comparing the same
two teachers’ average student residuals in year 2 (when both were teaching honors chemistry)
identifies the return to the 1st year of subject-specific experience, dj(1). Replacing basic
chemistry with honors physics in this example would instead identify the return to the 1st year of
level-specific experience (dl(1)), while replacing it with honors chemistry would identify the return
to the 1st year of subject-level specific experience (djl(1)). The return to the first year of general
experience (dt(1)) can then be identified via the growth in student average residuals from the 1st
to the 2nd year from teachers who teach the same subject-level in each of their first two years.
While the sample histories used in these scenarios are stylized, note that there are many
alternative moments that also provide identifying variation. Indeed, given the frequency with
which subject and level switching occurs, we frequently observe multiple teachers who have taught
the same set of subjects and levels over their careers at the school, but have taught them in
different orders, or in different proportions. Since each different sequence also implies a different
pattern of potential depreciation for a given model of depreciation, such comparisons allow us to
simultaneously estimate the rates at which different experience components depreciate.2
Furthermore, each subject or level switch, regardless of the point in the career, provides a further
source of identifying variation for the various context-specific experience profiles. Consequently,
not only are these experience profiles estimable with reasonable precision (at least for the first
several years of experience), but there are myriad overidentifying tests that can be implemented if
one worries that particular sequences may be likely to occur in conjunction with particular
changes in unobserved inputs (in violation of Assumption 1). Indeed, in Section 3.6 we show that
the function linking four-dimensional stocks of general and context-specific teacher experience to
normalize one value for each function. We do so by setting dk(0) = 0 for k ∈ {gen, j, l, lk}.
2In practice, after some experimentation, we include in our estimated specifications four dummy variables indi-
cating whether the teacher taught the current subject last year, the current level last year, the current subject-level
last year, and whether the teacher taught any class last year.
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student performance is non-parametrically identified, and we present estimates from a more
flexible (though noisily estimated) specification.
B Identification of Permanent Teaching Skill
To illustrate how µˆsrjl can be identified given any of Assumptions 2A-2C paired with 3A-3C,
consider a teacher r′ who teaches subject j′ and level l′ in school s′ during years t1 to t2. Let
Zct = Yct −Xctβ represent the average test score residual in classroom c at time t, after removing
the component predictable based on classroom inputs. Then the average residual performance of
students taught by teacher r′ in school-subject-level combination (s′, j′, l′) is given by:
E[Zct|(s, r, j, l) = (s′, r′, j′, l′)]








where the weight wt′ captures the fraction of all the students teacher r
′ taught in combination
(s′, j′, l′) that were taught in year t′. Since the experience profiles dgen(∗), dj(∗), dl(∗), and djl(∗)
were identified using comparisons of changes in performance across years in Section A, the
average level of performance of teacher r′ while teaching in school-subject level combination
(s′, j′, l′) identifies δs′j′l′ + µs′r′j′l′ . Under Assumption 2C, δsjl = 0 ∀ (s, j, l), so this moment
identifies µs′r′j′l′ directly. Under Assumption 2A, we can use the fact that the (student weighted)
average teacher quality in each school-subject-level is assumed to be zero. Specifically, the average
residual performance of students in a particular school-subject-level is given by:
E[Zct|(s, j, l) = (s′, j′, l′)]
= δs′j′l′ + E[d
gen(expgen) + dj(expj) + dl(expl) + djl(expjl)|(s, j, l) = (s′, j′, l′)], (B.2)
which identifies δs′j′l′ , leaving the teacher-specific average to identify µs′r′j′l′ . To identify δs′ under
Assumption 2B, we simply average at the school level instead of the school-subject-level level.
Thus, µsrjl can be identified for each combination of school-teacher-subject-level that we actually
observe in the data.
C Recovering the Latent Variance Decomposition
This section shows how to distill the true decomposition of time-invariant skill into general,
subject-specific, level-specific, and subject-level specific components from the estimated cell fixed
effects {µˆsrjl}. We first assume that each estimated school-teacher-subject-level fixed effect µˆsrjl
can be written as the sum of the teacher’s true context-specific skill and an uncorrelated error
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component: µˆsrjl = µsrjl + ξsrjl. Let C and C represent the set of classrooms and the total
number of classrooms in the sample, respectively. In addition, let µsrjl(c) represent the
context-specific skill of the teacher that taught classroom c. Then the (student-weighted) sample



















where each wc is a weight capturing the fraction of all student test scores in the sample that were
associated with classroom c.













































By using the delta method to estimate standard errors for ˆ˜µsrjl, denoted se(ξ˜srjl), we can
estimate ˆV ar(µ˜srjl) analogously. Then, ˆV ar(µsr) can be estimated via:
ˆV ar(µsr) = ˆV ar(µsrjl)− ˆV ar(µ˜srjl) (C.5)
To prevent teachers who only taught a single subject-level combination from biasing our estimate
of ˆV ar(µsr) downward, when calculating ˆV ar(
˜ˆµsrjl) we restrict the sample of
school-teacher-subject-level combinations to those in which the relevant school-teacher
combination was observed in at least two school-teacher-subject-level combinations.
Further use of the delta method allows the same procedure to be applied in recovering the true
variance of subject-specific, level-specific, and subject-level-specific teacher talent. 3
3Specifically, we calculate the true variances as follows. First, consider the alternative decomposition µ˜srjl =
µ˜srj + (µ˜srjl − µ˜srj). We estimate the true variance of the second component by first using the delta method to
calculate standard errors for ̂(µ˜srjl − µ˜srj) and then applying the same method as above. We then obtain the variance
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D Testing the Additive Separability of Context-Specific
Experience Profiles
D.1 Smoothing the Nonparametric Experience Contribution Function
To address the volatility of our experience cell fixed effect estimates, we assume that the true
structural function d(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗) is differentiable everywhere, and smooth our estimates using a
kernel function featuring the normal PDF with zero mean and standard deviation 0.5 (denoted φ
despite the non-unity standard deviation):
d˜(exp) =
∑
exp′∈EX wexp′φ(|exp′ − exp|)dˆ(exp′)∑
exp′∈EX wexp′φ(|exp′ − exp|)
, (D.1)
where dˆ(exp′) is the estimate on the given experience profile from equation (3.13). The argument
to the normal density |exp′ − exp| is the L1 norm or taxicab distance between the two experience
profiles: |exp′ − exp| = |expgen′ − expgen|+ |expj′ − expj |+ |expl′ − expl|+ |expjl′ − expjl|. The
weight wexp′ represents the fraction of observations in the sample in which the experience profile
exp′ is observed. Thus, the impact of dˆ(1, 1, 1, 1) on d˜(1, 1, 1, 0) will be greater than that of
dˆ(1, 1, 0, 0), despite equal L1 distances, because dˆ(1, 1, 1, 1) is much more precisely estimated than
dˆ(1, 1, 0, 0). The chosen bandwidth yields a four-dimensional function d˜(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗) that is smooth
enough to remove considerable sampling error, yet is still flexible enough to reveal true
complementarities where they may occur.
D.2 Marginal Effects Example
This subsection shows how we estimate profiles of returns to single dimensions of experience from
the smoothed nonparametric experience cell estimates. These profiles can then be compared with
the corresponding dimension-specific profiles from our additively-separable baseline specification.
For each initial value v of each component of experience, we approximate the average partial
derivative of the experience production function at v (E[∂d(exp
gen,expj ,expl,expsl)
∂expdim
|expdim = v] for
dim ∈ {gen, j, l, sl}) by calculating a weighted average marginal effect of an extra year of the
chosen component of experience (holding the other experience components fixed). The weighted
average is taken over all combinations of the other three experience dimensions that are observed
among experience cells that feature the chosen initial value v in the chosen dimension
dim ∈ {gen, j, l, sl}.
For example, let Qj,v denote the set of experience cells at which a partial derivative for
in subject-specific teaching talent, ˆV ar(µ˜srj), via
ˆV ar(µ˜srj) =
ˆV ar(˜ˆµsrjl)− ˆV ar((µ˜srjl−µ˜srj)). The variance in level-
specific teaching talent, ˆV ar(µ˜srl), can be calculated using an identical approach. Finally, we estimate the variance
in subject-level-specific teaching talent using: ˆV ar(µ˜srjl − µ˜srj − µ˜srl) = ˆV ar(˜ˆµsrjl)− ˆV ar(µ˜srj)− ˆV ar(µ˜srl).
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subject-specific experience at initial value v may be calculated:
Qj,v = {(expt, expj , expl, expsl) :
expj = v, (expt, expj , expl, expsl) ∈ D, (expt, expj + 1, expl, expsl) ∈ D}.
Then the average marginal effect of subject-specific experience among cells featuring expj = v can
be calculated via:










k )− dˆ(exptk, v, explk, expslk )]
The weight wk is composed of the product of two sub-weights associated with the two experience
cells included in the partial derivative estimate. Each sub-weight represents the fraction of all
teacher-school-subject-level-year cells that feature the chosen experience combination. The wk are
then re-scaled to sum to 1.
E Methodology for Measuring Forecast Bias
This appendix describes the implementation of the test for forecast bias in our estimates of
teacher talent discussed in Section 3.6.3. The intuition for the test is that if the estimated fixed
effects {µˆsrjl} properly capture the true talent contributions {µsrjl}, then differences in fixed
effects among teachers in a chosen context estimated from one partition of our data should
predict differences in mean residual achievement in the same context in a second, left out
partition. Our methodology closely mirrors that of Chetty et al. (2014).
The first step is to construct an appropriate sample of school-teacher-subject-level (hereafter
SRJL) combinations. Two conditions must be met for a given SRJL combination to enter the test
sample. First, the teacher must have taught at least three classes in the chosen
school-subject-level (hereafter SJL). At least one class must be available for the forecasted
partition, and at least two classes must be available for the partition that forms the basis for the
forecast (so that a valid standard error for the estimate µˆsrjl can be formed).
4 Second, the SJL
context associated with the chosen SRJL combination must be shared by at least one other
4If only one class is available for given SRJL combination for the partition within which production function is
estimated, the estimated value µˆsrjl will be chosen to perfectly fit the classroom mean test score residual, and there
will be no regression error with which to form heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. While other approaches to
estimating standard errors (estimating at the test score level, imposing homoskedastic standard errors) would not
require this second classroom in the forecasting partition, we want the method for constructing standard errors in
the model used for the forecast test to mimic as closely as possible the one employed for our main estimates.
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teacher. This ensures that persistent school inputs that are specific to (or differentially important
in) the chosen course-level can be differenced out. 2,285 out of an original 18,257 SRJL
combinations satisfy these two restrictions.
Let ZFct ≡ Yct −Xctβˆjl − dˆgen(expgenrt )− dˆj(expjrt)− dˆl(explrt)− dˆjl(expjlrt) represent classroom level
residuals, where the values βˆjl, dˆ
gen, dˆj , dˆl, and dˆjl are used to form the residuals represent the
estimated coefficients on the student demographics, year dummies, and context-specific
experience profiles from our restricted specification (3.3).
We randomly select one classroom from each eligible SRJL to form the forecasted partition
(Partition 2), and assign the remaining classrooms to Partition 1. Let ZFct ≡ [Z1Fct , Z2Fct ] capture
the corresponding partition of classroom-level residuals. We fit the following model to the






Since the estimated fixed effects from this model, µˆFsrjl, still contain the contributions of
school-subject-level inputs δsjl, we choose a teacher r
′ from each SJL environment and subtract
this teacher’s context-specific fixed effect from those of the other teachers in the SJL environment
to form the differences µˆFsrjl − µˆFsr′jl.
Because these differences still contain sampling error, the coefficient in a regression of differences
in residuals Z2Fc(s,r,j,l)t − Z2Fc(s,r′,j,l)t from the forecasted partition on the estimated fixed effect
differences (µˆFsrjl − µˆFsr′jl) will be attenuated toward zero even when these fixed effect differences
are unbiased estimates of true differences in task-specific talent. Still following Chetty et al.
(2014), we therefore shrink the estimated fixed effect differences by a pair-specific reliability ratio






)(µˆFsrjl − µˆFsr′jl), where
(σˆFsrjl)
2 is the squared standard error of the estimated fixed effect difference (obtained from the
component fixed effect estimates via the delta method), and ˆV ar(µsrjl) is the estimated true
variance in teacher talent contributions across classrooms (.154) from our lower bound
decomposition presented in Section 3.5.1.
We then regress the vector of differences in mean classroom residuals in the forecasted sample
(Partition 2) on the shrunken fixed effect differences DiffEBsrjl:
Z2Fc(s,r,j,l)t − Z2Fc(s,r′,j,l)t = βFDiffEBsrjl + e2Fct (E.2)
If the estimates of both the true variance in teacher talent contributions across classrooms (the
“signal”) and the standard errors of the fixed effect differences (the “noise”) are correct, the
coefficient βF should converge in probability to 1, so that the talent estimates are “forecast
unbiased” (Chetty et al. (2014)).
While this test captures the ability of our specification to consistently estimate the combined
general and context-specific talent of a given teacher teaching in a given context, the ability to
choose teachers’ classroom assignments in a way that maximizes achievement contributions
depends critically on the ability to isolate and consistently estimate only the context-specific
components of teacher fixed contributions to achievement. Thus, we also construct two additional
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forecast tests that capture the degree to which our estimates of subject-specific and level-specific
talent can forecast out-of-sample subject-specific and level-specific comparative advantages,
respectively.
Unfortunately, unlike our tests of the consistency of our combined talent estimates, which could
be performed using differences among teachers who taught in the same SJL context, testing the
consistency of comparative advantage estimates requires evaluating the degree to which
difference-in-differences between teachers who taught the same two courses at the same school can
be forecast. Thus, a given SRJL combination only enters the subject (level) forecast sample if (1)
the teacher taught at least three classrooms in both the chosen SJL and a second course that
shares the same school-level (school-subject) environment, and (2) there exists a second teacher
who also taught at least three classrooms in the same two school-subject-level contexts. These
criteria are far more stringent. Much of the variation that identified the estimated true variances
in subject-specific and level-specific talent came from difference-in-differences in which at least one
of the teachers taught fewer than three subjects in at least one of the school-subject-level contexts.
Indeed, applying these criteria leaves us with 205 and 289 difference-in-differences on which to
perform the forecast test for subject-specific and level-specific talent estimates, respectively.
The methodology for the context-specific forecast tests is otherwise perfectly analogous to the
forecast test for combined teacher talent. Difference-in-differences in residual mean test scores
from among the left-out classrooms in Partition 2 across teachers and either subjects or levels
(conditioning on the same school-level or school-course environment as appropriate) are regressed
on empirical Bayes estimates of difference-in-differences in teacher context-specific talent from the
forecasting sample:
(Z2Fc(s,r,j,l)t − Z2Fc(s,r,j′,l)t)− (Z2Fc(s,r′,j,l)t − Z2Fc(s,r′,j′,l)t) = βFDiff in DiffEBsrjl + eF,jct
(Z2Fc(s,r,j,l)t − Z2Fc(s,r,j,l′)t)− (Z2Fc(s,r′,j,l)t − Z2Fc(s,r′,j,l′)t) = βFDiff in DiffEBsrjl + eF,lct (E.3)
The results of the test for forecast bias in the combined talent estimates as well as the
corresponding tests for the subject-specific and level-specific talent estimates are presented in
Table F.7.
F Formulation of the Counterfactual Simulation
To formulate the static problem, first let J represent the set of subjects offered within a given
school-field combination. Similarly, let L represent the set of levels, and let JL represent the set
of subject-level combinations. Let Cjl represent the number of classes to be staffed in
subject-level combination jl ∈ JL, with Nc =
∑
jl∈JLCjl denoting the total number of classes to
be staffed. Let R represent the set of teachers, with R elements. As before, expgenr captures the
number of prior years in which teacher r has taught any classroom, and expjr, explr, and exp
jl
r
capture the number of prior years in which teacher r has taught at least one classroom in subject
j, level l, and subject-level combination jl, respectively. Student and classroom contributions
Xctβjl can be ignored, since they are assumed to be constant across counterfactual reallocations
(and are assumed to be additively separable from teacher inputs).
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Using (1) the estimated smoothed non-parametric experience production function from the “full”






rt ), and (2)
the empirical Bayes estimated posterior belief about teacher r’s context-specific talent for
increasing test scores in school s in subject-level combination (j(c), l(c)), denoted µEBsrj(c)l(c),
5 we
can predict the contribution of context-specific experience to the counterfactual performance of














The goal is to choose the mapping f : C → R from classrooms to teachers that maximizes the sum
of student test scores, subject to the constraints that each teacher can only teach as many
classrooms as he/she was observed teaching at time t (denoted Cr), and every classroom must be















1(f(c) = r) = Cr ∀ r (F.3)
where 1(f(c) = r) indicates that teacher r is assigned to classroom c.
This optimization problem can be recast as a binary integer programming problem:
5µEBsrj(c)l(c) is calculated by shrinking the fixed effect estimate µˆsrj(c)l(c) toward zero (the global mean contribution)
by multiplying it by the reliability ratio:
µEBsrjl = (µˆsrjl)(
V ar(µsrjl − µsr)
σˆ2µˆsrjl + V ar(µsrjl − µsr)
). (F.1)
V ar(µsrjl − µsr) is the estimated true variance in subject-level deviations from school-teacher general talent taken
from Row 3 of Column 1 of Table 3.4. σˆ2µˆsrjl is the estimated squared standard error from the fixed effect estimate
µˆsrjl, which captures the contribution of noise (sampling error) to the variance in the school-teacher-subject-level
fixed effect estimates {µsrjl}. We set µEBsrjl = 0 for school-teacher-subject-level combinations that are feasible in the
simulated assignment but are never observed in our sample.





s.t. Mc ∗ x = 1 ∀ c
s.t. Nr ∗ x = Cr ∀ r
s.t. x ∈ {0, 1} (F.4)
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where xcr = 1(f(c) = r) is an indicator for whether teacher r is assigned to classroom c.
Mc consists of a 1× C ∗R row vector capturing the number of teachers assigned to classroom c
(restricted to be 1 ∀ c):
Mc =




0 . . . 0 1
C−c︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 . . . 0

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Nr consists of a 1× C ∗R row vector capturing the number of classrooms taught by teacher r
(restricted to be equal to Cr, the number taught in the sample):
Nr =
(r−1)∗C︷ ︸︸ ︷0 . . . 0 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
(R−r)∗C︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 . . . 0
 .
We solve this binary integer programming problem for each school-field combination in the first
year of the sample. We then update each teacher’s context-specific experience profile for the
second year given the experience they gained under the optimal assignment in the first year.7 We
repeat this process until the end of the sample so as to reap the long-run rewards associated with
accumulating high levels of relevant context-specific experience. The “static” version of the
simulation does not update each teacher’s context-specific experience profile for the next year
after allocating teachers in a given year, but instead treats every year in the sample as if it were
the first year.
Some of our simulations exploit the full sample of teachers, rather than restricting attention to
those teachers with fully observed teaching histories. For teachers who begin teaching after 1995,
when our sample begins, we impute their teaching history as of 1995 by randomly assigning them
the teaching history of a full history teacher who 1) was observed (later in the sample) at the
1995 general experience level of the imputed teacher, and 2) who shares the same most commonly
taught subject-level across all the years of our sample as the imputed teacher. Some teachers are
sufficiently experienced in 1995 so that there is no teacher with a fully observed teaching history
who is ever observed at such a high level of general experience in our sample. These teachers are
randomly assigned a 1995 teaching history from among the full history teachers who are observed
at 12+ years of general experience who share the same most commonly taught subject-level. Once
a 1995 teaching history has been imputed for all teachers with missing histories, we accumulate
their post-1995 stocks of general and context-specific experience as it existed in the data (if
constructing actual stocks) or as it was optimally assigned (if constructing simulated stocks).
Finally, some of our simulation results tables use a random allocation of teachers to classrooms as
a baseline rather than the actual allocation of teachers. To enure that the random allocations are
feasible, we construct them by selecting, for each school-field, a random permutation of the
allocation identified as the solution to the binary assignment problem.
7Since non-tested subjects are not reallocated, any general or level-specific experience teachers accumulated in
those subjects under the true allocation is also included in the update.
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Table F.1: Identification Example: Experience Stocks for Hypothetical Teachers in Each Year
Panel A: Identifying Variation for Experience Profiles, Example 1
Teacher 1: New Subj/Lvl Teacher 2: New Subj Only
Year Crs. Gen. Subj. Lvl. Subj.-Lvl. Crs. Gen. Subj. Lvl. Subj.-Lvl.
1 BP 0 0 0 0 HP 0 0 0 0
2 HC 1 0 0 0 HC 1 0 1 0
3 HC 2 1 1 1 HC 2 1 2 1
4 HC 3 2 2 2 HC 3 2 3 2
5 HC 4 3 3 3 HC 4 3 4 3
Teacher 3: New Lvl Only Teacher 4: Same Subj/Lvl
Year Crs. Gen. Subj. Lvl. Subj.-Lvl. Crs. Gen. Subj. Lvl. Subj.-Lvl.
1 BC 0 0 0 0 HC 0 0 0 0
2 HC 1 1 0 0 HC 1 1 1 1
3 HC 2 2 1 1 HC 2 2 2 2
4 HC 3 3 2 2 HC 3 3 3 3
5 HC 4 4 3 3 HC 4 4 4 4
Panel B: Identifying Variation for Experience Profiles, Example 2
Teacher 1 Teacher 2
Year Crs. Gen. Subj. Lvl. Subj.-Lvl. Crs. Gen. Subj. Lvl. Subj.-Lvl.
1 BC 0 0 0 0 BP 0 0 0 0
2 HC 1 1 0 0 HC 1 0 0 0
3 BP 2 0 1 0 BC 2 1 1 0
4 HC 3 2 1 1 HC 3 2 1 1
Notes: This table provides the path of experience stocks for each teacher in each of the two examples
illustrating experience profile identification that occur in Appendix Section A. Each entry provides the
level of general or task-specific experience in the dimension indicated by the column heading at the
beginning of the year associated with the row. “B”-Basic, “H”-Honors, “P”-Physics, “C”-Chemistry.
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Table F.2: The Distribution of Years of Experience among Classes Taught by 2nd and 3rd Year
Teachers
Panel A: Second-Year Teachers
General Subject Level Subj.-Lvl %
1 1 1 1 70.8%
1 1 1 0 2.7%
1 1 0 0 4.5%
1 0 1 0 19.4%
1 0 0 0 2.5%
Panel B: Third-Year Teachers
General Subject Level Subj.-Lvl %
2 2 2 2 54.9%
2 2 2 1 3.0%
2 2 2 0 0.6%
2 2 1 1 4.1%
2 2 1 0 0.6%
2 2 0 0 2.2%
2 1 2 1 17.7%
2 1 2 0 1.0%
2 1 1 1 1.7%
2 1 1 0 0.8%
2 1 0 0 1.1%
2 0 2 0 10.5%
2 0 1 0 0.8%
2 0 0 0 1.1%
Notes: The table presents the classroom-weighted distribution of four-dimensional experience stocks
among second- and third-year teachers in our final sample. 10,270 and 8,665 total classes were taught by
second-year and third-year teachers respectively. Note that multiple subject-level combinations can be
taught in a year.
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Table F.3: Coefficient Estimates Associated with Control Variables Capturing Teacher Workload,
Depreciation of Experience Capital, and Productivity Declines in the Last Year Teaching Any
Class or Teaching a Class in the Chosen Subject, Level, or Subject-Level Combination (Baseline
Specification)
(1)
# of Concurrent Classes Taught 0.000
[0.000]
# of Concurrent Subject-Level Combinations Taught 0.000
[0.002]
1(Did Not Teach Last Year) 0.004
[0.020]
1(Did Not Teach Subject Last Year) -0.003
[0.013]
1(Did Not Teach Level Last Year) 0.006
[0.015]
1(Did Not Teach Subject-Level Last Year) -0.001
[0.012]
1(Did Not Teach in Last 2 Years) -0.006
[0.036]
1(Did Not Teach Subject in Last 2 Years) -0.014
[0.026]
1(Did Not Teach Level in Last 2 Years) 0.003
[0.028]
1(Did Not Teach Subject-Level in Last 2 Years) 0.002
[0.022]
1(Final Year Teaching) -0.005
[0.019]
1(Final Year Teaching Subject) 0.001
[0.012]
1(Final Year Teaching Level) -0.004
[0.018]
1(Final Year Teaching Subject-Level) -0.010
[0.011]
Notes: Regression also contains a full set of school-subject-level and
school-teacher-subject-level fixed effects, calendar year effects, a set of
observable classroom covariates, and a set of four additively separable
flexibly parameterized profiles capturing productivity gains from years
of general, subject-specific, level-specific, and subject-level-specific ex-
perience. See Table 3.5 for estimates of these experience profiles. Stan-
dard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the teacher level. Significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * re-
spectively. See Section 3.2 for methodological details.
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Table F.4: Coefficient Estimates Associated with Control Variables Capturing Teacher Workload,
Depreciation of Experience Capital, and Productivity Declines in the Last Year Teaching Any
Class or Teaching a Class in the Chosen Subject, Level, or Subject-Level Combination (Restricted
Specification)
(1)
# of Concurrent Classes Taught -0.000
[0.000]
# of Concurrent Subject-Level Combinations Taught -0.004*
[0.002]
1(Did Not Teach Last Year) 0.014
[0.017]
1(Did Not Teach Subject Last Year) -0.020*
[0.011]
1(Did Not Teach Level Last Year) 0.004
[0.012]
1(Did Not Teach Subject-Level Last Year) 0.005
[0.010]
1(Did Not Teach in Last 2 Years) 0.005
[0.031]
1(Did Not Teach Subject in Last 2 Years) -0.014
[0.019]
1(Did Not Teach Level in Last 2 Years) -0.001
[0.022]
1(Did Not Teach Subject-Level in Last 2 Years) 0.000
[0.017]
1(Final Year Teaching) -0.004
[0.014]
1(Final Year Teaching Subject) -0.029***
[0.008]
1(Final Year Teaching Level) 0.008
[0.012]
1(Final Year Teaching Subject-Level) -0.017**
[0.007]
Notes: Regression also contains a full set of school-subject-level and
school-teacher fixed effects, calendar year effects, a set of observable
classroom covariates, and a set of four additively separable flexibly pa-
rameterized profiles capturing productivity gains from years of general,
subject-specific, level-specific, and subject-level-specific experience. See
Table 3.6 for estimates of these experience profiles. Standard errors (in
brackets) are clustered at the teacher level. Significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. See
Section 3.2 for methodological details.
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Permanent Teacher Changes Temporary Teacher Changes
General Subject Level SL General Subject Level SL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
t− 1 0.010 0.005 0.039** -0.016 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001
[0.008] [0.007] [0.022] [0.016] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
t− 2 -0.012 -0.016* -0.021 0.022 0.001 0.003* 0.001 0.002
[0.012] [0.011] [0.017] [0.019] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
t− 3 -0.003 0.032** 0.037** 0.035* 0.005** 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
[0.012] [0.016] [0.016] [0.024] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
t− 4 0.017* -0.010 0.014 -0.009 0.002 0.001 0.006* 0.004
[0.013] [0.014] [0.038] [0.017] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
t− 5 -0.003 -0.014 0.017 0.024 -0.006* -0.002 0.002 0.004
[0.029] [0.013] [0.049] [0.037] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
t− 6 -0.021 0.002 -0.083*** 0.032 0.008* 0.005 -0.001 0.005
[0.018] [0.019] [0.031] [0.067] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
t− 7 -0.040 -0.012 -0.182 -0.115** 0.005 -0.001 0.015*** -0.006
[0.038] [0.022] [0.160] [0.055] [0.008] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007]
Notes: Table entries display average school-teacher-year residuals (Columns 1 and 5), school-teacher-subject-
year residuals (Columns 2 and 6), school-teacher-level-year residuals (Columns 3 and 7), and school-teacher-
subject-level-year residuals (Columns 4 and 8), respectively, in the years leading up to a change in classroom
assignment (using residuals from the Restricted Specification in equation (3.3). A permanent change in
general course assignment (Column 1) is defined as a teacher-year combination in which the teacher is not
observed teaching any course in a subsequent sample year. A permanent change in subject assignment
(Column 2) is defined as a teacher-subject-year combination in which the teacher teaches the chosen subject,
but is not observed teaching the chosen subject again in subsequent sample years. Permanent changes in
level (Column 3) and subject-level (Column 4) assignments are defined analogously to permanent subject
changes. Temporary changes in assignment (Columns 5-8) are defined in a similar manner as permanent
course assignment changes, except the teacher is observed returning to teach (Column 5) or teach in the
chosen subject (Column 6), level (Column 7), or subject-level (Column 8) in a subsequent sample year.
Bootstrap standard errors (in brackets) are computed using 1,000 iterations. Significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively.
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Table F.6: Backcasting Test for Non-Random Student Sorting (Restricted Specification with Class-
room Average 7th Grade Math Scores as the Outcome Variable)
Years
Experience
General Subject Level Subj.-Level Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 yr -0.027*** -0.005 0.024*** 0.002 -0.005*
[0.009] [0.007] [0.009] [0.006] [0.004]
2 yrs -0.014* -0.022*** 0.016** 0.016** -0.004
[0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [0.004]
3 yrs -0.026** -0.021** 0.032*** 0.024*** 0.009**
[0.013] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.005]
4 yrs -0.019* -0.030*** 0.022** 0.025*** -0.002
[0.013] [0.011] [0.012] [0.010] [0.005]
5-6 yrs -0.016 -0.020* 0.020* 0.026** 0.010**
[0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.005]
7-10 yrs 0.008 -0.028** -0.009 0.039*** 0.011*
[0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.006]
11-14 yrs 0.007 0.009 -0.011 0.012 0.017*
[0.020] [0.025] [0.020] [0.026] [0.013]
Notes: N = 61, 993 test-score-weighted classroom observations. Results are based on an altered version of the
Restricted Specification in equation (3.3) in which the actual classroom average of students current test scores
from the chosen class are replaced by the classroom average of the 7th grade math scores of these students. Refer
to notes below Table 3.5 for a full description of the control variables. Experience is measured as the total number
of prior years in which the classroom’s teacher taught at least one class at all (Col. 1) or in the subject (Col. 2),
level (Col. 3), or subject-level (Col. 4) associated with the current classroom observation. Column 5, entitled
Combined, captures the combined predicted contribution of all four dimensions of experience capital for the case
in which the teacher has taught the course associated with the classroom observation in every year of a career
length defined by the row label. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the teacher level. Significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. See Section 3.2 for methodological
details.
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Table F.7: Testing for Forecast Bias in Estimates of Time-Invariant Task-Specific Teacher Talent
Outcome (Forecasted Sample)
Diff (Sch-Tea-Subj-Lvl) Diff-in-Diff (Subj) Diff-in-Diff (Lvl)
Forecasting Sample (1) (2) (3)
DiffEB (Sch-Tea-Subj-Lvl) 0.825
[µˆsrjl − µˆsr′jl]EB (0.019)
Diff-in-Diff (Subj) 1.013
[(µˆsrjl − µˆsrj′l)− (µˆsr′jl − µˆsr′j′l)]EB (0.242)
Diff-in-Diff (Lvl) 0.456
[(µˆsrjl − µˆsrjl′)− (µˆsr′jl − µˆsr′jl′)]EB (0.333)
Observations 7,246 205 289
Notes: The entries in this table are coefficients (with standard errors in brackets) capturing the degree of forecast
bias in estimates of combined (general and task-specific) talent, subject-specific talent, and level-specific talent,
respectively, from a set of split sample tests. See Appendix Section E for a detailed description of the methodology.
In each specification, the estimator should yield a forecast coefficient that converges in probability to 1 if our
achievement production function is correctly specified. Specifically, the outcome in Column 1 is the difference in
average test score residuals among a pair of classes from the same school-subject-level taught by two different
teachers from a partition of our main sample. The entry in Row (1), Column (1) captures the coefficient on a
vector of empirical Bayes forecasts of the expected difference in achievement among these pairs of teachers based
on (appropriately shrunken) estimates of the difference in their combined general and course-specific productivity
from a second, mutually exclusive partition used to construct the forecast. The entries in Column 2 and Column
3 replace these pair-specific differences on both sides of the equation with differences-in-differences among pairs
of teachers across common pairs of courses that differ only in subject (Column 2) or level (Column 3). These
coefficients capture the degree of forecast bias in the model’s ability to estimate subject-specific and level-specific
comparative advantages. Heteroskedasticity-robust (White) standard errors (in brackets) are computed for each
coefficient.
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Table F.8: Effect of Number of Courses of General, Subject-Specific, Level-Specific, and Subject-
Level-Specific Experience on Student Test Scores (Restricted Specification)
Course
Experience
General Subject Level Subj.-Level Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 crs 0.019 0.011 -0.006 0.008 0.031
[0.036] [0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.035]
2 crs 0.051** 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.062***
[0.027] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.025]
3 crs 0.075*** 0.021** -0.005 0.002 0.094***
[0.017] [0.011] [0.012] [0.010] [0.015]
4-5 crs 0.066*** 0.032*** 0.001 0.004 0.104***
[0.013] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.008]
6-9 crs 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.009 0.002 0.114***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.006]
10-20 crs 0.070*** 0.062*** 0.005 -0.006 0.131***
[0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.007]
21+ crs 0.082*** 0.071*** 0.003 -0.009 0.146***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.010]
Notes: N = 61, 993 test-score-weighted classroom observations. The outcome is the class average of student
standardized test scores in the subject. Restricted Specification refers to equation (3.3). Refer to notes below
Table 3.5 for a full description of the control variables. Experience is measured as the number of classes taught in
prior years by the classroom’s teacher in total (Col. 1) or in the subject (Col. 2), level (Col. 3), or subject-level
(Col. 4) associated with the current classroom observation. Column 5, entitled Combined, captures the combined
predicted contribution of all four dimensions of experience capital for the case in which the teacher has taught the
course associated with the classroom observation in every classroom of a career length defined by the row label.
Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the teacher level. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are
represented by ***, **, and * respectively. See Section 3.2 for methodological details.
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Table F.9: True Variances in Fixed Effects (Using Course-Based Measure of Teacher Experience
with the Baseline Specification )
Lower Bound Intermediate Upper Bound
Var. SD Var. SD Var. SD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sch-Subj-Lvl-Tch Combos 0.0237 0.154 0.0467 0.216 0.0604 0.246
General Talent 0.0176 0.133 0.0368 0.192 0.0505 0.225
Subj-Lvl Combos 0.0061 0.078 0.0099 0.099 0.0099 0.099
Sch-Lvl-Tch Combos 0.0198 0.141 0.0407 0.202 0.0544 0.233
Subject Talent 0.0039 0.063 0.0060 0.077 0.0060 0.077
Sch-Subj-Tch Combos 0.0216 0.147 0.0433 0.208 0.0569 0.239
Level Talent 0.0021 0.045 0.0034 0.059 0.0034 0.059
Subject-Level Talent 0.0001 0.011 0.0005 0.022 0.0005 0.022
Notes: This variance decomposition is based on a version of the baseline specifica-
tion (equation 3.2 in which experience in each context dimension (general, subject-
specific, level-specific, and subject-level-specific) is measured as the total number of
previous classrooms taught in the relevant context. Lower Bound estimates allocate
all of the between school-subject-level variance in residual test scores to school and
student inputs (Assumption 2A). This is implemented by including school-subject-
level fixed effects and normalizing the mean among school-teacher-subject-level fixed
effects to be 0 in each school-subject-level. Intermediate estimates allocate the be-
tween school variance in residual test scores to school and student inputs, and the
within-school/between subject-level variance to teachers (Assumption 2B). This is
implemented by replacing the school-subject-level fixed effects with school fixed ef-
fects only. Upper Bound estimates allocate all of the between school-subject-level
variance in residual test scores to teachers (Assumption 2C). This is implemented by
removing all school-level controls. See Section 3.3.2 for details.
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Table F.10: Effect of Years of General, Subject-Specific, Level-Specific, and Subject-Level-Specific
Experience on Student Test Scores (Restricted Specification with the Sample Restricted to Class-
rooms Featuring Teachers in their First School)
Years
Experience
General Subject Level Subj.-Level Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 yr 0.062*** 0.018** -0.003 0.011 0.088***
[0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.005]
2 yrs 0.087*** 0.022** -0.011 0.018* 0.117***
[0.016] [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.006]
3 yrs 0.093*** 0.035** -0.016 0.014 0.126***
[0.018] [0.016] [0.016] [0.014] [0.007]
4 yrs 0.105*** 0.035** -0.022 0.012 0.130***
[0.020] [0.017] [0.018] [0.015] [0.008]
5-6 yrs 0.109*** 0.034** -0.019 0.023* 0.147***
[0.021] [0.020] [0.019] [0.017] [0.010]
7-10 yrs 0.116*** 0.020 -0.031* 0.027 0.131***
[0.025] [0.025] [0.023] [0.023] [0.013]
11-14 yrs 0.101*** 0.019 0.016 -0.014 0.122***
[0.034] [0.044] [0.035] [0.049] [0.033]
Notes: N = 51, 773 test-score-weighted classroom observations. The outcome is the class average of student
standardized test scores in the subject. Restricted Specification refers to equation (3.3). The sample is restricted
to classrooms featuring a teacher that is teaching in his/her first school (i.e. the teacher’s entire teaching history
was acquired at the current school). Refer to notes below Table 3.5 for a full description of the control variables.
Experience is measured as the total number of prior years in which the classroom’s teacher taught at least one
class at all (Col. 1) or in the subject (Col. 2), level (Col. 3), or subject-level (Col. 4) associated with the
current classroom observation. Column 5, entitled Combined, captures the combined predicted contribution of
all four dimensions of experience capital for the case in which the teacher has taught the course associated with
the classroom observation in every year of a career length defined by the row label. Standard errors (in brackets)
are clustered at the teacher level. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and *
respectively. See Section 3.2 for methodological details.
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Table F.11: True Variances in Fixed Effects (Using the Baseline Specification with the Year-Based
Measure of Teacher Experience and a Sample Restricted to Classrooms Featuring Teachers in Their
First Schools)
Lower Bound Intermediate Upper Bound
Var. SD Var. SD Var. SD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sch-Subj-Lvl-Tch Combos 0.0225 0.150 0.0454 0.213 0.0590 0.243
General Talent 0.0167 0.129 0.0356 0.189 0.0491 0.222
Subj-Lvl Combos 0.0058 0.076 0.0098 0.099 0.0098 0.099
Sch-Lvl-Tch Combos 0.0188 0.137 0.0395 0.199 0.0530 0.230
Subject Talent 0.0037 0.061 0.0060 0.077 0.0060 0.077
Sch-Subj-Tch Combos 0.0205 0.143 0.0421 0.205 0.0556 0.236
Level Talent 0.0019 0.044 0.0033 0.058 0.0033 0.058
Subject-Level Talent 0.0001 0.011 0.0005 0.023 0.0005 0.023
Notes: Lower Bound estimates allocate all of the between school-subject-level vari-
ance in residual test scores to school and student inputs (Assumption 2A). This is
implemented by including school-subject-level fixed effects and normalizing the mean
among school-teacher-subject-level fixed effects to be 0 in each school-subject-level.
Intermediate estimates allocate the between school variance in residual test scores to
school and student inputs, and the within-school/between subject-level variance to
teachers (Assumption 2B). This is implemented by replacing the school-subject-level
fixed effects with school fixed effects only. Upper Bound estimates allocate all of the
between school-subject-level variance in residual test scores to teachers (Assumption
2C). This is implemented by removing all school-level controls. See Section 3.3.2 for
details.
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Table F.12: Effect of Years of General, Subject-Specific, Level-Specific, and Subject-Level-Specific
Experience on Student Test Scores (Restricted Specification with Linear Depreciation)
Years
Experience
General Subject Level Subj.-Level Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 yr 0.066*** 0.013* -0.004 0.015** 0.089***
[0.011] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [0.004]
2 yrs 0.086*** 0.023** -0.005 0.014* 0.118***
[0.014] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.006]
3 yrs 0.095*** 0.036*** -0.006 0.006 0.131***
[0.016] [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.007]
4 yrs 0.103*** 0.040*** -0.009 0.004 0.137***
[0.018] [0.015] [0.016] [0.014] [0.008]
5-6 yrs 0.106*** 0.040** -0.000 0.005 0.151***
[0.019] [0.018] [0.017] [0.015] [0.009]
7-10 yrs 0.117*** 0.025 -0.004 -0.001 0.136***
[0.022] [0.021] [0.020] [0.019] [0.012]
11-14 yrs 0.111*** 0.027 0.031 -0.029 0.140***
[0.028] [0.038] [0.028] [0.041] [0.026]
Notes: Regression specification mimics the Restricted Specification (see Equation (3.3) and the notes to Table 3.6),
except that the indicator sets for whether the teacher failed to teach a course in each of the relevant dimensions of
context (general, subject, level, and subject-level) last year or in the last two years are replaced by linear controls
for the number of years since the teacher taught any course and since the teacher taught in the subject, level,
and subject-level associated with the classroom observation. Experience is measured as the total number of prior
years in which the classroom’s teacher taught at least one class at all (Col. 1) or in the subject (Col. 2), level (Col.
3), or subject-level (Col. 4) associated with the current classroom observation. Column 5, entitled Combined,
captures the combined predicted contribution of all four dimensions of experience capital for the case in which
the teacher has taught the course associated with the classroom observation in every classroom of a career length
defined by the row label. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the teacher level. Significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. See Section 3.2 for methodological details.
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Table F.13: Coefficient Estimates Associated with Control Variables Capturing Teacher Workload,
Depreciation of Experience Capital, and Productivity Declines in the Last Year Teaching Any
Class or Teaching a Class in the Chosen Subject, Level, or Subject-Level Combination (Restricted
Specification with Linear Depreciation)
(1)
# of Concurrent Classes Taught -0.000
[0.000]
# of Concurrent Subject-Level Combinations Taught -0.003
[0.002]
# of Years Since Last Taught 0.004
[0.006]
# of Years Since Last Taught Subject -0.005
[0.004]
# of Years Since Last Taught Level 0.001
[0.004]
# of Years Since Last Taught Subject-Level -0.005
[0.004]
1(Final Year Teaching) -0.005
[0.014]
1(Final Year Teaching Subject) -0.028***
[0.008]
1(Final Year Teaching Level) 0.008
[0.012]
1(Final Year Teaching Subject-Level) -0.018**
[0.007]
Notes: Regression specification mimics the Restricted Specification (see
Equation (3.3) and the notes to Table 3.6), except that the indicator
sets for whether the teacher failed to teach a course in each of the rel-
evant dimensions of context (general, subject, level, and subject-level)
last year or in the last two years are replaced by linear controls for
the number of years since the teacher taught any course and since the
teacher taught in the subject, level, and subject-level associated with
the classroom observation. Regression also contains a full set of school-
subject-level and school-teacher fixed effects, calendar year effects, a set
of observable classroom covariates, and a set of four additively separable
flexibly parameterized profiles capturing productivity gains from years
of general, subject-specific, level-specific, and subject-level-specific ex-
perience. See Table F.12 for estimates of these experience profiles.
Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the teacher level. Signif-
icance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and
* respectively. See Section 3.2 for methodological details.
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Table F.14: Effect of Years of General, Subject-Specific, Level-Specific, and Subject-Level-Specific
Experience on Student Test Scores (Restricted Specification with 7th Grade Math and Reading
Test Scores Added as Controls)
Years
Experience
General Subject Level Subj.-Level Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 yr 0.069*** 0.014* -0.007 0.014** 0.090***
[0.011] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [0.004]
2 yrs 0.088*** 0.025** -0.007 0.013* 0.119***
[0.014] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.006]
3 yrs 0.099*** 0.037*** -0.013 0.007 0.131***
[0.016] [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.007]
4 yrs 0.106*** 0.042*** -0.016 0.005 0.138***
[0.018] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.008]
5-6 yrs 0.108*** 0.042*** -0.006 0.007 0.151***
[0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.015] [0.009]
7-10 yrs 0.115*** 0.026 -0.009 0.002 0.135***
[0.022] [0.021] [0.019] [0.019] [0.011]
11-14 yrs 0.108*** 0.018 0.025 -0.014 0.137***
[0.028] [0.037] [0.028] [0.041] [0.026]
Notes: N = 61, 993 test-score-weighted classroom observations. The outcome is the class average of student
standardized test scores in the subject. Restricted Specification refers to equation (3.3). Refer to notes below
Table 3.5 for a full description of the control variables. This regression also includes 7th grade math and reading
standardized test scores as additional controls. Experience is measured as the total number of prior years in
which the classroom’s teacher taught at least one class at all (Col. 1) or in the subject (Col. 2), level (Col. 3), or
subject-level (Col. 4) associated with the current classroom observation. Column 5, entitled Combined, captures
the combined predicted contribution of all four dimensions of experience capital for the case in which the teacher
has taught the course associated with the classroom observation in every classroom of a career length defined by
the row label. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the teacher level. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. See Section 3.2 for methodological details.
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Table F.15: Heterogeneity across Subject Fields in the Effects of Years of General and Subject-
Specific Experience on Student Test Scores (Restricted Specification with Level and Subject-Level
Experience Additionally Constrained to 0)
Years Exp. Math Science Social Studies English
General Subject General Subject General Subject General Subject
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 yr 0.072*** 0.021** 0.070*** 0.046*** 0.072*** 0.017 0.020 0.013
[0.012] [0.010] [0.013] [0.011] [0.014] [0.012] [0.016] [0.015]
2 yrs 0.090*** 0.038*** 0.098*** 0.047*** 0.091*** 0.027* 0.017 0.035*
[0.014] [0.012] [0.017] [0.015] [0.017] [0.015] [0.022] [0.021]
3 yrs 0.102*** 0.048*** 0.101*** 0.062*** 0.091*** 0.032* 0.020 0.036
[0.016] [0.014] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.026] [0.026]
4 yrs 0.095*** 0.053*** 0.089*** 0.078*** 0.119*** 0.026 0.036 0.022
[0.017] [0.015] [0.022] [0.021] [0.020] [0.019] [0.031] [0.031]
5-6 yrs 0.120*** 0.057*** 0.089*** 0.075*** 0.119*** 0.042** 0.023 0.025
[0.018] [0.017] [0.025] [0.024] [0.021] [0.022] [0.037] [0.037]
7-10 yrs 0.134*** 0.038* 0.062** 0.075** 0.133*** 0.005 0.038 0.009
[0.020] [0.020] [0.032] [0.031] [0.022] [0.026] [0.045] [0.045]
11-14 yrs 0.154*** 0.008 0.073 0.097* 0.125*** -0.081 0.066 0.042
[0.028] [0.042] [0.047] [0.051] [0.036] [0.058] [0.055] [0.058]
Notes: N = 61, 993 test-score-weighted classroom observations. The outcome is the class average of student standardized test
scores in the subject. Results are based on an altered version of the Restricted Specification in equation (3.3) in which 1) we
impose the additional restrictions that gains from level-specific and subject-level-specific experience are constrained to be 0:
dl(exp) = 0 and djl(exp) = 0 ∀ exp, and 2) we generalize the gains from years of general and subject-specific experience to be
field-specific: dgen(exp) → dgenfield(exp), dj(exp) → djfield(exp), field ∈ {Math, Science,Social Studies,English}. Refer to notes
below Table 3.5 for a full description of the control variables. Experience is measured as the total number of prior years in
which the classroom’s teacher taught at least one class at all (odd Columns) or in the subject (even Columns) associated with
the current classroom observation. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the teacher level. Significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. See Section 3.2 for methodological details.
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Table F.16: Effect of Years of General, Subject-Specific, Level-Specific, and Subject-Level-Specific
Experience on Student Test Scores (Restricted Specification with Full Set of Indicator Variables
for Each Observed Years of Experience)
Years
Experience
General Subject Level Subj.-Level Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 yr 0.064*** 0.013* -0.002 0.013** 0.089***
[0.011] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [0.004]
2 yrs 0.084*** 0.021** -0.003 0.016* 0.118***
[0.014] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.006]
3 yrs 0.093*** 0.033*** -0.005 0.010 0.131***
[0.016] [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] [0.007]
4 yrs 0.100*** 0.036*** -0.008 0.010 0.137***
[0.018] [0.015] [0.016] [0.014] [0.008]
5 yrs 0.101*** 0.041*** 0.003 0.012 0.156***
[0.019] [0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.009]
6 yrs 0.101*** 0.021 -0.001 0.026* 0.146***
[0.021] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.011]
7 yrs 0.117*** 0.018 -0.017 0.019 0.137***
[0.023] [0.022] [0.020] [0.020] [0.012]
8 yrs 0.110*** -0.017 0.002 0.028 0.123***
[0.026] [0.026] [0.023] [0.024] [0.014]
9 yrs 0.120*** -0.001 0.002 0.027 0.148***
[0.028] [0.031] [0.026] [0.029] [0.017]
10 yrs 0.120*** -0.020 0.006 0.021 0.127***
[0.032] [0.036] [0.029] [0.037] [0.022]
11 yrs 0.104*** 0.006 0.056** -0.025 0.140***
[0.035] [0.047] [0.032] [0.050] [0.029]
12 yrs 0.153*** -0.086* -0.014 0.147** 0.199***
[0.044] [0.062] [0.042] [0.065] [0.039]
13 yrs 0.087* -0.063 0.010 0.176* 0.210***
[0.053] [0.105] [0.055] [0.113] [0.044]
Notes: N = 61, 993 test-score-weighted classroom observations. The outcome is the class average of student
standardized test scores in the subject. Refer to notes below Table 3.5 for a full description of the control
variables. Results are based on an altered version of the Restricted Specification from equation (3.3) in which bins
for years of experience 5-6, 7-11, and 11+, respectively, are replaced by indicator variables for each individual year
of experience (general, subject, level, and subject-level combination). Experience is measured as the total number
of prior years in which the classroom’s teacher taught at least one class at all (Col. 1) or in the subject (Col. 2),
level (Col. 3), or subject-level (Col. 4) associated with the current classroom observation. Column 5, entitled
Combined, captures the combined predicted contribution of all four dimensions of experience capital for the case
in which the teacher has taught the course associated with the classroom observation in every year of a career
length defined by the row label. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the teacher level. Significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. See Section 3.2 for methodological
details. 248
Table F.17: Effect of Years of General, Subject-Specific, Level-Specific, and Subject-Level-Specific




General Subject Level Subj.-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year Exp. 0.063*** 0.019* 0.006 0.007
[0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010]
(Year Exp.)2 -0.014*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.001
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004]
(Year Exp.)3 0.001*** 0.000 0.001 -0.000
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
(Year Exp.)4 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: N = 61, 993 test-score-weighted classroom observations. The outcome is the class
average of student standardized test scores in the subject. Restricted Specification refers to
equation (3.3). Refer to notes below Table 3.5 for a full description of the control variables.
Experience profiles in this regression are generated by replacing year-of-experience dummy
variables from the restricted specification with a quartic in each of the four dimensions
of experience (general, subject, level, and subject-level). Experience is measured as the
total number of prior years in which the classroom’s teacher taught at least one class at
all (Col. 1) or in the subject (Col. 2), level (Col. 3), or subject-level (Col. 4) associated
with the current classroom observation. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the
teacher level. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and *
respectively. See Section 3.2 for methodological details.
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Table F.18: Effect of Years of General, Subject-Specific, Level-Specific, and Subject-Level-Specific
Experience on Student Test Scores (Restricted Specification Featuring Quartics in Each Dimension
of Context-Specific Experience: Predicted Values for First 10 Years of Experience)
Years
Experience
General Subject Level Subj.-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pred. Exp. in Years 1 0.050*** 0.016** 0.003 0.007
[0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007]
Pred. Exp. in Years 2 0.078*** 0.027** 0.001 0.011
[0.013] [0.011] [0.012] [0.010]
Pred. Exp. in Years 3 0.092*** 0.032** -0.002 0.014
[0.016] [0.013] [0.014] [0.011]
Pred. Exp. in Years 4 0.098*** 0.034** -0.005 0.015
[0.017] [0.015] [0.015] [0.013]
Pred. Exp. in Years 5 0.099*** 0.032* -0.006 0.014
[0.018] [0.016] [0.016] [0.014]
Pred. Exp. in Years 6 0.100*** 0.027 -0.005 0.013
[0.020] [0.018] [0.017] [0.016]
Pred. Exp. in Years 7 0.101*** 0.019 -0.002 0.013
[0.022] [0.021] [0.019] [0.019]
Pred. Exp. in Years 8 0.105*** 0.009 0.004 0.014
[0.024] [0.025] [0.021] [0.022]
Pred. Exp. in Years 9 0.110*** -0.004 0.010 0.019
[0.027] [0.029] [0.024] [0.027]
Pred. Exp. in Years 10 0.116*** -0.018 0.016 0.030
[0.030] [0.034] [0.027] [0.032]
Notes: N = 61, 993 test-score-weighted classroom observations. The outcome is the class
average of student standardized test scores in the subject. Restricted Specification refers to
equation (3.3). Refer to notes below Table 3.5 for a full description of the control variables.
Experience profiles in this regression are generated by replacing year-of-experience dummy
variables from the restricted specification with a quartic in each of the four dimensions of
experience (general, subject, level, and subject-level). Predicted values are used for the first
10 years of experience in each dimension. Experience is measured as the total number of
prior years in which the classroom’s teacher taught at least one class at all (Col. 1) or in
the subject (Col. 2), level (Col. 3), or subject-level (Col. 4) associated with the current
classroom observation. Standard errors (in brackets) are calculated by applying the delta
method to the cluster-robust standard errors for the experience estimates from Table F.17,
which were clustered at the teacher level. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are
represented by ***, **, and * respectively. See Section 3.2 for methodological details.
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Table F.19: Average Accumulated Marginal Effects Derived from Non-Parametric Experience Pro-
duction Function (Full Specification with Year-Based Definition of Experience)
Years
Experience
General Subject Level Subj.-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 yr 0.021*** 0.024** 0.006 0.014**
[0.007] [0.013] [0.012] [0.007]
2 yrs 0.073** 0.043** 0.006 0.016*
[0.033] [0.019] [0.018] [0.012]
3 yrs 0.076** 0.080*** 0.016 0.016
[0.044] [0.026] [0.023] [0.017]
4 yrs 0.073** 0.094*** 0.030 0.019
[0.044] [0.032] [0.028] [0.021]
5-6 yrs 0.097** 0.098*** 0.051** 0.018
[0.047] [0.039] [0.031] [0.024]
7-10 yrs 0.114** 0.117*** 0.035 0.016
[0.050] [0.049] [0.034] [0.028]
11-14 yrs 0.128*** 0.135*** 0.072** 0.007
[0.053] [0.056] [0.041] [0.037]
Notes: Refer to the notes below Table 3.5 for a full description of the control variables.
Experience profiles are generated by integrating partial derivatives of extra experience in each
experience dimension, evaluated at each level of experience, over all the levels of experience.
These partial derivatives are derived from a smoothed version of the non-parametrically
estimated production function for experience gains described in equation (3.13). Experience
is measured as the total number of prior years in which the classroom’s teacher taught at
least one class at all (Col. 1) or in the subject (Col. 2), level (Col. 3), or subject-level
(Col. 4) associated with the current classroom observation. Standard errors (in brackets)
are calculated by applying the delta method to the cluster-robust standard errors for the
experience-cell fixed effects, which were clustered at the teacher level. Significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. See D.2 for methodological
details.
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Table F.20: Average Accumulated Marginal Effects Derived from Non-Parametric Experience Pro-
duction Function (Restricted Specification with Year-Based Definition of Experience)
Years
Experience
General Subject Level Subj.-Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 yr 0.017*** 0.029*** 0.020*** 0.013***
[0.004] [0.007] [0.006] [0.004]
2 yrs 0.062*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.017***
[0.016] [0.010] [0.009] [0.005]
3 yrs 0.052** 0.058*** 0.025** 0.015**
[0.027] [0.013] [0.011] [0.008]
4 yrs 0.041* 0.067*** 0.020** 0.014*
[0.027] [0.016] [0.012] [0.010]
5-6 yrs 0.096*** 0.065*** 0.025** 0.015*
[0.027] [0.020] [0.014] [0.011]
7-10 yrs 0.092*** 0.065*** 0.011 0.011
[0.031] [0.025] [0.016] [0.014]
11-14 yrs 0.116*** 0.069** 0.059*** 0.005
[0.036] [0.031] [0.020] [0.027]
Notes: Refer to the notes below Table 3.6 for a full description of the control variables.
Experience profiles are generated by integrating partial derivatives of extra experience in each
experience dimension, evaluated at each level of experience, over all the levels of experience.
These partial derivatives are derived from a smoothed version of the non-parametrically
estimated production function for experience gains described in equation (3.13), but where
the school-teacher-subject-level fixed effects µsrjl are restricted to be common across subject-
levels within a school-teacher combination: µsrjl = µ¯st ∀ (j, l) and (s, r). Experience is
measured as the total number of prior years in which the classroom’s teacher taught at
least one class at all (Col. 1) or in the subject (Col. 2), level (Col. 3), or subject-level
(Col. 4) associated with the current classroom observation. Standard errors (in brackets)
are calculated by applying the delta method to the cluster-robust standard errors for the
experience-cell fixed effects, which were clustered at the teacher level. Significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels are represented by ***, **, and * respectively. See D.2 for methodological
details.
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Table F.21: Counterfactual Simulations: Achievement Gains from Optimal Allocation Relative to
Actual and Random Allocations Separately by Field (Year-Based Measure of Experience, Excluding
Teachers Without Full Histories)
Math Science Social Studies
Eligible
Teach.
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
Actual Random Actual Random Actual Random Actual Random Actual Random Actual Random
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2
Total .015 .018 .016 .021 .017 .026 .017 .028 .018 .027 .019 .028
Talent .015 .015 .015 .017 .019 .021 .020 .022 .020 .022 .020 .022
Exper. -.000 .003 .000 .004 -.002 .005 -.003 .005 -.002 .004 -.001 .005
3
Total .029 .035 .030 .041 .024 .040 .026 .041 .025 .034 .027 .038
Talent .029 .031 .030 .034 .026 .033 .027 .033 .026 .029 .027 .029
Exper. -.000 .004 .000 .007 -.002 .006 -.001 .008 -.001 .005 .000 .008
4
Total .033 .043 .035 .045 .030 .043 .032 .044 .031 .038 .033 .044
Talent .034 .039 .034 .036 .032 .034 .032 .033 .032 .032 .032 .034
Exper. -.001 .004 .001 .009 -.002 .009 -.000 .011 -.001 .006 .001 .010
5-6
Total .041 .049 .043 .051 .034 .050 .037 .052 .038 .046 .040 .053
Talent .041 .044 .041 .042 .036 .039 .037 .039 .038 .039 .038 .042
Exper. -.000 .005 .002 .009 -.002 .011 .000 .013 -.000 .007 .002 .011
7-10
Total .039 .049 .042 .054 .041 .051 .044 .057 .037 .046 .038 .050
Talent .039 .042 .039 .043 .043 .040 .044 .042 .036 .038 .036 .038
Exper. .000 .007 .003 .012 -.002 .011 .000 .015 .001 .009 .002 .012
11+
Total .042 .053 .045 .064 — — — — .039 .052 .038 .045
Talent .039 .044 .039 .048 — — — — .037 .039 .037 .029
Exper. .003 .009 .005 .016 — — — — .003 .013 .001 .017
Notes: Each cell presents simulated achievement gains from the optimal allocation of teachers to classrooms relative to either the observed allocation (in
columns labeled “Actual”) or a randomly selected feasible allocation (columns labeled “Random”) among all school-year-field combinations with the number
of eligible teachers specified by the row label in the field specified by the column label. The top entry in each cell displays the total achievement gains,
while the middle and bottom entries display the components of the gains attributable to task-specific experience and task-specific talent, respectively. Static
refers to simulations in which teacher experience stocks are held fixed as they were in the actual sample through year t− 1 prior to simulated reassignment
in year t. Dynamic refers to simulations in which teacher experience stocks used as the basis for simulated reassignment in year t are based on simulated
assignments from 1995 through year t− 1. See Section 3.7.1 and Appendix Section F for further detail about simulation methodology. A teacher is eligible
for reassignment if their full teaching history is observed in the data. Estimates of gains from task-specific experience and of teachers’ task-specific talent
are derived from the Full Specification (equation (3.13)). The principal incorporates information from empirical Bayes posterior beliefs about each teacher’s
task-specific talent based on our school-teacher-subject-level fixed effect estimates for any school-teacher-subject-level combination that is observed in our
sample. We assign task-specific productivities of 0 for any school-teacher-subject-level combination that we do not observe.
253
Figure F.1: Tests for Dynamic Course Assignment Responses to Unobserved Time-Varying En-
dogenous Inputs
(a) Temp. Break from Teaching (General) (b) Temp. Break from Teaching (Subject)
(c) Temporary Break from Teaching (Level) (d) Temporary Break from Teaching (SL)
(e) Last Year of Teaching (General) (f) Last Year Teaching (Subject)
(g) Last Year Teaching (Level) (h) Last Year Teaching (Subject-Level)
Notes: Figures display average school-teacher-year residuals (Figures F.1a and F.1e), school-teacher-subject-year residuals (Figures F.1b
and F.1f), school-teacher-level-year residuals (Figures F.1c and F.1g), and school-teacher-subject-level-year residuals (Figures F.1d and
F.1h), respectively, in the years leading up to a change in classroom assignment (using residuals from the Restricted Specification).
Restricted Specification refers to a specification in which the school-teacher-subject-level fixed effects µsrjl from Equation (3.2) are
restricted to be common across subject-levels within a school-teacher combination: µsrjl = µ¯st ∀ (j, l) and (s, r). A permanent change
in general course assignment (F.1e) is defined as a teacher-year combination in which the teacher is not observed teaching any course in
a subsequent sample year. A permanent change in subject assignment (F.1f) is defined as a teacher-subject-year combination in which
the teacher teaches the chosen subject, but is not observed teaching the chosen subject again in subsequent sample years. Permanent
changes in level (F.1g) and subject-level (F.1h) assignments are defined analogously to permanent subject changes. Temporary changes
in assignment are defined in a similar manner as permanent course assignment changes, except the teacher is observed returning to
teach (F.1a) or teach in the chosen subject (F.1b), level (F.1c), or subject-level (F.1d) in a subsequent sample year. Bootstrap standard
errors (in brackets) are computed using 1,000 iterations.
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Table F.22: Counterfactual Simulations: Fraction of Classrooms Reallocated (Year-Based Measure
of Experience, Excluding Teachers Without Full Histories)
Math Science Social Studies
Eligible
Teachers
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2 0.253 0.303 0.230 0.329 0.267 0.317
3 0.331 0.391 0.337 0.412 0.370 0.444
4 0.404 0.449 0.410 0.482 0.422 0.479
5-6 0.428 0.469 0.434 0.505 0.463 0.518
7-10 0.427 0.469 0.484 0.574 0.488 0.542
11+ 0.456 0.519 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.540
Notes: Each cell presents the fraction of classroom assignments in which a reallocation takes place (i.e. the simulated
teacher assignment does not match the actual teacher assignment) among all school-year-field combinations with the
number of eligible teachers specified by the row label in the field specified by the column label. Static refers to simulations
in which teacher experience stocks are held fixed as they were in the actual sample through year t− 1 prior to simulated
reassignment in year t. Dynamic refers simulations in which teacher experience stocks used as the basis for simulated
reassignment in year t are based on simulated assignments from 1995 through year t−1. See Section 3.7.1 and Appendix
Section F for further detail about simulation methodology. A teacher is eligible for reassignment if their full teaching
history is observed in the data.
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Table F.23: Counterfactual Simulations: Achievement Gains from Optimal Allocation Relative to





Actual Random Actual Random
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2
Total .005 .010 .005 .011
Talent .004 .005 .004 .005
Exper. .001 .005 .000 .006
3
Total .011 .018 .011 .021
Talent .010 .010 .011 .011
Exper. .001 .008 .001 .010
4
Total .014 .023 .014 .027
Talent .012 .014 .012 .014
Exper. .001 .010 .001 .013
5-6
Total .018 .030 .019 .034
Talent .017 .018 .017 .018
Exper. .001 .011 .002 .016
7-10
Total .022 .034 .023 .040
Talent .020 .021 .020 .021
Exper. .002 .013 .003 .019
11+
Total .023 .035 .025 .042
Talent .020 .021 .020 .021
Exper. .003 .014 .004 .021
Notes: Each cell presents simulated achievement gains from the optimal allocation of teachers to classrooms relative to either the observed
allocation (in columns labeled “Actual”) or a randomly selected feasible allocation (columns labeled “Random”) among all school-year-
field combinations with the number of eligible teachers specified by the row label. Classroom-level gains are pooled across the three
fields (math, science, and social studies). The top entry in each cell displays the total achievement gains, while the middle and bottom
entries display the contribution to this total of gains from task-specific experience and task-specific talent, respectively. Static refers to
simulations in which teacher experience stocks are held fixed as they were in the actual sample through year t − 1 prior to simulated
reassignment in year t. Dynamic refers to simulations in which teacher experience stocks used as the basis for simulated reassignment in
year t are based on simulated assignments from 1995 through year t−1. See Section 3.7.1 and Appendix Section F for further detail about
simulation methodology. Eligible teachers consist of teachers who taught a test subject in the chosen school-year-field. Teachers who begin
teaching prior to 1995 for whom full teaching histories were not observed are assigned imputed teaching histories as of 1995. See Section
F for a description of the imputation procedure. Estimates of gains from task-specific experience and of teachers’ task-specific talent are
derived from the Full Specification (presented in equation (3.13)). The principal incorporates information from empirical Bayes posterior
beliefs about each teacher’s task-specific talent based on our school-teacher-subject-level fixed effect estimates for any school-teacher-
subject-level combination that is observed in our sample. We assign task-specific productivities of 0 for any school-teacher-subject-level
combination that we do not observe. 256
